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ABSTRACT 
 
The effect of innovation on the economy is increasingly obvious and important in many 
countries, including China. In order to encourage and sustain technological innovation, Small 
and Medium sized Enterprises (SMEs) are not only necessary but also vital. This dissertation 
presents an empirical study to test what critical measures the government should adopt and 
balance in order to efficiently pursue its goal of increasing innovation by SMEs. 
This dissertation focuses on the measures of intellectual property (IP), public sector, 
including the subsidies or grants from the government, as well as the private sector, indicating 
the financial tools as the main capital resources for technology companies. The government 
makes the rules and policies for both a market-oriented economy and a government-oriented 
economy. However, under both models, the government should craft meaningful rules and 
regulations that benefit SMEs. Accordingly, government regulators need to know whether they 
should encourage the free market further or pursue command and control in the 
government-dominated sector. This study will evaluate the flexibility of the different 
administrative systems, rules and regulations of IP, taxes, subsidies, financial markets, and other 
related government actions. 
This study will use panel data regressions to access the 140 public SMEs from two science 
parks in China, Zhongguan-Cun Science Park in Beijing and Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park in 
Shanghai. Its goal is to learn the efficiency of the variance of the rules and policies in their 
innovation between 2009 and 2013, especially when the rules and policies are criticized by other 
countries as a weak IP regime, over subsidies, weak lender protection and bad enforcement of 
financial contract. Moreover, this study will also use difference-in-difference estimations to 
study the impact of the 2011 tax policy changes in China and the 2012 patent subsidy policy 
change in Shanghai on the innovation, market performance and patenting behaviors of the 140 
SMEs. 
Zhongguan-Cun Science Park and Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park are two national model 
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technical industry parks, and they include most of the enterprises that develop technologies in 
Beijing or Shanghai. Usually, various types of national favoring policies apply to the firms in 
these two science parks ahead of the science parks in the other provinces in China. Their 
administrative measures are tested and analyzed, and the most successful and innovative 
measures are then applied to other science parks.  
Regardless of the effective measures that had caused the successful growth of the domestic 
companies, the Chinese government has continued to provide funding, offering subsidies and 
attractive regulations for them. The main objective of the policies in the two parks is to create 
and to facilitate technical SMEs' survival and growth. The government also understands the 
important of the capital from the financial market, so it is providing guide funds and policies 
governing the financial market. In addition, the government is also guiding companies to use IP 
regimes to improve their ability to compete and the government expects original innovations 
from them to improve China’s ability to compete and innovate in the technology sector in a time 
of globalization. However, the costs of different measures are different, so it is necessary for the 
government to identify the most efficient strategies to encourage SMEs' creation. Hence, besides 
independently testing the efficiency of each approach of the policies, this study combines and 
compares the efficiency of the three approaches of policies in stimulating the SME to innovate. 
The results from this work will not only help the government of China to understand the 
strategies adopted by the two cities for stimulating technical innovation by SMEs, but it will also 
help to engineer similar science parks in the other provinces. In addition, this work will help 
other developing countries to learn effective strategies involving policies, laws and regulations to 
create SMEs, and to simultaneously develop technological innovation and the economies of their 
countries. 
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CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 
Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) play a critical role in the development of the 
economy.1 As “the engine of an economy,” SMEs are responsible for a large part of exports and 
imports of goods in many countries. Also, “they are an essential source of jobs, create 
entrepreneurial spirit and innovation and are thus crucial for fostering competitiveness and 
employment.”2 
Over the past 30-40 years, many western governments have identified startups and SMEs 
as significant components in economic strategies to create employment, increase productivity 
and commercialize innovations.3 Among all the industries in the U.S. in 1982, SMEs accounted 
for 94.2% of all firms, 21.4% of sales, and 28.9% of employment in manufacturing. 4 
Simultaneously, about 60% of the positions of employment in the areas involving cutting-edge 
technology are created by SMEs in Japan,5 and SMEs provide 80% positions of employment in 
China.6 In a global scale, SMEs on average account for approximately 60% of manufacturing 
employment.7   
The degree of the importance of SMEs on economy, however, depends on their growth 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	   Stephane	  Rousseau,	  “The	  Future	  of	  Capital	  Formation	  for	  Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises:	  Rethinking	  Initial	  Public	  2	   The	  European	  Commission,	  User	  Guide	  to	  the	  SME	  Definition,	  2003,	  35,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://ec.europa.eu/growth/index_en.htm.	   	  3	   Sue	  Birley	  and	  Paul	  Westhead,	  “Growth	  and	  Performance	  Contrasts	  Between	  ‘types’	  of	  Small	  Firms,”	  Strategic	  
Management	  JournalM	  11	  (1990):	  535.	  Also	  see,	  Stephen	  Barkoczy	  and	  Peter	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  Intertax	  37,	  no.	  1	  (2009):	  56.	   	  4	   Charles	  P.	  Himmelberg	  and	  Bruce	  C.	  Petersen,	  “R&D	  and	  Internai	  Finance:	  A	  Panel	  Study	  of	  Small	  Firms	  in	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries.,”	  The	  Review	  of	  Economics	  and	  Statistics	  76,	  no.	  1	  (1994):	  49.	   	   	  5	   Eric	  C	  Sibbitt,	  “Law,	  Venture	  Capital,	  and	  Entrepreneurism	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	  Generation	  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses,”	  Conn.	  J.	  Int’l	  L.	  13	  (n.d.):	  61.	   	  6	   Xiulin	  Pan	  (潘秀林)	  and	  Gu	  Yu(谷裕),	  “Shangwubu	  Buzhang	  Zhuli:	  Zhongguo	  Zhongxiaoqiye	  Tigong	  80%	  Jiuye	  Jihui	  (商
务部部长助理：中国中小企业提供 80%就业机会)[The	  Minister	  Assitance	  of	  He	  P.R.C.	  Ministry	  of	  Commerce:	  China’s	  SMEs	  Provide	  80%	  Employment	  Opportunities],”	   Wangyi	  Caijing(网易财经)[Wangyi	  Finance],	  2010,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://money.163.com/10/0701/11/6AGLACJ000254IH0.html.	  7	   Thorsten	  Beck,	  Asli	  D.	  Kunt,	  and	  Maria	  Soledad	  Martinez	  Peria,	  Bank	  Financing	  for	  SMEs	  around	  the	  World:	  Drivers,	  
Obstacles,	  Business	  Models,	  and	  Lending	  Practices,	  World	  Bank	  Policy	  Research	  Working	  Paper	  Series,	  2008,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://scholar.google.com/scholar?hl=en&btnG=Search&q=intitle:Bank+Financing+for+SMEs+around+the+World#2.	  1.	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capabilities.8 Despite a high proportion that SMEs account for firms in the market, the failure 
rate of SMEs is also very high. “95% of new businesses fail within the first five years.”9 In the 
past 5-10 years, the failure rate of startups was around 80% in the U.S., 42% in Australia and 50% 
in the U.K.10 In the context of China, the average life length of an SME is only 2.5 years.11 In 
order to develop and survive, SMEs need to innovate to improve their competitiveness through 
developing new or improved technologies.12 A survey in Belgium has revealed that research and 
development (R&D) support can increase sales to roughly 19%.13 
On the other side, R&D spending by its own is significant to the development of the 
economy.14 In the U.S., R&D spending is between $300 billion and $400 billion per year and 
accounts for roughly 2.7% of GDP.15  Even though R&D spending usually is concentrated in 
developed countries,16 there is empirical evidence suggesting a positive correlation between 
GDP per capita and R&D in both OECD and non-OECD countries.17  
In order to encourage and sustain innovation and its pivotal role in national growth, SMEs 
are not only necessary but also vital. SMEs' business structure has highly flexible and intensive 
human dimensions in both the horizontal and the vertical branches, which create strong 
interconnection through the formal and informal elements and intensive decisional centralization 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	   Rousseau,	  “The	  Future	  of	  Capital	  Formation	  for	  Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises:	  Rethinking	  Initial	  Public	  Offering	  Regulation	  after	  the	  Restructuring	  of	  Canadian,”	  665.	   	  9	   Moya	  K.	  Mason,	  “What	  Causes	  Small	  Business	  to	  Fail?,”	  2009.	  10	   Mark	  Pizzacalla,	  “SME	  ‘Life	  Cycle’	  Imperative,”	  Austl.	  Tax	  F.	  27	  (2012):	  195.	   	  11	   Yang	  Fu	  (傅洋),	  “Diaocha	  Xianshi	  Zhongguo	  Zhongxiao	  Qiye	  Pingjun	  Shouming	  Jin	  2.5	  Nian(调查显示中国中小企业平
均寿命仅 2.5年)[Survey	  Shows	  That	  the	  Life	  Length	  of	  SMEs	  in	  China	  on	  Average	  Is	  Only	  2.6	  Year],”	   Beijing	  Wanbao(北
京晚报)[Beijing	  Evening	  Paper],	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://finance.people.com.cn/n/2012/0903/c70846-­‐18906006.html.	  12	   U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce,	  The	  Competitiveness	  and	  Innovative	  Capacity	  of	  the	  United	  States,	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.esa.doc.gov/sites/default/files/thecompetitivenessandinnovativecapacityoftheunitedstates.pdf.	  13	   Bart	  Clarysse,	  Valentijn	  Bilsen,	  and	  Geert	  Steurs,	  “Behavioural	  Additionality	  of	  the	  R&D	  Subsidies	  Programme	  of	  IWT-­‐Flanders	  (Belgium),”	  in	  Government	  R&D	  Funding	  and	  Company	  Behaviour:	  Measuring	  Behavioural	  Additionality,	  2006,	  92–114.	  14	   Andrew	  Metrick	  and	  Ayako	  Yasuda,	  Venture	  Capital	  &	  the	  Finance	  of	  Innovation,	  2nd	  editio	  (John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  Inc.,	  2011),	  339.	   	  15	   Ibid.	  16	   Ibid.	   	  17	   Hulya	  Ulku,	  R&D,	  Innovation,	  and	  Economic	  Growth:	  An	  Empirical	  Analysis,	  2004,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2004/wp04185.pdf,	  27.	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so that innovations could be realized effectively and efficiently.18 
The World Bank’s data show that the SMEs in the U.S. have continually increased their 
share of total industrial R&D during the last two decades. The same trend also appears to be 
occurring in China. For example, the data from the P.R.C. Industrial and Commercial Bureau 
suggest that in 2007, the China’s SMEs accounted for 65% of patent filings and 80% of new 
product development. However, while China is gradually transforming from an 
imitation-oriented country to an innovation-oriented country,19 innovation by SMEs is still 
relatively scant.  
One situation is that most of the SMEs in China are in the fields of processing and 
manufacturing, where few opportunities for innovation exist. Those process industries can bring 
many employment positions, but they cannot provide much of China’s innovative energy. Also, 
because labor costs there have surged up 20% a year in the past four to eight years in China,20 
some global companies are moving their processing plants to other countries. Therefore, the 
Chinese government is trying to shift the role of SMEs in its economy from the engine of 
manufacturing to the engine of technology.  
Moreover, most of the large enterprises in China are in the field of energy, real estate and 
finance, which are owned by the government. Most of the time, they are monopolies and control 
a vital segment of social resources; their impact on the economy is large because they have 
ultimate control of the resources due to their size and special relationship with the national, 
provincial, and local governments. Under this situation, these large monopolies do not have 
much incentive to innovate. Also, because their systems are huge and rigid, it is difficult for 
them to be flexible and efficient to conduct technical innovation. They do, however, act as 
venture capitalists for SMEs or buy patent licenses from them. Accordingly, China is a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	   Ovidiu	  Nicolescu,	  “Main	  Features	  of	  SMEs	  Organisation	  System,”	  Review	  of	  International	  Comparative	  Management	  10,	  no.	  3	  (2009):	  405,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://rmci.ase.ro/ro/no10vol3/Vol10_No3_Article1.pdf.	   	  19	   Yahong	  Li,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries	  in	  China,”	  Or.	  Rev.	  Int’I	  L.	  13	  (2011):	  265.	   	  20	   Shaun	  Rein,	  “The	  End	  of	  Cheap	  China,”	  The	  Economist,	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016，http://www.economist.com/node/21549956.	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prominent example of a developing country to be studied with about innovation by SMEs.  
With respect to the demands of innovation by SMEs for the development of the economy, 
in 2014, the Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proposed “mass entrepreneurship and innovation,” 
which was authorized by the P.R.C. State Council to promote entrepreneurship and innovation 
by any people and in any industries in that following year. 21   In other countries, the 
governments also have adopted various policies to support the survival and innovation of SMEs. 
The U.S. government, for example, established the Small Business Association (SBA) in 1953.22 
Germany also has similar programs to facilitate the growth of SMEs and their innovations, such 
as the European Recovery Program (ERP), which was started in 1947, and Equity Stock 
Companies (Kapitalbeteiligungsgesellschaften), which were initiated in the 1950s and 1960s. 23 
In a long history, since SMEs have a significant impact on economy, and the growth and 
innovation of SMEs bolster the growth of the economy, it is meaningful to study how SMEs are 
stimulated to innovate. There are usually three key measures–government supports, intellectual 
property (IP), and financing. This dissertation follows the three tracks to study the critical and 
complementary measures discussed above in the context of China.    
Chapter 2 explains the impact of government supports on the innovations by SMEs. SMEs 
face to various types of business risks, such as the economy environment, the industry entrance, 
and other unique risks, so as to be difficult to survive on its own.24 In order to induce them to 
innovate and finally succeed to survive, the government subsidizes them and their innovations.25 
The most critical subsidy is through tax credits that are directly provided to SMEs or some 
external connections regarding their financing or market.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  21	   Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Guowu	  Yuan(中华人民共和国国务院)[The	  State	  Councile	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Guowuyuan	  
Guanyu	  Dali	  Tuijin	  Dazhong	  Chuangye	  Wanzhong	  Chuangxin	  Ruogan	  Zhengce	  Cuoshi	  De	  Yijian[国务院关于大力推荐大众创
业万众创新若干政策的意见](The	  Oppinions	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  on	  Several	  Policies	  about	  Strongly	  Recommending	  Mass	  
Entrepreneurship	  and	  Innovation),	  2015.	  22	   Mark	  Pizzacalla,	  “Global	  SME	  Tax	  Policy	  Conundrum,”	  Austl.	  Tax	  F.	  23	  (2008):	  54,	  http://heinonlinebackup.com/hol-­‐cgi-­‐bin/get_pdf.cgi?handle=hein.journals/austraxrum23&section=7.	   	  23	   Leslie	  a.	  Jeng	  and	  Philippe	  C.	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  Journal	  
of	  Corporate	  Finance	  6,	  no.	  3	  (September	  2000):	  282.	   	   	  24	   Pizzacalla,	  “SME	  ‘Life	  Cycle’	  Imperative,”	  191.	   	  25	   Edmund	  W.	  Kitch,	  “The	  Nature	  and	  Function	  of	  the	  Patent	  System,”	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Economics	  20	  (1977):	  288.	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The SMEs in different stages of development could be affected by tax credits to different 
degrees.26 For some SMEs, tax incentives may not be effective enough to improve their R&D, 
especially under the globalization when multiple governments provide various categories of tax 
credits at different levels to attract and promote innovation.27  
Moreover, funding is another critical measure broadly undertaken by the government to 
stimulate innovation by SMEs and improve their R&D capabilities and R&D commercialization 
as functional as sales do.28 However, while R&D funding has similar effects to promote 
innovation by SMEs as tax credits do, or R&D funding even has stronger effects than the tax 
credits, as a result of the low possibility of their survival and spillovers of technology,29 it is still 
a hazard how effective this measure is.30 For example, the EU government believes that 
government funding is a necessary condition to induce SMEs to conduct innovation and 
significantly improves their R&D capabilities.31 Meanwhile, it is inevitable that information 
asymmetry issues result in the failures of government funding to SMEs.32 Therefore, the 
efficiency of various categories should be measured case-by-case. For the ambitions of the 
Chinese government, the possibilities of the SMEs in its market and their gap with the innovative 
SMEs in developed countries, Chapter 2 analyzes the various types of government supports, 
including grants, tax credits, prizes and other subsidies. It then combines the theories in the 
context of China with empirical evidence.  
The government also designs IP regimes as a kind of instrumental regulation to promote 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  26	   Pizzacalla,	  “SME	  ‘Life	  Cycle’	  Imperative,”	  176.	  27	   Kenneth	  M	  Brown,	  “The	  Elusive	  Carrot :	  Tax	  Incentives	  for	  R	  &	  D,”	  Regulation	  8,	  no.	  1	  (1984):	  33–38.	  28	   Jari	  Hyvarinen,	  “Behavioural	  Additionality	  of	  Public	  R&D	  Funding	  in	  Finland,”	  in	  Government	  R&D	  Funding	  and	  
Company	  Behaviour:	  Measuring	  Behavioural	  Additionality,	  2006,	  115–26.	  29	   Bo	  Zhao	  and	  Rosemarie	  Ziedonis,	  State	  Governments	  as	  Financiers	  of	  Technology	  Startups:	  Implications	  for	  Firm	  
Performance,	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2060739.	  30	   Rahel	  Falk,	  “Behaviroual	  Additionality	  of	  Austria’s	  Industrial	  Research	  Promotion	  Fund	  (FFF),”	  in	  Government	  R&D	  
Funding	  and	  Company	  Behaviour:	  Measuring	  Behavioural	  Additionality	  (Paris:	  OECD,	  2006),	  59–74,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2014/article_0018.html.	  31	   Wolfgang	  Polt	  and	  Foteini	  Psarra,	  “Behavioural	  Additionality	  of	  the	  EU’s	  5th	  Framework	  Programme,”	  in	  Government	  
R&D	  Funding	  and	  Company	  Behaviour:	  Measuring	  Behavioural	  Additionality,	  2006,	  235–46.	  32	   Scott	  J.	  Wallsten,	  “The	  R&D	  Boondoggle,”	  Regulation	  23,	  no.	  4	  (2000):	  12–16.	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innovation,33 but the importance and the efficiency of the formal protection by patents for 
technologies is also controversial.34 Therefore, Chapter 3 studies the efficiency of IP regimes on 
stimulating innovation by SMEs. 
 In the recent years, the patent applications in China have dramatically grown and China 
even drives the global patent application growth.35 Based on the statistics by the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) in 2013, the filed patent applications in China 
accounted for a third of the world’s 2.6 million patent applications, and China has become the 
third largest country with patent application filings, ranking after the U.S. and Japan. Over 84 
percent of the local patent applications in China were filed by firms and particularly in some 
cities, and the statistics by the Industrial and Commercial Bureau of China show that over 60 
percent of the patent applications were filed by SMEs.36 
 Nevertheless, patents are not exactly equal to innovation and also incapable to completely 
represent the outcomes of R&D.37 Patenting propensity varies among firms,38 and it may also 
not be relevant to the increase of the strength of IP protection.39 A survey by Acs and Audretsch 
shows that in different technological and economic environments, the considerations of small 
and large firms to utilize patents to protect invention outcomes are different.40 According to the 
complexity of the theories and practice on how IPRs provide innovation incentives to SMEs, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	   Daniel	  Gervais,	  “Of	  Clusters	  and	  Assumptions:	  Innovation	  as	  Part	  of	  a	  Full	  TRIPS	  Implementation,”	  Fordham	  Law	  
Review	  77,	  no.	  5	  (2009):	  2377.	   	  34	   Brownyn	  Hall	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Choice	  between	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Intellectual	  Property:	  A	  Review,”	  Journal	  of	  Economic	  
Literature	  52,	  no.	  2	  (2014):	  376,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://128.32.105.3/~bhhall/papers/HHRS13_IP_choice_lit_survey.pdf..	  35	   World	  Intellectual	  Property	  Organization	  (WIPO),	  Global	  Intellectual	  Property	  Filings	  Up	  in	  2013,	  China	  Drives	  Patent	  
Application	  Growth,	  2014.	  36	   Jianguo	  Zhao	  (赵建国),	  “Gongxinbu	  Guozhiju:	  Zhongxiao	  Qiye	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Zhanlue	  Tuijin	  Gongcheng	  Xian	  Chengxiao(工信部、国知局：中小企业知识产权战略推进工程显成效)[The	  Industrial	  and	  Commercial	  Bureau	  and	  SIPO:	  The	  Project	  of	  Promoting	  SMEs’	   IP	  Strategies	  Shows	  Achievements],”	   Guojia	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Bao(国家知识产权
报)[China	  Report	  Intellectual	  Property],	  2014,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.nipso.cn/onews.asp?id=22189.	  37	   Zoltan	  J.	  Acs	  and	  David	  B.	  Audretsch,	  “Innovation	  in	  Large	  and	  Small	  Firms:	  An	  Empirical	  Analysis,”	  The	  American	  
Economic	  Review	  78,	  no.	  4	  (1988):	  688.	  38	   Hall	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Choice	  between	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Intellectual	  Property:	  A	  Review,”	  394.	  39	   Samuel	  Kortum	  and	  Josh	  Lerner,	  “Stronger	  Protection	  or	  Technological	  Revolution:	  What	  Is	  Behind	  the	  Recent	  Surge	  in	  Patenting?,”	  in	  Carnegie-­‐Rochester	  Conference,	  1997.	  40	   Acs	  and	  Audretsch,	  “Innovation	  in	  Large	  and	  Small	  Firms:	  An	  Empirical	  Analysis,”	  688.	  
	   7	  
Chapter 3 uses empirical methods to analyze the IP regime in China for promoting innovation by 
SMEs. 
Besides government supports, the measures to finance R&D includes the internal financing 
by the profits as well as the external financing by bank loans, public equity market, venture 
capital (VC), and enterprise investors as alliances.41 Chapter 4 discusses how external financing 
impacts innovation by SMEs. 
The efficiency of the financial sector is significant to economic growth.42 In particular, 
venture capital has positive effects on creating jobs and promoting innovation.43 VC has 
successfully become the next rescuersalvation of the development of the economy after 
manufacturing and cheap labors.44 Data for the 1980s and the 1990s in the U.S. shows that 36.3 
percent of investments in the early-stage of SMEs were made by venture capitalists.45 
In developing countries, the requirements of public equity are too high to be satisfied by 
SMEs, so venture capital and private equity becomes popular.46 Statistics show that the VC 
market in developing countries is continuously growing and expanding, and follows the success 
of the VC market in the U.S.47 Beyond the capital contribution provided by the VCs, they also 
provide non-cash contributions, such as business management.48  
By contrast, debt financing may not be appropriate for innovative SMEs.49 Even though 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  41	   Metrick	  and	  Yasuda,	  Venture	  Capital	  &	  the	  Finance	  of	  Innovation,	  349.	  42	   Alison	  Harwood,	  “Financing	  Reform	  in	  Developing	  Countries,”	  in	  Sequencing?	  Financial	  Strategies	  for	  Developing	  
Countries,	  ed.	  Alison	  Harwood	  and	  Bruce	  L.R.	  Smith	  (Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  1997),	  70.	   	  43	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  242.	   	  44	   Ronald	  J.	  Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience,”	  Stanford	  Law	  Review	  55,	  no.	  November	  (2003):	  1124,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016，	  http://www.researchgate.net/publication/5197504_Further_Evidence_that_Legalized_Abortion_Lowered_Crime_A_Reply_to_Joyce/file/32bfe50e325f772809.pdf.	   	  45	   Paul	  Gompers	  et	  al.,	  Venture	  Capital	  Investment	  Cycle:	  The	  The	  Impact	  of	  Public	  Market,	  NBER	  Working	  Paper	  Series,	  n.d,	  9.	  46	   Josh	  Lerner,	  Felda	  Hardymon,	  and	  Ann	  Leamon,	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Book,	  fifth	  edit	  (John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  Inc.,	  2012),	  247-­‐248.	   	  47	   Ibid,	  243.	   	  48	   Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience,”	  1075.	  Also	  see,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  247.	  49	   P	  Winker,	  “Causes	  and	  Effects	  of	  Financing	  Constraints	  at	  the	  Firm	  Level,”	  Small	  Business	  Economics	  12,	  no.	  2	  (1999):	  170.	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the cost of equity financing is high for SMEs and entrepreneurs may be anxious about venture 
capitalists (VCs) who they are not familiar with, they may firstly try debt financing before equity 
financing,50 even if the cost of debt financing is not necessary lower than equity financing.51 
The interest for loans is dead lost for the debtors, and the increase of the interest negatively 
affects the business of the SME debtors.52  
On the other hand, since R&D is risky, it is hardly to predict its output when the investors 
invest in R&D projects.53 Investors usually do not invest in riskier investments when they 
evaluate their target firms.54 Meanwhile, some policymakers believe that it is safe to control the 
capital within various industries to develop economy, compared to the other types of market 
controls.55 Hence, all the external financing resources could be essential to SMEs and their 
innovation.  
In the face of globalization, U.S. investors have started investing more heavily in China's 
technology market.56 For example, Intel Capital recently invested $67 million in eight Chinese 
startups, and Dell Inc. pledged $125 billion of investments towards Chinese businesses, 
including technological components purchasing and manufacturing expenses.57 Corresponding 
to the entrance of foreign VCs, China can become a successful example of the development of 
the VC market in developing countries.58  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  50	   Elisabeth	  Mueller	  and	  Frank	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  Can	  Innovative	  Companies	  Better	  Cope	  with	  Loan	  
Denials?,	  ZEW	  (Centre	  for	  European	  Economic	  Research),	  2010,	  5,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00036846.2013.808314.	  51	   Bronwyn	  H.	  Hall,	  Investment	  and	  Research	  and	  Development	  at	  the	  Firm	  Level:	  Does	  the	  Source	  of	  Financing	  Matter,	  
WORKING	  PAPER,	  1992,	  10.	  52	   Winker,	  “Causes	  and	  Effects	  of	  Financing	  Constraints	  at	  the	  Firm	  Level,”	  170.	  53	   Kenneth	  J.	  Arrow,	  “Economic	  Welfare	  and	  the	  Allocation	  of	  Resources	  for	  Invention,”	  The	  Rate	  and	  Direction	  of	  
Inventive	  Activity:	  Economic	  and	  Social	  Factors	  I	  (1962):	  609–26.	  54	   Sibbitt,	  “Law,	  Venture	  Capital,	  and	  Entrepreneurism	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	  Generation	  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses,”	  85.	  55	   Curtis	  J.	  Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy,”	  J.	  Small	  &	  Emerging	  Bus.	  L.	  2	  (1998):	  185.	  56	   Runhua	  Wang,	  “Utility	  Models	  Revisited:	  The	  Case	  of	  Investing	  in	  China,”	  Elect.	  U.ILL.	  J.	  L.	  Tech.	  &	  Pol’y,	  2015,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://illinoisjltp.com/timelytech/utility-­‐models-­‐revisited-­‐the-­‐case-­‐of-­‐investing-­‐in-­‐china/.	  57	   Eva	  Dou,	  “Intel	  Capital	  Invests	  $67	  Million	  in	  Eight	  Chinese	  Startups,”	  The	  Wall	  Street	  Journal,	  2015,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.wsj.com/articles/intel-­‐capital-­‐invests-­‐67-­‐million-­‐in-­‐eight-­‐chinese-­‐startups-­‐1442492847.	  58	   Lerner,	  Hardymon,	  and	  Leamon,	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Book,	  253.	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As a developing country, China has a VC market that inevitably involves government 
direct funding, subsidies, state-owned VCs and state-owned enterprise investors. Chapter 4 
employs empirical methods to study the public SMEs in China and the association between their 
behaviors with respect to external financing and innovation, both of which essential conditions 
and significant outcomes for each other. Due to information asymmetries that are serious among 
high-tech SMEs,59 investors and debtors value the IPRs, the intangible assets, owned by the 
portfolio SMEs.60 Therefore, beyond the discussion of the association between innovation and 
external financing by SMEs, Chapter 4 also considers the effects of IPRs in the financing 
process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  59	   Himmelberg	  and	  Petersen,	  “R&D	  and	  Internai	  Finance:	  A	  Panel	  Study	  of	  Small	  Firms	  in	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries,”	  39.	   	  60	   Rainer	  Haselmann	  and	  Paul	  Wachtel,	  “Institutions	  and	  Bank	  Behavior,”	  in	  CEPR/EBRD	  Tokyo	  Conference,	  accessed	  January	  16,	  2015,	  http://web-­‐docs.stern.nyu.edu/old_web/emplibrary/ACFCwCg7O.pdf.	  Also	  see,	  Mariassunta	  Giannetti,	  “Do	  Better	  Institutions	  Mitigate	  Agency	  Problems?	  Evidence	  from	  Corporate	  Finance	  Choices,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Financial	  
and	  Quantitative	  Analysis	  38,	  no.	  1	  (March	  2003):	  185–212.	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CHAPTER TWO SUBSIDIES/GRANTS BY THE GOVERNMENTS & SMES’ TECHNICAL 
INNOVATION 
I. Literature Review - Government Involvements 
 
In this part, the literature argues how various government supporting policies or restrictions 
directly or indirectly have effects on the R&D activities in SMEs. Most of the literature proves 
the effects through statistical data or cross-country empirical analysis. Section 1 discusses some 
basic types of subsidies, such as tax credits, and subsidies as awards, prizes or small amount of 
compensation for creating innovation incentives. These subsidies are ex post and take a relatively 
small share of their cost of R&D.  
Comparatively, Section 2 presents how the government assists the investments in SMEs and 
their R&D projects and how their impressions are. The literature addresses that the government 
can directly fund the R&D in SMEs by grants, be their investors, or subsidize the financial 
markets to bridge SMEs and lenders or equity investors.  
 
1. Government Subsidies for SMEs and Their R&D Activities 
 
In the sense of administration, the government may protect SMEs’ interest for their 
demands in the market when they are competing with large enterprises.61 Thus, scholars always 
have enthusiasm to study how the government can efficiently support SMEs and their R&D 
activities through funding, subsidies, awards, and subsidizing policies, and they also argue 
whether or not SMEs need these various types of subsidies.  
This part firstly introduces the arguments on the effectiveness of tax credits by the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	   Lawrence	  Repeta,	  “The	  Small	  and	  Medium	  Enterprises	  Domain	  Protection	  Law	  of	  1977:	  Its	  Operation	  and	  Likely	  Effect,”	  
Law	  Japan	  10	  (1977):	  150.	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government on encouraging R&D. Then, it presents how the scholars suggest that governments 
in various economies should adopt an appropriate prize or subsidy regime to encourage R&D.    
 
1.1 Tax Credits 
 
    Many developed countries formulate tax policies as strategies to assist the survival and 
growth of SMEs.62 At a macro level, Pizzacalla believes that the Blair administration in the U.K. 
planned to build an SME friendly environment, so it removed tax barriers only for SMEs’ 
growth.63 Moreover, the U.S. federal tax reform in 1977 provided discriminated tax credits for 
different sizes of companies, although the recent tax reforms of the U.S. are more harmonized.64 
Pizzacalla argues that the discrimination in the tax policy is efficient; otherwise, the tax policy 
would not fill the “finance gap” of SMEs at their inception and survival stage.65 Also, he 
believes that the tax credits for the SMEs in expansion stage are considerable for their R&D 
activities.66 When Chinese governments are exploring specific policies to support SMEs doing 
technical innovations, Chen votes for tax reforms favoring SMEs because they are weak 
competitors in the market.67  
Pigou proposed to use taxes or subsidies to correct market failures and to improve the R&D 
incentives of innovators.68 The economic logic is that the subsidies adding on to the private 
return of R&D increase their total return, which compensates the innovators in a higher level.69 
However, how efficient the tax incentives are on R&D is always a question. For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	   Pizzacalla,	  “Global	  SME	  Tax	  Policy	  Conundrum,”	  54.	  63	   Ibid.	  70-­‐72,	  78.	   	  64	   Ibid.	  71.	   	  65	   Pizzacalla,	  “SME	  ‘Life	  Cycle’	  Imperative,”	  201.	   	  66	   Ibid.	  204	  67	   Jianlin	  Chen,	  “Challenges	  in	  Designing	  Public	  Procerement	  Linkages:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  SMEs	  Preference	  in	  China’s	  Government	  Procurement,”	  UCLA	  Pac.	  Basin	  L.	  J.	  30	  (2013):	  157.	   	  68	   Christine	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Mark	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth	  (Princeton	  University	  Press,	  2010),	  24.	  69	   Bronwyn	  H	  Hall,	  “R&D	  Tax	  Policy	  during	  the	  90s:	  Success	  or	  Failure?,”	  in	  Tax	  Policy	  and	  the	  Economy,	  vol.	  7	  (MIT	  Press,	  1993),	  6.	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Connor claims that tax provisions did not have a substantial influence on innovation in many 
companies. 70  In Canada, the survey about Ontario innovative healthcare firms in 2008, 
conducted by Cumming and Johan, shows that these firms have little concerns about the tax 
credits.71 The firms affected by the removal of tax credits are the firms that had previously 
received a relatively great amount of capital from the institutions providing the tax credits.72 
Also, Brown suggests that the effects of tax incentives for R&D are merely procyclical.73 
Among the G5 countries, the U.S., Japan and France offer tax concessions to encourage 
R&D, but U.K. only provided these under size-discrimination (only to small firms) rather than 
for R&D demand until 2002, and Germany does not have a tax deduction mechanism with the 
both conditions. 74  The U.S. General Accounting Office reported that the research and 
experimentation tax credit created by Congress in 1981 stimulated between $1 billion and $2.5 
billion additional R&D spending at a cost of $7 billion in revenues foregone during the period of 
1981 to 1985.75 Also, Hall’s empirical study proves that $1 billion tax credits stimulated 
additional $2 billion R&D expenditure per year during 1980s in the U.S.76 Moreover, in 1970s, 
when South Korea’s economy grew because of the increasing number of private companies, they 
adopted government tax incentives to encourage their companies to do R&D.77 
Currently, most of OECD countries (Organization for Economic Co-operation and 
Development) use tax credits to subsidize firms for increasing their business profits and creating 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  70	   U.S.	  Department	  of	  Commerce,	  Technological	  Innovation:	  Its	  Environment	  and	  Management,	  1967,	  31.	   	  71	   Douglas	  Cumming	  and	  Sofia	  Johan,	  “Phasing	  Out	  an	  Inefficient	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Credit,”	  Journal	  of	  Industry,	  
Competition	  and	  Trade	  10,	  no.	  November	  2009	  (2010):	  249.	  The	  tax	  credits	  testified	  here	  are	  only	  the	  tax	  credits	  from	  the	  Labour	  Sponsored	  Venture	  Capital	  Corporations	  (LSVCC,	  also	  known	  as	  Labour	  Sponsored	  Investment	  Funds,	  or	  LSIFs),	  which	  have	  existed	  in	  the	  Province	  of	  Ontario	  since	  1992,	  the	  primary	  mechanism	  for	  supporting	  entrepreneurial	  finance	  by	  Canadian	  government.	   	  72	   Ibid.	  249.	  The	  organization	  is	  LSVCC.	   	  73	   Brown,	  “The	  Elusive	  Carrot :	  Tax	  Incentives	  for	  R	  &	  D,”	  38.	   	  74	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  25.	   	  75	   U.S.	  General	  Accounting	  Office,	  The	  Research	  Tax	  Credit	  Has	  Stimulated	  Some	  Additional	  Research	  Spending,	  
GAO/GGD-­‐8S-­‐114,	  1989,	  30.	  76	   Hall,	  “R&D	  Tax	  Policy	  during	  the	  90s:	  Success	  or	  Failure?”	  29.	   	  77	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  106.	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their R&D incentive, especially more on SMEs than large firms.78 In Ernst & Young’s study of 
OECD, the effects of tax incentives on R&D were positive in almost half of 23 countries over 
2006 to 2011.79 Hodzi’s empirical study on the cases in Austria and Croatia concludes that their 
tax incentive systems efficiently encourage R&D.80 Greenhalg, Rogers and Atkinson also 
believe that tax incentives are effective and significant policies in promoting innovation.81 For 
developing countries, Olwen suggests that they should have appropriate tax exceptions for local 
corporations to encourage them to provide free and open source software.82  
Hodzi, furthermore, emphasizes how political and economic system is important to the 
efficiency of the tax incentives for R&D.83 Similarly, Hall reminds that tax policy is a short-term 
policy, so its effects are not isolated but related with the whole corporate tax system. Hence, it is 
necessary to learn the interaction of various types of tax credits for encouraging different 
incentives, such as SMEs, R&D or investment.84    
 
1.2. Subsidies, Prizes or Rewards 
 
Fisher lists subsidies, and prizes or rewards as significant strategies of how governments 
encourage technical innovation.85 Hall uses economic models to explain how subsidies correct 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  78	   OECD,	  Tax	  Incentives	  for	  Research	  and	  Development :	  Trends	  and	  Issues,	  2002,	  2-­‐17.	   	  79	   Ernst	  &	  Young,	  OECD	  Issues	  New	  R&D	  Incentive	  Report,	  2014,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/OECD_issues_new_R_and_D_incentive_report/$FILE/2014G_CM4345_OECD	  issues	  new	  R	  and	  D	  incentive	  report.pdf.	  2.	   	  80	   Sabina	  Hodži,	  “Tax	  Incentives	  for	  Research	  and	  Development	  in	  South	  Africa,”	  Economic	  Thgouth	  and	  Practice,	  no.	  2	  (2013):	  413.	   	  81	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  324.	  Also	  see	  Robert	  D.	  Atkinson,	  “Expanding	  the	  R&E	  Tax	  Credit	  to	  Drive	  Innovation,	  Competitiveness	  and	  Prosperity,”	  Journal	  of	  Technology	  Transfer	  32,	  no.	  April	  (2007):	  617–28.	  82	   Rami	  M	  Olwan,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development :	  Theory	  and	  Practice	  (Springer	  Heidelberg	  New	  York	  Dordrecht	  London,	  2011),	  325,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://eprints.qut.edu.au/54839/.	  83	   Hodži,	  “Tax	  Incentives	  for	  Research	  and	  Development	  in	  South	  Africa,”	  413.	   	  84	   Hall,	  “R&D	  Tax	  Policy	  during	  the	  90s:	  Success	  or	  Failure?”	  30.	   	  85	   William	  Fisher,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  Theoretical,	  Empirical,	  and	  Historical	  Perspectives,”	  in	  New	  
Essays	  in	  the	  Legal	  and	  Political	  Theory	  of	  Property,	  ed.	  Stephen	  R.	  Munzer	  (Combrige	  University	  Press,	  2001),	  2.	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market failure to increase R&D investment of investors.86 Greenhalgh and Rogers point out that 
direct R&D subsidies and grants are important to provide firms incentives to innovate because of 
social benefits of the innovation and the limitation of social returns to their R&D from patents.87 
However, along with their understanding of the idea that the government can generally subsidize 
R&D, they also remind us the issue of information asymmetry, which causes the government 
impossible to fund specific invention.88  
In the face of globalization, Reichman, Rai, Newell and Wiener strongly recommend 
developing countries, which have relatively low market-driven inducement of innovation, to 
adopt a prize system to encourage original and initiative innovations.89 Actually, Olwan’s case 
study with Arab countries reports that indigenous people demand grants, subsidies, taxes, or 
screen quotas, without discrimination in category, to support the development of local 
communities.90  
Furthermore, Dosi and Stiglitz believe that a prize system can become an alternative to the 
patent system for providing R&D incentives, and its lower transaction cost makes it even much 
better than a patent system.91 Nevertheless, they still have a concern that the process of 
self-selection to prize by the government could disfavor smaller firms in reality.  
In specific cases, Maskus and Okediji believe that public subsidies are important to induce 
new technologies, especially patentable innovations in broader alternative energy technologies.92 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  86	   Hall,	  “R&D	  Tax	  Policy	  during	  the	  90s:	  Success	  or	  Failure?”	  6.	   	  87	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  53-­‐54,	  88,	  313.	  They	  also	  believe	  that	  it	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  government	  to	  consider	  offer	  subsidies	  to	  business	  R&D	  when	  they	  are	  building	  the	  national	  innovation	  system.	   	  88	   Ibid.	  317.	   	  89	   Jerome	  H.	  Reichman	  et	  al.,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Alternatives:	  Strategies	  for	  Green	  Innovation,”	  in	  Intellectual	  
Property	  Rights:	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  Challenges	  for	  Development,	  ed.	  Mario	  Cimoli	  et	  al.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  373.	   	  90	   Olwan,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development :	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  193.	  91	   Giovanni	  Dosi	  and	  Joseph	  E.	  Stiglitz,	  “The	  Role	  of	  IPRs	  in	  the	  Development	  Process,	  with	  Some	  Lessons	  from	  Developed	  Countries:	  An	  Introduction,”	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  Challenges	  for	  Development,	  ed.	  Mario	  Cimoli	  et	  al.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  28-­‐31.	   	  92	   Keith	  E.	  Maskus	  and	  Ruth	  L.	  Okediji,	  “Legal	  and	  Economic	  Perspectives	  on	  International	  Technology	  Transfer	  in	  Environmentally	  Sound	  Technologies,”	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  Challenges	  for	  Development,	  ed.	  Mario	  Cimoli	  et	  al.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  394.	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Comparatively, Burlamaqui and Cimoli treat subsidies as development rents, which a state needs 
credibility to withdraw when subsidized firms are underperformance, or as a permanent cost that 
infant industries could not mature will be added.93  
 
2. Government Direct Investment in SMEs: Grants and Funding 
 
SMEs have difficulties acquiring capital from financial markets. This section uses literature 
to show how government agencies and institutions directly funded SMEs and their innovations, 
and Chapter 4 further discusses those difficulties in detail and how government agencies 
indirectly subsidize or fund SMEs and their innovations. To be clear, in this section, the scholars 
debate on the efficiency of the grants from the government or their direct investments in the 
firms on stimulating the R&D activities by the firms, especially by innovative SMEs.  
Despite the fact that many countries setting programs to fund SMEs and their R&D 
activities, its effectiveness comparing to the engine of innovation from free market is always 
arguable among scholars. Reenen believes that while the pharmaceutical industry has stable 
demands from government funding, subsidies and regulations favoring R&D, the key of the 
success of the industry in the U.K. is the larger firms, which create a healthy labor markets to 
spread ideas.94 Smith also points out that pharmaceutical is the industry with main sources of 
state funding in the U.K., but 49 percent of all R&D in this industry are funded by private firms 
over tens years.95 Moreover, in the empirical study with the Canadian LSVCC, Cumming and 
Johan conclude that PE capital is more effective in encouraging R&D and patents that are 
obtained by innovative healthcare firms than LSVCC capital from government is.96   
The U.S. SBIR (small business innovation development) program mandated all federal 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  93	   Leonardo	  Burlamaqui	  and	  Mario	  Cimoli,	  “Industrial	  Policy	  and	  IPR:	  A	  Knowledge	  Governance	  Approach,”	  in	  Intellectual	  
Property	  Rights:	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  Challenges	  for	  Development,	  ed.	  Mario	  Cimoli	  et	  al.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  486.	   	   	  94	   John	  Van	  Reenen,	  Economics	  Issues	  for	  the	  U.K.	  Biotechnology	  Sector,	  2002,	  11-­‐12.	   	  95	   Helen	  Lawton	  Smith,	  “Regulating	  Science	  and	  Technology:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  UK	  Biotechnology	  Industry,”	  Law	  &	  Pol’y	  27	  (2005):	  200.	   	   	  96	   Cumming	  and	  Johan,	  “Phasing	  Out	  an	  Inefficient	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Credit,”	  250.	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agencies to fund more than $100 million on small businesses annually.97 On the one hand, the 
statistic of SBA shows that there was a positive trend in external R&D spending when the 
funding was increasing from 1983 to 1997.98 On the other hand, in this duration, while the 
empirical study conducted by Gompers and Lerner shows that the SBIR-subsidized firms enjoy 
greater employment and revenue, they conclude that the SBIR funding does not change how 
firms perform in their R&D activities.99  
Moreover, with regards to the result of a behavioral study, the OECD reports that direct 
R&D grants are becoming less important as a share of R&D in firms.100 Comparatively, 
Wendland supports state aid rules are more likely in the form of regulations or plans, such as 
“the Lisbon Strategy for Growth and Jobs” by the EU commission, rather than in the form of 
subsidies or public funding to R&D.101 These state aid activities fund some intermediate 
institutions, such as TTIs (technology transfer institutes) funded by the Commission of E.U. 
because they do not influence the direction of the research, and they are aim to facilitate SMEs 
acquiring investment, risk capital and funding for R&D.102  
Greenhalgh and Rogers, however, take the examples of SMART program in the U.K. and 
Advanced Technology Program in the U.S. to argue that funding is still important to SMEs and 
R&D. 103  Precisely, because individual farmers have limited resources for carrying out 
systematic experimentation, Germany governments provided public funding of agriculture of 
research in the later 19th century, which was also imitated by the U.S., but Nuvolari and Tartari 
believe the success of this model is because public support involves policies and education, more 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  97	   Paul	  Gompers	  and	  Josh	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  Cycle,	  2nd	  ed.	  (MIT	  Press,	  2004),	  318.	   	  98	   Ibid.	  319.	   	  99	   Ibid.	  341.	   	  100	   OECD,	  Government	  R&D	  Funding	  and	  Company	  Behaviour.	  Mesuring	  Behavioural	  Additionality,	  2006,	  232.	   	   	  101	   Bernhard	  Von	  Wendland,	  “R&D&	  I-­‐State	  Aid	  Rules	  at	  the	  Crossroads-­‐Taking	  Stock	  and	  Preparing	  the	  Revision,”	  Eur.	  St.	  
Aid	  L.	  Q.	  2012	  (2012):	  395.	  102	   Ibid.	  407.	   	  103	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  315.	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than merely research.104  
By contrast, after Zhao and Ziedonis used empirical methods to study the state funding on 
R&D by entrepreneurial firms in Michigan, even though their study cannot prove that the state 
R&D funding or awards can induce the patenting activities by the firms, their research shows 
that the funding is an effective instrument in the survival of the start-ups.105 Because of the 
imperfection of capital market, without the R&D funding or awards from the state, these 
start-ups are less likely to remain in business or acquire follow-on VC investment, especially 
when they cannot acquire funding or subsidies from the SBA.106 Thus, Zhao and Ziedonis 
conclude the function of the funding or awards equals to the function of the first round VC 
investment.107 They explains that while the state funding on R&D may not be effectively 
stimulate further R&D by the firms, the commercialization of the current R&D by the firms has 
been improved under this regime.108  
In the biotechnology industry, Allarakhia suggests the government and public funding 
agencies facilitating weaker innovators to enter research arenas.109 When observing the practice 
of funding programs in the pharmaceutical industry, Coriat and Orsenigo believe that public 
funding to support private R&D is essential for developing the fundamental knowledge base and 
infrastructures to raise the industry and attract investment from the financial market.110  
Moreover, because some public funding agencies expect more outputs of R&D putting in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  104	   Alessandro	  Nuvolari	  and	  Valentina	  Tartari,	  “Innovation,	  Appropriability	  and	  Productivity	  Growth	  in	  Agriculture:	  A	  Broad	  Historical	  Viewpoint,”	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  Challenges	  for	  Development,	  ed.	  Mario	  Cimoli	  et	  al.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  249.	   	  105	   Their	  empirical	  study	  covers	  three	  state	  R&D	  funding	  programs,	  including	  the	  Michigan	  Life	  Science	  Corridor	  (MLSC),	  the	  Michigan	  Technology	  Tri-­‐corridor	  (MTTC)	  and	  a	  new	  21st	  Century	  Jobs	  Fund	  (21CJF)	  programs.	  Zhao	  and	  Ziedonis,	  
State	  Governments	  as	  Financiers	  of	  Technology	  Startups:	  Implications	  for	  Firm	  Performance.	  18.	   	  106	   Ibid.	  3,	  20-­‐22.	   	  107	   Ibid.	  20.	   	  108	   Ibid.	  25-­‐27.	   	  109	   Minna	  Allarakhia,	  “Mode	  of	  Entry	  for	  Emerging	  Markets:	  An	  Ex	  Ante	  and	  Ex	  Post	  Perspective	  of	  the	  Open	  Source	  Development	  and	  Management	  of	  Biotechnology	  Knowledge	  Assets,”	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  
Challenges	  for	  Development,	  ed.	  Mario	  Cimoli	  et	  al.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  349.	   	   	  110	   Benjamin	  Coriat	  and	  Luigi	  Orsenigo,	  “IPRs,	  Public	  Health	  and	  the	  Pharmaceutical	  Industry:	  Issues	  in	  the	  Post-­‐2005	  TRIPS	  Agenda,”	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights:	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  Challenges	  for	  Development,	  ed.	  Mario	  Cimoli	  et	  al.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  222.	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public domain, the choice between IP incentives and public funding is largely a trade-off for 
innovators. In this situation, Scotchmer concludes that public funding on R&D is extensive and 
efficient comparing to supporting R&D through an IP system.111 Also, Olwan suggests the 
governments of Arab countries should adopt grants as a measure other than IP laws to support 
the development of their local communities.112  
Meanwhile, however, when he points out that necessary funding is an important element of 
the success of creating the software industry in Jordan, he also reminds us that this success 
requires supporting industries and infrastructure with a supportive legal regime.113 Similarly, 
because of the lack of patent commercialization in China, Li suggests that Chinese government 
should improve the infrastructure for commercialization through funding, which is increasing, 
but is not enough yet.114   
Another approach of thoughts to support government direct investment is similar to the 
thoughts of Gulinello, who believes that the government can establish a seed fund, just as the 
High Technology Venture Capital Fund that was created by Taiwanese government in 1950 and 
hold New Taiwan Dollar 800 million. 115  The seed fund and other types of fund with 
government investment reduce monitoring costs for the private investors, so they can efficiently 
attract more private investors.116  
 
3. Other Subsidized Policies Directly for Innovations 
 
Previous sections discuss various types of monetary subsidies by the government 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  111	   S.	  Scotchmer,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Treaties,”	  Journal	  of	  Law,	  Economics,	  and	  Organization	  20,	  no.	  2	  (October	  1,	  2004):	  415–37,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://jleo.oupjournals.org/cgi/doi/10.1093/jleo/ewh040.	  436.	   	  112	   Olwan,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development :	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  193.	  113	   Ibid.	  245.	   	  114	   Li,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries	  in	  China.”	  302.	   	  115	   Christopher	  Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience,”	  Geo.	  Wash.	  Int’l	  L.	  Rev.	  37,	  no.	  4	  (2005):	  870.	   	  116	   Ibid.	  871-­‐874.	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effectively or ineffectively in stimulating innovation. In this section, the literature introduces the 
subsidized policies to support the innovations in SMEs. The previous scholars prove the 
effectiveness of the policies that the government designed for directly supporting R&D or SMEs 
and this section also discusses those results in practice.  
When analyzing the government procurement policy in China, Chen believes that the 
subsidize policies in China are weaker than the other countries because of their backward 
realization to support SMEs through government procurement and other policies other than to 
merely support state-owned enterprises that used to assist the government to dominate the 
economy.117  
Besides tax policies, the government also creates other policies and regulations to instruct 
firms’ behaviors in the market. However, many scholars are hesitant to use them as efficient 
measures to encourage growth of SMEs and their innovations.  
On the one side, Shapiro believes that market power can stimulate innovation, especially 
joint-invention, stronger and more efficiently than any awarding policies.118 On the other side, 
Wendland argues that state interventions can effectively eliminate market failures to create 
incentives to do more R&D and innovations.119  
With the goal of state aid rules, that is to avoid distortion in the single market and promote 
the competitiveness of industry in Europe, Wendland believes that the state aid rules created by 
the E.U. Commission bridges the line between R&D and innovation promotion on one side, and 
efficient competition on the other side. 120  Furthermore, Salter and Smith conclude that 
regulatory policies are important to industrial development because it can strengthen consumer 
confidence by controlling market in some degree.121  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  117	   Chen,	  “Challenges	  in	  Designing	  Public	  Procerement	  Linkages:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  SMEs	  Preference	  in	  China’s	  Government	  Procurement,”	  158-­‐159.	   	  118	   Carl	  Shapiro,	  “Prior	  User	  Rights,”	  The	  American	  Economic	  Review	  96,	  no.	  2	  (2006):	  95,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/30034621.	   	  119	   Wendland,	  “R&D&	  I-­‐State	  Aid	  Rules	  at	  the	  Crossroads-­‐Taking	  Stock	  and	  Preparing	  the	  Revision,”	  389-­‐390.	   	  120	   Ibid.	  391-­‐407.	  121	   Brian	  Salter	  and	  Michael	  E	  Smith,	  The	  UK’	  S	  Stake	  in	  the	  Biotechnology	  Debate :	  Global	  Competition	  and	  Regulatory	  
Politics,	  2002,	  8,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/3/3517/papers/salter.pdf.	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In the empirical study with the U.S. firms in the semiconductor industry, Ziedonis and Hall 
show how pro-patent policies rather than the market are effectively encourage the firms 
patenting so as to improve their management skills on the process of innovating and ultimately to 
improve their productivity of R&D.122 When studying green innovation, Reichman et al. argue 
that green gas emission policy can be an effective inducement to innovation only if the policy 
can be credible to the private sector over a long term.123 With the data of OECD countries 
between 1978 and 2003, the empirical study conducted by Johnstone, Hascic and Popp shows 
that public policy has a significant influence on the development of the innovation of renewable 
energies.124 However, the economic analysis by Smith presents that the regulatory structure of 
the E.U. declines its biotechnology market.125 
Naturally the mechanism of government policies cannot be perfect, even to its supporters. 
While there are some regulations, such as GBER (the General Block Exemption Regulation of 
2008), established by the E.U. commission, to be concern about the growth of SMEs, Wendland 
admits that most of the state aid rules favor larger firms over SMEs and prefer to benefit 
high-tech industries.126 Also, if regulations are too intrusive, they reminds that companies will 
remove their global business to the other countries.127 
Denivolo and Franzoni conclude that policies must be designed as a supplement of law to 
trade-off the incentives of innovation and the demands of encouraging diffusion when there is a 
puzzle that the former goal asks for strong IPRs protection but hurts the latter aim to foster 
competition.128  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  122	   Rosemarie	  Ham	  Ziedonis	  and	  Bronwyn	  H.	  Hall,	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Strengthening	  Patent	  Rights	  on	  Firms	  Engaged	  in	  Cumulative	  Innovation:	  Insights	  from	  the	  Semiconductor	  Industry,”	  in	  Advances	  in	  the	  Study	  of	  Entrepreneurship	  
Innovation	  Economic	  Growth,	  vol.	  Volume	  13,	  2001,	  176.	   	  123	   Reichman	  et	  al.,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Alternatives:	  Strategies	  for	  Green	  Innovation,”	  360.	   	  124	   Nick	  Johnstone,	  Ivan	  Hascic,	  and	  David	  Popp,	  “Renewable	  Energy	  Policies	  and	  Technological	  Innovation:	  Evidence	  Based	  on	  Patent	  Counts,”	  Environmental	  and	  Resource	  Economics	  45	  (2010):	  151.	   	  125	   Smith,	  “Regulating	  Science	  and	  Technology:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  UK	  Biotechnology	  Industry,”	  198.	   	  126	   Wendland,	  “R&D&	  I-­‐State	  Aid	  Rules	  at	  the	  Crossroads-­‐Taking	  Stock	  and	  Preparing	  the	  Revision,”	  393.	   	  127	   Smith,	  “Regulating	  Science	  and	  Technology:	  The	  Case	  of	  the	  UK	  Biotechnology	  Industry,”	  199.	   	  128	   Vincenzo	  Denicolò	  and	  Luigi	  Alberto	  Franzoni,	  “Weak	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  ,	  Research	  Spill-­‐Overs	  and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  Innovate,”	  Am	  Law	  Econ	  Rev	  14	  (2012):	  111–40,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	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Besides the instrument regulation of IPRs, Gervais believes that other public policies 
improving competition, basic science or public knowledge should be more effective in 
stimulating innovation, especially in developing countries.129 Moreover, Maskus and Okediji 
argue that merely having public policies is not enough to spur practical and advanced 
innovations, which have the demands of subsidies and other support as well.130 
In the case of China, the former president Hu Jintao announced that the strategy to establish 
and innovative society in China is through a promoted legal system,131 including monitoring the 
administration by the governments, or designing and improving laws, policies and other 
regulations. Hence, overall, the above thoughtful discussions and suggestions should be valuable 
to be considered by Chinese legislatures and scholars to build this legal environment.   
 
II. Problems – Efficiency of Economic Instrument by Governments in Fostering Innovation 
by SMEs 
 
Chapter 3 explains how innovators are compensated with the IP regimes around the world. 
However, innovators may not be able to be fully compensated for their R&D costs from the 
market under the IP regime due to market failures132 or their weak competitiveness in the 
market.133 Governments thus directly or indirectly subsidize them to fill the gap between the 
compensation from market and their R&D costs to encourage them to act for public interests, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1825045.	  113.	   	  129	   Gervais,	  “Of	  Clusters	  and	  Assumptions:	  Innovation	  as	  Part	  of	  a	  Full	  TRIPS	  Implementation,”	  2377.	   	  130	   Maskus	  and	  Okediji,	  “Legal	  and	  Economic	  Perspectives	  on	  International	  Technology	  Transfer	  in	  Environmentally	  Sound	  Technologies,”	  394.	   	  131	   Jintao	  Hu	  presented	  this	  idea	  in	  the	  Meeting	  of	  National	  Technical	  Innovation	  in	  2006,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://news.xinhuanet.com/st/2006-­‐01/09/content_4030855.htm.	  132	   Besides	  the	  inefficient	  competition	  problem	  I	  raise	  in	  the	  problem	  of	  constructing	  a	  strong	  or	  weak	  IP	  regime,	  market	  failures	  also	  include	  public	  good,	  externalities,	  indivisibility,	  duplication	  R&D	  and	  other	  effects	  impeding	  the	  R&D	  incentives	  of	  innovators	  in	  the	  market.	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  18-­‐22.	   	  133	   The	  competitiveness	  of	  the	  products	  does	  not	  only	  depend	  on	  the	  particular	  technology,	  but	  also	  depend	  on	  the	  market	  shares	  of	  a	  firm.	  Also	  see,	  Ibid.	  141-­‐142.	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such as to develop green technologies.  
Generally, tax policies are a type of popular economic instrument that governments use for 
every type of their political goals, not limited to directly encouraging R&D, and it is effective in 
some levels.134 Other than tax policies, economic instruments by governments to generate 
innovation incentives of SMEs have multiple types, sources, forms and sizes. For example, 
governments directly invest in SMEs and provide them grants to support their R&D, or indirectly 
invest in them through VC funds. Alternatively, governments can award or give prizes to the 
firms when they have done particular behaviors relating to public good or innovation. The 
sources of these economic instruments can be state governments or local governments.  
In contrast to the consensus on effects of tax credits by scholars, although scholars basically 
agree on the importance of subsidies, prizes or rewards135, there is a huge fight on the efficiency 
of having government funding, and the efficiency in fact fluctuates with time, areas, industries, 
degrees and forms of funding, which was proved by the statistics or empirical studies by the 
scholars mentioned in the literature review. In practice, many countries provide government 
funding as an economic instrument to encourage R&D and induce the development of some 
high-tech industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, the biotechnology industry, and the 
software industry.136 However, although many scholars have proved that government grants are 
necessary,137 other scholars doubt this conclusion and compare government funding with other 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	   As	  I	  present	  in	  the	  literature	  review,	  both	  developed	  countries	  and	  developing	  countries	  use	  tax	  credits	  to	  subsidize	  R&D	  in	  particular	  size	  firms,	  such	  as	  SMEs,	  and	  in	  particular	  industries,	  and	  encourage	  other	  types	  market	  behaviors,	  such	  as	  investment	  in	  the	  innovative	  firms,	  SMEs,	  or	  the	  firms	  in	  these	  particular	  industries.	  The	  empirical	  results	  show	  that	  their	  efficiency	  in	  different	  areas	  and	  different	  time	  are	  different.	   	  135	   Fisher,	  Hall,	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Reichman	  et	  al.,	  Olwan,	  Dosi	  and	  Stiglitz,	  Maskus	  and	  Okediji	  support	  to	  have	  a	  regime	  with	  subsidies,	  prizes	  and	  awards	  providing	  R&D	  incentives,	  although	  Burlamaqui	  and	  Cimoli	  worry	  its	  high	  costs.	   	  136	   Cumming	  and	  Johan	  studied	  the	  state	  funding	  in	  the	  U.K.	  for	  pharmaceutical	  firms.	  Nuvolari	  and	  Tartari	  mentioned	  that	  Germany	  governments	  provided	  public	  funding	  to	  agricultural	  research.	  The	  statistic	  by	  Allarakhia	  shows	  that	  developing	  countries	  provide	  government	  funding	  to	  agricultural	  innovation	  and	  biotechnologies.	  Olwan	  uses	  Jordan’s	  example	  to	  present	  how	  its	  software	  industry	  was	  successfully	  created	  by	  government	  funding.	  See	  Cumming	  and	  Johan,	  “Phasing	  Out	  an	  Inefficient	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Credit.”	  See	  also,	  Nuvolari	  and	  Tartari,	  “Innovation,	  Appropriability	  and	  Productivity	  Growth	  in	  Agriculture:	  A	  Broad	  Historical	  Viewpoint.”	  See	  also,	  Allarakhia,	  “Mode	  of	  Entry	  for	  Emerging	  Markets:	  An	  Ex	  Ante	  and	  Ex	  Post	  Perspective	  of	  the	  Open	  Source	  Development	  and	  Management	  of	  Biotechnology	  Knowledge	  Assets.”	  Also	  see,	  Olwan,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development :	  Theory	  and	  Practice.	  137	   For	  example,	  Gulinello,	  Li,	  Allarkhia,	  Coriat	  and	  Orsenigo	  theoretically	  discuss	  the	  importance	  of	  government	  funding	  in	  supporting	  R&D	  and	  innovators,	  or	  emphasize	  the	  importance	  by	  the	  case	  of	  Taiwan	  and	  China	  with	  empirical	  evidence.	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measures for achieving the same function. These measures include equity investments in firms 
by government, investments from private capital markets, and IP regimes.138  
Some of the previous studies show that the former two types of economic instruments by 
government, tax credits and prizes, are more effective in encouraging R&D in high-tech 
industries, especially by SMEs. Reenen, Smith, Cumming and Johan, Gompers and Lerner 
studied the experiences of the U.K., Canada, the U.S., and the E.U. members and make this 
suggestion. Comparatively, the scholars, such as Scotchmer and Olwan, who studied the 
efficiency of government funding, favor IP regime less.  
There are, nevertheless, three main issues remaining in these previous studies. First, the 
scholars who prefer those former two types of economic instruments to government funding 
merely studied the cases and data of developed countries. Therefore, the value of their suggestion 
to the governments of developing countries is limited. One reason is that the innovation 
capabilities in different economies are different.139 Also, the financial environments of private or 
public investment in these two groups of economies are different because most developing 
countries usually do not have a mature capital market140 in which equity investments through 
different investors, such as government, private investors or public investors, can be efficiently 
made. Thus, it is hard to directly apply the suggestion meant for developed countries to 
developing countries.  
Fortunately, the methodologies adopted in that previous empirical literature studying the 
efficiency of government funding in particular areas or markets can be reasonably adopted by 
this study. From my analysis of the efficiency of government funding in China, other developing 
countries can understand this first issue better because a developing country case is closer to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  138	   OECD,	  Government	  R&D	  Funding	  and	  Company	  Behaviour.	  Mesuring	  Behavioural	  Additionality.	  See	  also,	  Cumming	  and	  Johan,	  “Phasing	  Out	  an	  Inefficient	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Credit.”	  See	  also,	  Olwan,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development :	  
Theory	  and	  Practice.	  Also	  see,	  Scotchmer,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Treaties.”	  139	   One	  difference	  is	  that	  the	  innovators	  in	  developing	  countries	  are	  basically	  innovation	  followers,	  far	  away	  falling	  behind	  the	  innovators	  in	  developed	  countries.	  Because	  this,	  their	  innovation	  environments	  are	  different	  in	  public	  goods,	  infrastructures	  and	  IP	  regime.	   	  140	   For	  example,	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson	  mentioned	  that	  the	  VC	  markets	  in	  the	  countries	  other	  than	  the	  U.S.	  are	  relatively	  immature.	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs.”	  56.	  Thus,	  to	  structure	  an	  efficient	  financial	  market	  in	  China	  and	  developing	  countries	  will	  be	  discussed	  in	  this	  research.	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their situations than the previous studies which used the cases of developed countries.  
The second issue is that the previous literature merely independently tested the efficiency of 
tax credits, awards, prizes, and government funding in encouraging R&D, and the literature did 
not count the mutual effects among these various policies, which are not limited to the policies 
particularly supporting R&D, but also include the policies to support SMEs or IP applications. 
The subsidized innovative firms that have been previously studied may qualify the conditions of 
several different supporting policies in the same period.141 Without controlling for the other 
types of subsidies, the conclusions of inefficiency or efficiency of solely tax credits, awards, 
prizes, or government funding may not be sufficiently robust. In order to understand their mutual 
effects on the incentives of R&D in SMEs, this study will test these types of subsidies both 
separately and jointly.  
The third problem of the existing literature is about the ignored interacted effects between 
the IP regime and government funding on the R&D incentives of firms. Both of these systems 
are artificially designed by governments.142 The IP regime ex post compensates the innovators 
through a market,143 whereas the government funding ex ante compensates the innovators based 
on the government’s blueprint in some industries or public interests.  
The previous studies conducted by Scotchmer and Olwan compare the efficiencies of the IP 
regime and government funding independently, but they ignore the fact that an IP regime has 
been established in many countries and cannot be abolished even if it could be shown to be 
inefficient in stimulating the incentives of innovation in practice.144 Rather than selecting which 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	   For	  example,	  SBA	  provides	  grants,	  tax	  credits,	  assistance	  to	  find	  investors	  and	  loans	  to	  SMEs.	  The	  grants	  may	  be	  not	  only	  from	  a	  single	  resource	  because	  besides	  subsidizing	  SMEs,	  different	  department	  of	  governments	  provide	  grants	  to	  firms	  to	  encourage	  their	  innovation	  in	  particular	  industries.	  Moreover,	  local	  governments	  also	  provide	  subsidies	  to	  the	  firms.	  Detail	  knowledge	  can	  be	  found	  from	  the	  website	  of	  SBA.	  https://www.sba.gov	  142	   Taking	  the	  U.S.	  as	  an	  example	  of	  common	  law	  countries,	  IP	  laws	  are	  designed	  by	  federal	  government,	  and	  the	  applications	  of	  patents	  are	  processed	  through	  PTO,	  a	  government	  agency.	  In	  China,	  a	  civil	  law	  country,	  IP	  laws	  are	  designed	  by	  the	  legislatures	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  country,	  and	  the	  applications	  of	  patent	  are	  processed	  by	  SIPO,	  a	  government	  agency,	  and	  the	  registrations	  of	  copyrights	  are	  authorized	  by	  Copyright	  Protection	  Center	  of	  China,	  also	  an	  institution	  organized	  by	  Chinese	  government.	   	  143	   Recall	  the	  economics	  theory,	  how	  IPRs	  create	  monopoly	  to	  encourage	  innovation.	  See	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  
Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  32-­‐34.	   	   	  144	   Scotchmer,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Treaties.”	  See	  also	  Olwan,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  
Development :	  Theory	  and	  Practice.	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regime is more effective so as to suggest that governments of developing countries should 
strengthen one over the other, like in Scotchmer’s and Olwan’s studies, it is better to suggest 
how governments should efficiently adjust their funding to firms in a proper IP regime or how 
governments should use subsidies or subsidized policies to facilitate patent commercialization to 
compensate innovators in an inefficient market.145 This is exactly the path of logic that this 
study is going to take.  
 
III. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
To respond the discussed problems with regards to the government intervention in the 
innovation by SMEs, this section lists the concerns that this research structures and the 
corresponding hypothesis, including: 
What is the efficiency of the economic instruments by the government in stimulating 
innovation by SMEs? Can those improve the R&D capabilities and commercialization by SMEs? 
In precise, is the capital from the government, including tax credits for innovative firms or for 
the “high-tech” firms, grants, or other subsidies associated with the SMEs’ R&D inputs and 
outcomes in revenue?  
One hypothesis is that revenue and net profit would vary as the functions of R&D intensity 
(a rate of R&D investment over employee), outcomes of R&D investment in the form of various 
types of IPRs, including utility patents, utility models, design patents and software copyrights, 
and inputs of R&D from government funding, prizes, and tax credits for subsidizing and 
encouraging R&D. The other hypothesis is that the effects of these inputs are through their 
interaction with R&D intensity of the SMEs and the outcomes in the form of IPRs.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	   Even	  though	  Murphy	  and	  Orcutt	  have	  studied	  the	  issues	  on	  patent	  subsidies,	  their	  interpretation	  of	  laws	  in	  Chinese	  sometimes	  is	  not	  accurate.	  For	  example,	  they	  mentioned	  that	  the	  SIPO	  Patent	  Subsidy	  Program	  is	  restricted	  to	  SMEs,	  public	  institutions	  and	  government	  research	  institutions.	  This	  is	  not	  true,	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  subsidizing	  firms	  never	  defines	  the	  types	  of	  subsidized	  targets.	  Hence,	  the	  meaning	  of	  their	  suggestion	  for	  Chinese	  subsidy	  programs	  is	  limited.	  William	  J.	  Murphy	  and	  John	  L.	  Orcutt,	  “Using	  Valuation-­‐Based	  Decision	  Making	  to	  Increase	  the	  Efficiency	  of	  China’s	  Patent	  Subsidy	  Strategies,”	  Cardozo	  Law	  Review,	  2013,	  116–46.	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IV. Data and Methodology 
 
This part explains the data and methodology that this research adopts. Section 1 introduces 
the background of the observations. Then, Section 2 explains the variable selections, and Section 
3 describes the data distributions. In Section 4, the model designs with the data and the variables 
are discussed.   
 
1. Data Background 
 
The research adopts firm-level data and the firm-level data are collected from some of the 
public firms in Zhongguan-Cun Science Park and Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park, the top two most 
significant national science parks in China. This section introduces the background of the two 
parks. Due to the complexity of the circumstances in China, which is such a big country both in 
geography and population, learning about their background is necessarily helpful to 
understanding the reason why I exploit the enterprises in the two science parks to represent the 
innovative SMEs and the relevant issues in China. Based on my observations, these two parks 
use two extremely different styles of policy to facilitate their domestic registered enterprises, and 
other cities copy their modes at different levels.  
Section 1.1 introduces the background of Zhongguan-Cun Science Park, and Section 1.2 
introduces the background of Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park.  
 
1.1. Zhongguan-Cun Science Park 
  
Learning from the experience of Silicon Valley, the P.R.C. State Council established 
Zhongguan-Cun Science Park (Zhongguan-Cun) in the 1980s as the first high-tech park in China 
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and named it as “Beijing New Technology Industrial Development Trial Zone.”146 This was the 
beginning of technology commercialization and entrepreneurship in China.147 Moreover, since 
then, the national government and the Beijing government have been actively and strongly 
supporting the construction of Zhongguan-Cun through a large number of policies and a great 
amount of funding.148 
Zhongguan-Cun is located in Beijing and is surrounded by 39 universities or colleges, 
including Tsinghua University and Peking University.149 In 2007, these universities held 56 of 
“the highest state-level disciplines,” which represented 77.8% of these disciplines in total.150   
In 2009, the State Council first authorized it as the “Zhongguan-Cun National 
Demonstration Zone” and started testing multiple supporting policies with the firms there.151 
Besides providing beneficial tax policies to support doing innovation by the firms in 
Zhongguan-Cun, the government of China decided to test its most advanced policies of financial 
reform in Zhongguan-Cun. Also, it organized the firms in Zhongguan-Cun to collect innovations 
for some national projects covering several industries, such as green technology, electronic 
information and the biological and pharmaceutical industry. As a probable result, based on the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  146	  “Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  Science	  Park	  Profile,”	  accessed	  May	  31,	  2015,	  http://en.zhongguancun.gov.cn/2013-­‐12/04/content_17148863.htm.	  147	  “(Zhongguan	  Cun)	  Fazhan	  Licheng((中关村)发展历程)[Path	  of	  the	  Development	  (of	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun)],”	   2009,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.zgc.gov.cn/sfqgk/55179.htm.	  148	   The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Scientific	  and	  Technological	  Commission	  authorized	  to	  organize	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  into	  five	  tiny	  technical	  parks	  and	  sometimes	  applied	  different	  tested	  policies	  on	  them.	  In	  1999,	  the	  five	  technical	  parks	  were	  extended	  to	  ten,	  and	  finally	  extended	  to	  sixteen	  in	  2009.	  Ibid.	  149	   Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  Keji	  Yuan	  Guanweihui(中关村科技园管委会)[Administrative	  Committee	  of	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  Science	  Park],	  “Zhongguan	  Cun	  Shifan	  Qu	  Gaoxiao	  Keji	  Ziyuan	  Diaocha	  Ji	  Jiexi	  (Zhaiyao)(中关村示范区高校科技资源调查及解析
（摘要）)[The	  Investigation	  and	  Analysis	  of	  Technology	  Sources	  by	  Universities	  in	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  Demonstration	  Zone	  (Abstract)],”	  accessed	  May	  31,	  2015,	  http://www.zgc.gov.cn/fzbg/yjkt/70110.htm.	  150	   Ibid.	  The	  title	  was	  named	  by	  the	  P.R.C.	  State	  Council	  and	  selected	  by	  the	  Department	  of	  Education	  among	  all	  universities	  or	  colleges	  in	  China.	  In	  2014,	  the	  State	  Council	  abolished	  this	  mechanism.	  See	  also	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Guowu	  Yuan(中华人民共和国国务院)[The	  State	  Councile	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Guowuyuan	  Guanyu	  Quxiao	  He	  Xiafang	  Yipi	  
Xingzheng	  Shenpi	  Xiangmu	  De	  Jueding(国务院关于取消和下放一批行政审批项目的决定)[Decisions	  on	  Abolishing	  or	  
Releasing	  Some	  Administrative	  Projects	  by	  the	  State	  Council],	  2014,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.gov.cn/zwgk/2014-­‐02/15/content_2602146.htm.	  151	   Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Guowu	  Yuan(中华人民共和国国务院)[The	  State	  Councile	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Guowuyuan	  
Guanyu	  Tongyi	  Zhichi	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  Kejiyuanqu	  Jianshe	  Guojia	  Zizhu	  Chuangxin	  Shifanqu	  De	  Pifu(国务院关于同意支持中
关村科技园区建设国家自主创新示范区的批复)[The	  Response	  to	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  Science	  Park	  in	  the	  Construction	  of	  the	  
National	  Demonstration	  Zone	  by	  the	  State	  Council],	  2009,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.zgc.gov.cn/zcfg10/gj/56120.htm.	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statistics by SIPO, Beijing is always the city having the most patent applications every year.152  
In December 2010, Zhongguan-Cun established the “Zhonggua-Cun Innovation Platform” 
to bridge universities, state laboratories, large state-owned enterprises and high-tech firms.153 
The administrative agency of Zhongguan-Cun organizes its officers in this platform, the officers 
from the Beijing government and some national departments to work in eight professional 
institutions responsible for authorization of projects, technical finance, attraction of professionals, 
government procurement, application commercialization, policy testing, policy construction, 
science center and modern service industries to facilitate the operation and development of the 
domestic firms, their innovation, and commercialization of their technology.154  
Besides the plentiful public sources provided by the governments, due to its location in the 
capital of China, private sources are also accumulated in Zhongguan-Cun. For example, in 2009, 
21 funds holding 980 million Yuan in equity investment registered in Haidian Park, the central 
park of Zhongguan-Cun, and over 154 funds in equity investment had registered there.155 
Between 2009 and 2011, both the amount of PE investments and the number of the cases of PE 
investments in Beijing were the highest among all the provinces.156  
Until June 2013, there have been 211 public enterprises in Zhongguan-Cun.157 On the one 
hand, 30 enterprises of them are listed on SME board of Shenzhen Stock Exchange. In 2013, 
they took 4.28% of the total number of the listed SMEs on SME board and valued 20.85% of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  152	   Data	  are	  collected	  from	  SIPO.	   	  153	  “Zhongguan	  Cun	  Chuangxin	  Pingtai(中关村创新平台)[Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  Innovation	  Platform],”	   accessed	  June	  3,	  2015,	  http://www.zgc.gov.cn/zgccxpt/.	  154	   Ibid.	  155	   Zhongguo	  Fengxian	  Touzi	  Yanjiu	  Yuan(中国风险投资研究院)[China	  VC	  Investment	  Research	  Institute],	  Zhongguo	  
Fengxian	  Touzi	  Nianjian	  2010(中国风险投资年鉴 2010)[China	  Venture	  Capital	  Yearbook	  2010]	  (Minzhu	  Yu	  Jianshe(民主与
建设)[Democracy	  and	  Construction],	  2010),	  112.	  156	   Ibid.	  150.	  See	  also,	  Zhongguo	  Fengxian	  Touzi	  Yanjiu	  Yuan(中国风险投资研究院)[China	  VC	  Investment	  Research	  Institute],	  Zhongguo	  Fengxian	  Touzi	  Nianjian	  2012(中国风险投资年鉴 2012)[China	  Venture	  Capital	  Yearbook	  2012]	  (Minzhu	  Yu	  Jianshe(民主与建设)[Democracy	  and	  Construction],	  2012),	  181.	  See	  also,	  Zhongguo	  Fengxian	  Touzi	  Yanjiu	  Yuan(中国风险投资研究院)[China	  VC	  Investment	  Research	  Institute],	  Zhongguo	  Fengxian	  Touzi	  Nianjian	  2011(中国风险
投资年鉴 2011)[China	  Venture	  Capital	  Yearbook	  2011]	  (Minzhu	  Yu	  Jianshe(民主与建设)[Democracy	  and	  Construction],	  2011),	  150.	  157	   Shuhua(田书华)	  Tian,	  Zhongguan	  Cun	  Guojia	  Zizhu	  Chuangxin	  Shifan	  Qu	  Shangshi	  Gongsi	  Jiben	  Qingkuang	  Bijiao	  
Fenxi(中关村国家自主创新示范区上市公司基本情况比较分析)[Comparative	  Analysis	  on	  Pubilc	  Firms	  in	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  
National	  Demonstration	  Zone],	  2013,	  1.	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whole value of SME Board. On the other hand, another 52 enterprises are listed on GEM, 
Growth Enterprise Market, of Shenzhen Stock Exchange.158 In 2013, they took 14.65% of the 
total number of the traded enterprises on GEM, and valued 7.79% of GEM. Moreover, there 
have been more than 50 enterprises listed on the two main boards of China and another 79 
enterprises listed on the Stock Exchanges of the countries other than Mainland China.159  
 
1.2. Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park 
 
In 1992, Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park (Zhangjiang) was established in Shanghai, China, to be 
one of China’s first state level high-tech zones.160  
Besides a large number of the universities or colleges, such as Fudan University, 
surrounding it, it has many professional training institutes to train the employees working in its 
enterprises. In 2006, it founded its own training institute, Shanghai Zhangjiang Institute for 
Innovation, specifically for supporting various demands during innovation.161 Moreover, both 
the Chinese universities and foreign universities have set innovation centers in Zhangjiang.162 
Beyond the basic function of training, not only can they corporate with the domestic firms in 
Zhangjiang to commercialize their technologies, they can also facilitate innovation by the firms 
and stimulate entrepreneurships.163 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  158	   SME	  board	  and	  GEM	  are	  second	  boards	  of	  Shenzhen	  Stock	  Exchange	  and	  Shanghai	  Stock	  Exchange.	   	  159	   Shuhua	  Tian,	  Comparative	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Public	  Corporations	  in	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  National	  Innovation	  Model	  Park,	  China	  Galaxy	  Securities,	  (Jun,	  22.	  2013),	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	   	  http://www.chinastock.com.cn/yhwz_postdoc.do?methodCall=getResultsInfo&docId=3522355	   	  160	  “张江高科技园概况[Introudction	  of	  Zhangjiang	  Hi-­‐Tech	  Park],”	   accessed	  June	  6,	  2015,	  http://www.zhangjiang.net/Default.aspx?tabid=152.	  161	  “（Zhangjiang)	  Jiaoyu	  Peixun)((张江)教育培训)[(Zhangjiang)	  Education	  and	  Training],”	   accessed	  June	  2,	  2015,	  http://www.zjpark.com/Second.aspx?infoitem_id=318&infoitem_pid=3.	  162	   	   For	  example,	  UC	  Berkeley	  College	  of	  Engineering	  created	  the	  Z-­‐BEI	  Center,	  the	  Shanghai	  Zhangjiang	  Berkeley	  Engineering	  Innovation	  Center,	  in	  Zhangjiang.	  SeeShanghai	  Municipal	  People’s	  Government,	  “City	  ‘Silicon	  Valley’	  and	  Berkeley	  Join	  up,”	  2013,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node27118/node27818/u22ai74060.html.	  163	   Zhenying	  Yang	  (杨珍莹),	  “Shanghai	  Zhangjiang	  Bokeli	  Gongcheng	  Chuangxin	  Qiyong(上海张江伯克利工程创新中心
启用)[Z-­‐BEI	  Center	  Starts	  Operation],”	   Pudong	  Shibao(浦东时报)[Pudong	  Times],	  2013,	  http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/hqgj/jryw/2013-­‐11-­‐19/content_10620433.html.	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Different from Zhongguan-Cun nursing entrepreneurships altogether with various sources 
from universities, public laboratories and the government, Zhangjiang firstly and intentionally 
collects and organizes the firms from the five main industries: the industry of information 
technology, the biological and pharmaceutical industry, the entertainment industry, the 
mechanical industry and the green technology industry. 164  For the financial activities or 
innovative activities, Zhangjiang provides flexible subsidies, funding or other supportive policies 
to support their development and the construction of the particular industries their businesses 
belong to.165 
Based on the 2012 statistics, over 90% of the Zhangjiang enterprises are in small or medium 
sizes, and most of them are small enterprises.166 Even though the utility patent applications in 
Shanghai are usually less than Beijing, due to the clearly categorized industries to be supported 
in Zhangjiang, the total number of all three types of patent applications, including utility patent 
applications, utility model applications and design patent applications, are on the same level with 
that in Beijing and much higher than Shenzhen and other significant cities in China.167  
The administrative agency of the Pudong New Area, a district of Shanghai and covering 
many enterprises of Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park, costs at least 200 million Yuan on funding 
technical development and freely providing to the local SMEs every year.168 Indirectly, the 
agency had invested over 20,000 million Yuan on funding some VC funds since 2006.169 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  164	  “Zhangjiang	  Gaokeji	  Yuan	  Gaikuang(张江高科技园概况)[Introudction	  of	  Zhangjiang	  Hi-­‐Tech	  Park].”	  165	   Zhangjiang	  Gaoxin	  Keji	  Yuanqu	  Guanweihui(张江高新科技园区管委会)[Administrative	  Committee	  of	  Zhangjiang	  High-­‐Tech	  Park],	  Shanghai	  Shi	  Zhangjiang	  Gaokeji	  Yuanqu	  Chanye	  Fuchi	  Guanli	  Banfa(上海市张江高科技园区产业扶持管
理办法)[Supportive	  and	  Administrative	  Methods	  of	  Shanghai	  Zhangjiang	  Hi-­‐Tech	  Park	  for	  Industries](effective	  Jan.	  1,	  2011),	  n.d.,	  http://www.zhangjiang.net/Default.aspx?tabid=278&ItemId=146&CategoryId=6.	  See	  also,	  Shanghaishi	  Zhangjiang	  
Gaokeji	  Yuanqu	  Qiye	  Fazhan	  Fuchi	  Banfa(上海市张江高科技园区企业发展扶持办法）[Supportive	  Methods	  for	  Enterprises	  
Development	  of	  Shanghai	  Zhangjiang	  Hi-­‐Tech	  Park],	  2011,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.zhangjiang.net/Default.aspx?tabid=278&ItemId=147&CategoryId=6.	  166	  “Brief	  of	  Zhangjiang	  Hi-­‐Tech	  Park	  and	  Zhangjiang	  Group,”	  2013,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.zjpark.com/en/rules/about.	  167	   In	  some	  years,	  the	  number	  of	  all	  types	  of	  patent	  applications	  in	  Shanghai	  and	  Beijing	  can	  be	  triple	  times	  of	  that	  number	  in	  Shenzhen.	  Statistic	  by	  SIPO.	   	  168	  “Zhangjiang	  Juban	  Chuangyeban	  Rongzi	  Luntan(张江举办创业板融资论坛)[Zhangjiang	  Held	  a	  GEM	  Financial	  Forum],”	  2009,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://finance.sina.com.cn/stock/t/20090626/09202916567.shtml.	  169	   Ibid.	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Furthermore, these VC funds attracted over 30,000 million Yuan from local and foreign 
investors and at least one third of their investments would be invested in the local enterprises.170  
Actually, in the history of China, Shanghai is always an innovative city in finance. In 2013, 
when the OTC (over-the-counter) market started in China, not only had Shanghai involved this 
market to sell PE loans, 95 private enterprises listed their share price on a professional platform 
established in Shanghai.171 Other than Beijing, Shanghai usually holds the most registered VC or 
PE investment funds among all other cities in China.172 In an environment of investment like 
this, Zhangjiang has 58 SMEs listed on the SME board or the GEM board of the Shenzhen Stock 
Exchange by 2013.  
 
2. Data and Data Sources 
 
    In order to further explore the research questions raised in Section III, and follow up the 
prior literature, this section introduces the data that this research adopts. The data are at firm 
level and between 2009 and 2013. With regards to the specific government monetary supports 
for SMEs, the data are at firm level. Section 2.1 introduces the sources of the firm-level data in 
innovation and their sources. Section 2.2 introduces the firm-level data in other economic 
instruments by the government. The two sections explain the variables I select and the process of 
collecting and coding the data into those variables. 
 
2.1.Firm-Level Data in Innovation 
 
    For the reliability and the availability of the firm-level data that the research needs, the 
samples of the research cover only all 82 public SMEs in the GEM and the SME Board of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  170	   Ibid.	  171	   Zhongguo	  Fengxian	  Touzi	  Yanjiu	  Yuan(中国风险投资研究院)[China	  VC	  Investment	  Research	  Institute],	  Zhongguo	  
Fengxian	  Touzi	  Nianjian	  2014(中国风险投资年鉴 2014)[China	  Venture	  Capital	  Yearbook	  2014]	  (Minzhu	  Yu	  Jianshe(民主与
建设)[Democracy	  and	  Construction],	  2014),	  117.	   	   	  172	   Ibid.	  234.	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Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2009 and 2013 from Zhonggun-Cun and all 58 public SMEs 
on the two boards from Zhangjiang. Moreover, these public SMEs are comparatively more 
mature, so any serious issues relating survival will not be discussed in this research and also do 
not disturb other issues relating to the research questions.173 Hence, I can acquire their business 
information from their prospectus and annual reports. 
To learn the basic characteristics of the SMEs, the data collection covers the revenue of 
each SME every year, its net profits, the number of its employees and the category of its 
industry. 174  Besides presenting sizes of the SMEs, revenue can present the growth and 
competitiveness of the SMEs.175 
First, I collect firm-level data to learn the innovative activities and IP activities by SMEs. 
To learn the former, I collect their R&D expenditure per year, R&D intensity, represented by 
R&D-to-employee ratio and their R&D-to-revenue ratio to learn their input of innovations.   
The R&D expenditure tells the amount of the input of technology investment by an SME, 
which can represent the R&D capabilities of the SME. In accounting, different stages of the 
process of R&D make the relevant expenditures go to costs or expenses. When it has been 
recorded as costs, it cannot be discriminated from other types of costs in the running of the 
business of the SME. Hence, if an SME revised its R&D expenditure in its further annual reports, 
I record the higher number as their R&D expenditure. 
Companies in various sizes or various industries, however, may have different extent of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	   The	  SMEs	  are	  required	  to	  disclosure	  their	  recent	  three	  years’	  accounting	  reports.	  The	  disclosure	  requirements	  of	  GEM	  are	  more	  than	  that	  of	  the	  main	  board,	  and	  the	  disclosure	  requirements	  of	  SME	  adopt	  that	  of	  the	  main	  board.	  Rule	  5.1.3,	  section5,	  Shenzhen	  Zhengquan	  Jiaoyisuo	  Gupiao	  Shangshi	  Guize	  (深圳证券交易所股票上市规则)[Public	  Securities	  Rules	  for	  
Shenzhen	  Stock	  Exchange],	  2014,	  http://www.szse.cn/main/files/2014/11/28/深圳证券交易所股票上市规则（2014年修
订）.pdf.	  16.	  See	  also,	  Rule	  26,	  Gongkai	  Faxing	  Zhengquan	  De	  Gongsi	  Xinxi	  Pilu	  Neirong	  Yu	  Geshi	  Zhunze	  Di	  35	  Hao	  (公开发行
证券的公司信息披露内容与格式准则第 35号)[Regulation	  of	  Disclosure	  Content	  and	  Format	  for	  the	  Firms	  with	  Public	  
Traded	  Securities,	  No.	  35],	  2014,	  9,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.szse.cn/main/files/2014/06/19/463467907250.pdf.	  174	   Hall	  et	  al.	  find	  that	  most	  of	  the	  previous	  empirical	  studies	  show	  that	  industry	  could	  be	  an	  important	  factor	  in	  innovating,	  patenting	  and	  litigating.	  Hall	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Choice	  between	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Intellectual	  Property:	  A	  Review,”	  410-­‐418.	  175	   The	  size	  definitions	  of	  SMEs	  in	  different	  industries	  are	  different.	  They	  are	  usually	  defined	  by	  revenue.	  Zhongguo	  Guojia	  Fagai	  Wei(中国国家发改委)[National	  Development	  and	  Reform	  Commission]	  et	  al.,	  Zhongxiao	  Qiye	  Huaxing	  
Biaozhun	  Guiding	  (中小企业划型标准规定)[Size	  Definition	  of	  SMEs],	  2011,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.miit.gov.cn/n11293472/n11293832/n11293907/n11368223/13912671.html.	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capabilities of R&D and demand of R&D activities. Therefore, I need another R&D relative 
variable from the annual reports of the SMEs to tell their attitudes on doing innovation, even 
though I do not use questionnaires or interviews to acquire the data. 176  Here, the 
R&D-to-revenue ratio can tell the importance of how an SME treats R&D in its business 
operation. R&D-to-revenue is a measure usually indicating R&D intensity.177 The Chinese 
governments also adopt this ratio to measure the innovation by firms and then decide relevant 
subsidized policies to apply to the firms.178 In order to distinguish from this standard adopted by 
the governments, another scaled measure for R&D that this research adopts most frequently is 
the R&D intensity, represented R&D-to-employee ratio. In Ziedonis’s papers, she consistently 
adopts this ratio to represent R&D intensity.179  
Moreover, I look into the IP activities of the SMEs to learn their outcome of innovations 
and their reflections on the IP regime.180 In precise, the data include the number of annual filed 
applications for utility patents, utility models and design patents, issued utility patents, utility 
models and design patents, as well as registered software copyrights. All patent relevant data are 
collected from the SIPO database. The registered software copyrights are known from the 
prospectus and annual reports. If the records in these two sources are not clear, I trace back the 
original records from the CPCC (the Copyright Protection Center of China).  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  176	   The	  decisions	  of	  an	  SME	  are	  made	  by	  groups	  of	  people,	  not	  just	  a	  person.	  Therefore,	  to	  understand	  any	  attitudes	  of	  the	  decision	  groups	  of	  the	  SME,	  questionnaires	  or	  interviews	  are	  not	  object	  and	  accurate	  enough,	  even	  doing	  the	  survey	  with	  their	  CEOs.	  Comparatively,	  using	  the	  data	  reflecting	  their	  innovative	  activities	  in	  the	  past	  can	  be	  a	  better	  approach	  to	  learn	  their	  true	  plans	  and	  attitudes	  on	  innovation.	   	  177	   Scholars,	  such	  as	  Bessen,	  Maskin,	  Hunt	  and	  Yrkko,	  usually	  adopt	  the	  ratio	  of	  R&D	  investment	  to	  revenue	  to	  represent	  R&D	  intensity.	  James	  Bessen	  and	  Eric	  Maskin,	  “Sequential	  Innovation,	  Patents,	  and	  Imitation,”	  RAND	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  40,	  no.	  4	  (2009):	  611–35.	  See	  also,	  James	  Bessen	  and	  Rober	  M.	  Hunt,	  An	  Empirical	  Look	  at	  Software	  Patents,	  PhD	  Proposal,	  2004.	  See	  also,	  Jyrki	  Ali-­‐Yrkko,	  “Impact	  of	  Public	  R&D	  Financing	  on	  Private	  R&D:	  Does	  Financial	  Constraint	  Matter?,”	  
ENEPRI	  Working	  Paper,	  2005.	   	  178	   Chapter	  3,§10.4.	  See,	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Hexue	  Jishu	  Bu(中华人民共和国科学技术部)[The	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Tehnology	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Caizheng	  Bu(中华人民共和国财政部)[The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  and	  Guojia	  Shuiwu	  Zongju(国家税务总局)[The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Administration	  of	  Taxation],	  Gaoxin	  
Jishu	  Qiye	  Rending	  Guanli	  Banfa(高新技术企业认定管理办法)[Hi-­‐Tech	  Enterprises	  Certification	  Methods],	  2008.	  179	   Bronwyn	  H	  Hall	  and	  Rosemarie	  Ham	  Ziedonis,	  “The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Semiconductor	  Industry,	  1979-­‐1995,”	  RAND	  Journal	  of	  Economics	  32,	  no.	  1	  (2001):	  101–28.	  Also	  see,	  Rosemarie	  Ham	  Ziedonis,	  When	  the	  Giants’	  Shoulders	  Are	  Crowded:	  Fragmented	  Rights	  and	  Patent	  Strategies	  in	  Semiconductors,	  2002.	  180	   Patent	  and	  copyright	  are	  significant	  for	  innovators	  to	  protect	  their	  achievement	  of	  innovation	  or	  staged	  achievement	  of	  innovation.	  Although	  they	  can	  protect	  their	  innovations	  through	  trade	  secrets,	  our	  literature	  review	  has	  compared	  the	  advantage	  and	  importance	  of	  IP	  protection	  with	  them.	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In the process of data collecting, however, there are still some limitations. First, it is 
impossible to include the IP information of both parent companies and all subsidiaries, because 
the annual reports of the SMEs may not disclose all of their subsidiaries. Moreover, with a huge 
amount of the subsidiaries of the SMEs, the controls of these subsidiaries are complex. Some of 
them are completely controlled by the parent company, but some are not. The influence of the 
SMEs as a whole on the R&D in the subsidiaries, hence, is difficult to declare. Therefore, even 
though the data of R&D that are directly recorded from the prospectus and annual reports of the 
SMEs may include both the parent companies and their subsidiaries, the data of patents probably 
only count the parent firm.  
Another limitation is caused by the exclusive licensing patents or pool licensing patents. 
The technology cooperation, including but not limited to these two types, is vaguely recorded in 
the SMEs’ annual reports. For example, following the first limitation, the use of licensing is rare 
between the parent firms and their subsidiaries by these enterprises.181  
Even if an annual report may disclose some information about licensing patents, or 
technology cooperation, it is hard to define the level of endeavor that the SME has spent on that 
output. In reality, the Statistic from SIPO shows that the technology transactions as a whole are 
still rare in the market of China, where all registered patent transactions are less than ten percent 
of the patent filing a year. Also the SMEs in this study have almost none of the registered records 
so as to be impossible to trace them by the SMEs, I do not include these types of transactions in 
the consideration of R&D output of the SMEs.  
In the case of non-discrimination of various types of patent applications, I also test with the 
number of all types of patent applications filed by per SME per year and the number of all types 
of issued patents.182  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  181	   Even	  though	  the	  people	  or	  entities	  other	  than	  the	  patent	  owners	  can	  use	  the	  patents	  when	  the	  owners	  authorize	  them	  to	  do	  by	  licenses,	  subsidiaries	  to	  manufacture	  or	  mechanize	  them	  usually	  are	  not	  through	  licenses,	  which	  are	  too	  formal	  and	  costly	  for	  their	  registrations.	  The	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  SMEs	  rarely	  disclose	  any	  licenses	  between	  a	  parent	  firm	  and	  its	  subsidiaries.	   	  182	   As	  the	  novelty	  requirement	  of	  utility	  patents	  was	  higher,	  a	  strategy	  for	  patent	  applicants	  is	  to	  file	  both	  the	  invention	  patent	  and	  the	  utility	  model,	  especially	  when	  a	  firm	  does	  not	  have	  enough	  self-­‐confidence	  to	  acquire	  an	  invention	  patent	  or	  plans	  to	  circumvent	  the	  relative	  technologies	  as	  earlier	  as	  it	  can.	  Zhuanli	  Fa	  Shishi	  Xize	  (专利法实施细则)	  [The Rules for 
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2.2. Firm-Level Data in Other Economic Instruments by Government 
 
After learning some private economic instruments by VC/PE investors, recall the 
importance of economic instruments taken by governments. The data collection includes the 
amount of tax credits acquired by each SME every year, other general subsidies, and 
governments’ direct funding or grants.  
I collect the data of tax credits by categories. In precise, national governments of China 
authorize tax credits on corporate tax, business tax, capital income tax, land tax and dividends 
tax. Meanwhile, local governments subsidize firms with their local tax.  
Corporate tax in China also is called enterprises income tax. When firms are entitled with 
“national key high-tech enterprises” or “national key software enterprises”, they can be 
authorized a corporate tax deduction in 10% to 25% of the enterprises' income.183 For particular 
reasons, some of other enterprises can also be authorized a full corporate tax deduction in 
particular periods.184 For example, in order to encourage technology transfers, the government 
of Shanghai authorizes conditional tax credits on corporate tax for the companies performing 
technology transfers. In this case, the tax credits for subsidizing the technology transfers by the 
SMEs of the observations are recorded as an independent category.  
For capital income tax, in most of the time, it is used to subsidize export enterprises to avoid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
the Implementation of the Patent Law (“the	  Rules”)]	  (promulgated	  by	  St.	  Council,	  2010)	  Article	  41	  China).	  The	  Rules	  for	  the	  Implementation	  of	  the	  Patent	  Law	  (“the	  Rules”),	  Article.	  An applicant can file applications for both rights at the same day but 
make a clear claim to inform the SIPO that the technology has a dual application.	  183	   Section	  4:	  “	  Enterprise	  Income	  Tax	  rate	  is	  25%.”	   	  	   	   Section	  28:	  “The	  key	  high	  technology	  companies	  supported	  by	  the	  government	  of	  country	  can	  have	  a	  deducted	  tax	  rate	  in	  15%.”	   	  	   	   Qiye	  Suodeshui	  Fa(企业所得税法)[The	  Law	  of	  the	  People’s	  Republic	  of	  China	  on	  Enterprise	  Income	  Tax]	  (promulgated	  by	  the	  Standing	  Comm.	  Nat’l	  People’s	  Cong.,	  Mar.	  16,	  2007,	  effective	  Jan	  1,	  2008)	  (Lawinforchina)	  (China).	  	   	   Guojia	  Shuiwu	  Zongju(国家税务总局)[The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Admistration	  of	  Taxation],	  Guanyu	  Jinyibu	  Guli	  Ruanjian	  Chanye	  
He	  Jicheng	  Dianlu	  Chanye	  Fazhan	  Qiye	  Suodeshui	  Zhengce	  de	  Tongzhi	  (关于进一步鼓励软件产业和集成电路产业发展企业
所得税政策的通知)[Notice	  of	  the	  State	  Council	  on	  Issuing	  Enterprises	  Income	  Tax	  Policies	  on	  Further	  Encouraging	  the	  
Development	  of	  the	  Sof,	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810765/n812151/n812421/c1083639/content.html.	  184	   Because	  not	  all	  policies	  are	  public	  in	  China,	  from	  some	  of	  the	  annual	  reports	  of	  our	  sample	  SMEs,	  we	  learn	  that	  sometimes	  governments	  can	  particular	  authorize	  one	  firm	  or	  few	  firms	  with	  one	  independent	  policy.	  This	  type	  of	  policies	  was	  proposed	  by	  local	  government	  but	  authorized	  by	  the	  national	  government.	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the situation of replicated taxation or when the enterprises import equipments for production or 
innovation.185 However, for my sample SMEs, most of them do not have export businesses. 
Therefore, for these firms, because some reasons of providing tax credits on capital gains tax can 
be political policies, such as encouraging technology transactions, the tax credits should induce 
their behaviors to follow those policies.  
Besides the above tax credits, other types of subsidies can also be used to induce behaviors 
of firms. For example, Chinese governments subsidize patent application fees to encourage 
SMEs to apply patents. Also, to fill the gap between SMEs and financial sources, the 
governments provide subsidies for interests of loans. Moreover, the governments subsidize 
international trade exhibitions by the firms to encourage their exportations and technology 
communications with foreign firms.  
Even though these subsidies were given for reasons of policies, my data collection records 
the sum of these various types of subsidies other than tax credits because the firms that have 
been subsidized are free to expend these subsidies. For the same reasons, the tax credits of the 
sample SMEs are also collected in sum. However, because corporate tax deductions are 
particular prizes for innovative firms, I independently collect the tax credits on corporate tax in 
per SME per year.  
Overall, I separate subsidies as tax credits or general subsidies. This is because of the 
significant effects of tax credits on innovation, learned from the literature review. Also, since the 
subsidies are goal-oriented, they are recorded by particular categories. For example, the subsidies 
for debt interests and patent application fees are recorded separately from other types of 
subsidies that are not necessarily related to my research goals.  
Moreover, due to the same function as ex post compensation by prizes from the 
governments, my data collection of general subsidies record monetary prizes from the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  185	   Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Guowu	  Yuan(中华人民共和国国务院)[The	  State	  Councile	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Guowuyuan	  
Guanyu	  Tiaozheng	  Jinkou	  Shebei	  Shuishou	  Zhengce	  De	  Tongzhi	  (国务院关于调整进口设备税收政策的通知)[Notice	  of	  the	  
State	  Council	  on	  Adjusting	  Tax	  Policies	  about	  Imported	  Equipment],	  1997,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.customs.gov.cn/Default.aspx?TabID=20149&InfoID=110991&ctl=InfoDetail&mid=51150&ContainerSrc=%5BG%5Dnotitle.	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governments separately. Meanwhile, these prizes as non-repayable funds to compensate the 
SMEs are also combined with other non-retrievable pre-funding by the governments to be 
recorded as grants.  
Besides discussed various types of subsidies by the governments, another type of 
government supports in capital is government funding. In my data collection, government 
funding of each SME per year includes the fund of project supporting or lab supporting by the 
governments. Also, it includes public procurement contract.  
Even though public procurement contracts are not free for firms, the payments of these 
contracts are not only healthy but also always ahead of the performance of the contracts. 
Meanwhile, public procurement contracts are offered by the governments, so it must be a process 
in which the behaviors, especially the R&D behaviors, of the firms as the other party to sign 
them and follow the instruction of the governments and particular policies of the governments.  
In addition, since government funding is usually goal-oriented, for my research goals to 
learn the effects of particular government funding on the innovation related activities, the funds 
obtained by the SMEs for encouraging their patent applications and making patent strategies are 
recorded alone.  
One issue in the process of collecting the data of funding is on accounting. Because 
government funding is a type of income for firms, they usually have book cooking to revise the 
amount of income in the same tax year and delay to disclosure the income in parts or in total to 
adjust their payments on tax. In the practice of accounting, firms usually disclosure a funding as 
income when they think that they are doing research under the purpose of the funding. However, 
it is difficult to relay on their description on the annual reports to discriminate their R&D in 
different projects in the same year. These projects may have been processing in parallel. Also, 
there is no a process like auditing to restrict one project to cost the funding of another project, 
and a firm may spend the pool of funding either from governments or investors on various 
innovative projects simultaneously.  
In my research, in order to learn the direct effects of capital on innovative behaviors of the 
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SMEs, my data collection clears this type of book cooking. I record the amount of funding that 
an SME acquired as the amount of capital when it flew into the account of the SME. Even 
though sometimes a government promised to pay a total amount in front and paid by several 
times in practice, I record the exact number of the amount of fund that was available to the SMEs 
every year between 2009 and 2013.  
A similar issue of delay also exists in the data collection for subsidies of the SMEs. For this 
issue, I also only record the subsidies when they in cash are available in the accounts of the 
SMEs because innovative behaviors can only happen with cash rather than any promises. 
Comparatively, the deduction on corporate tax happens directly when firms pay tax to the 
government, so it is recorded as the same year when the corporate tax happened.  
Because the tax credits on corporate tax are in a form of deduction, the SMEs usually do not 
disclosure the exact numbers. For a situation like this, I have to calculate them from the income 
statement of the parent firms of the SMEs by their deduction rates. Even though the SMEs make 
integrated balance sheets and income statements, it is rare that the subsidiaries of the SMEs are 
qualified for the deduction.186 Moreover, recall the difficulties to know the complete subsidiaries 
of the SMEs. It is even more difficult to have the knowledge of their tax rates. Therefore, there 
could be a bias that I undervalued the corporate tax deduction. However, compared to the income 
statement of a parent firm among my sample SMEs to its integrated income statement, I observe 
that the contribution of income from the subsidiaries of the SMEs is usually less than 10% to be 
not significant.  
 
3. General Data Descriptions 
 
This section presents the data description and compares the Beijing SMEs and the Shanghai 
SMEs. T-tests show the R&D investment amount, R&D intensity and patent application 
activities between the Beijing SMEs and Shanghai SMEs are different in a statistically 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  186	   Recall	  the	  standards	  of	  acquiring	  corporate	  tax	  deduction.	  The	  firms	  must	  be	  entitled	  as	  “national	  key	  high-­‐tech	  enterprises”	  or	  “national	  key	  software	  enterprises.”	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significant degree, so the SMEs from the two cities are left in two panels to be studied 
separately.    
    Generally, the SMEs are distinguished as fourteen categories of industries, including the 
industries of mine, media and culture, real estate, construction, trade in wholesale and retail, 
social service, information technology, electronic manufacturing, textile manufacturing, 
mechanical manufacturing, metal and non-metal manufacturing petroleum and plastic 
manufacturing, food and beverage manufacturing, pharmaceutical manufacturing, printing 
manufacturing, and public media and culture. Among those industries, the industry of 
information technology, electronic manufacturing, mechanical manufacturing, petroleum and 
plastic manufacturing, and pharmaceutical manufacturing are the five largest groups of SMEs in 
the samples. 
    Between 2009 and 2013, the Beijing SMEs on average invested more money in R&D than 
the Shanghai SMEs, and the ratio of R&D to revenue of Beijing SMEs on average was higher 
than that of the Shanghai SMEs in a statistically significant degree, shown by t-tests.  
In precise, the summary statistics for innovation and government supports in Table 2.1 
shows that the Beijing SMEs on average invested ￥41.07 RMB in R&D per year between 2009 
and 2013, higher than ￥27.06 million RMB invested by the Shanghai SMEs. The ratio of R&D 
to employee of the Beijing SMEs on average was 5.71, 1.11 percent higher than that of the 
Shanghai SMEs.  
On average, the Beijing SMEs were funded ￥8.08 million RMB by the governments every 
year between 2009 and 2013. By contrast, the Shanghai SMEs on average yearly obtained 
￥6.59 million RMB from government funding.  
In the industry of information technology, the Beijing SMEs were more likely to invest in 
their R&D activities, and had stronger R&D incentives. The t-test for the number of issued 
patents does not show a statistical significance between the SMEs from the two cities. In the 
industry of electronics manufacturing, the size of the Shanghai SMEs on average was larger than 
the Beijing SMEs. The Shanghai SMEs on average spent more money in R&D and had better 
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market performance in the form of revenue than the Beijing SMEs.  
Moreover, in the industry of mechanical manufacturing, the SMEs from the two cities did 
not show statistically significant difference in conducting R&D, IP related activities and revenue, 
but the Shanghai SMEs acquired more government funding during 2009 to 2013.  
In the industry of petroleum and plastic manufacturing, the differences in the revenue 
between the SMEs from Beijing and Shanghai are statistically significant. As regards the results, 
the Beijing SMEs on average received more compensation from the market. In the industry of 
pharmaceutical manufacturing, the result of t-test shows that the Shanghai SMEs were statistical 
significantly larger than the Beijing SMEs. The Shanghai SMEs received more compensation 
from the market during 2009 to 2013 in the form of revenue. The Beijing SMEs on average 
invested 3.34 percent more of the revenue on R&D than the Shanghai SMEs did.  
The differences in the R&D investment, R&D intensity, the numbers of IPRs obtained by 
the SMEs, and market performance between the SMEs from Beijing and Shanghai could present 
the efficiency of the endeavors of the SMEs and the governments when the variances of these 
factors between the SMEs from the two cities are correlated in a statistically significant degree 
but not consistent with each other. Therefore, it is important to compare the SMEs from the two 
cities and their interior and exterior factors relating to innovation.  
 
4. Methodology 
 
4.1. Panel Data Regressions 
 
To explore the research questions in Section III, I firstly develop a panel dataset with the 
above-presented variables and estimate a series of panel data models for them. Because the 
sources of the firm-level data are from two different science parks, their empirical results will be 
compared with each other, combining the local policies in IP and finance. Moreover, beyond the 
comparison between the two parks, to explore the research questions, the further implications 
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will apply comparative analysis between their comprehensive pros and cons and the experience 
of other countries, which have been discussed in the literature review, especially the U.S.’s. This 
part introduces the design of empirical models to test on the panel data.  
The data are coded into three panel datasets for the differences between the two cities where 
they register and headquarter, and one panel dataset is made by the overall case. The panel 
datasets are constructed for the 82 and 58 enterprises and their general information in the market 
of China for five years between 2009 and 2013. Moreover, the same series of estimations are 
applied to analyzing the three datasets, so the methodology should have 410 and 290 
observations separately, and 700 observations in total. However, the difficulties in collecting the 
data of some variables leave with fewer observations in the estimates.  
First, to explore the existence of associations among government funding, prize, corporate 
tax credits, capital gains tax credits and revenue generated by the SMEs, the two-way effect 
models are estimated as the followings187: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (1) 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!"+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"      (2) 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (3) 
 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (4) 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  187	   The	  lagging	  effects	  of	  the	  explanatory	  variables	  and	  control	  variables	  representing	  innovation-­‐related	  information	  are	  also	  tested,	  but	  the	  results	  are	  not	  as	  good	  as	  the	  results	  with	  the	  immediate	  effects	  of	  the	  variables.	  Therefore	  and	  finally,	  the	  models	  only	  stay	  with	  the	  immediate	  effects	  of	  the	  independent	  variables.	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    where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
i denotes the individual SME. t denotes the year in which the SMEs innovate to apply and 
acquire patents, and f denotes the industry type. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡, a dummy variable, is controlled as fixed, 
denoting the time effect and varying across the five years. 𝜇! is an individual effect and varies 
across individual SMEs, but not across time. The remainder disturbance 𝜈!" denotes the residual 
varying with individuals and time. In different individuals or levels of time, ∝ denotes the 
intercept and 𝛽!, 𝛽!, ..., 𝛽!" denote the slopes. 
Revenue of an SME (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒) and net profit of the SME (𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡), the dependent 
variables, are chosen to capture the performance and competitiveness in the market by the SME. 
The explanatory variables, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 and 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒, are chosen to signify the subsidies or grants 
released to the SMEs by governments in different stages of their capital demands and for 
different reasons. 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒  is coded as ex post compensations when an SME has finished 
particular compulsory activities for non-profit or realized particular achievements in a year. In 
contrast, 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑 is coded as ex ante sponsorship of the innovative projects or the management 
cost in an SME in a year.  𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 are the other two explanatory variables to signify the two 
types of tax credits – corporate tax credit and capital gains tax credit. As tax credits, they are also 
ex post compensations.  𝑅&𝐷𝐼, 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒, 𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 and 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 are the control variables and indicate 
R&D intensity, the number of issued utility patents, issued utility models, and registered 
software copyrights in an SME in a year. Since the SMEs have limited ability on innovation 
compared to large firms, most of the SMEs cannot annually acquire issued utility patents from 
SIPO, which is also proved by the descriptive statistical results. The models also add a dummy 
variable as a control to distinguish the SMEs acquiring issued utility patents from the SMEs not.  
The other variables representing individual firm’s characteristics and time are also included 
as control variables. The number of employees (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒) surrogates for the size of an SME 
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growing every year. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 is a dummy variable to control for the category of industries 
where an SME is, so it only varies across individuals, but not across time.  
Individual effect, 𝜇!, is added to account for the unobservable individual heterogeneity in 
each SME. It accounts for any individual-specific effect that is not included in the models, so the 
models having it can in principle control for all time-invariant unobserved abilities. 
When estimating each of the models, based on the different assumptions about 𝜇! and the 
interactions between it and other regressors, estimators should be used differently as the 
followings: 
 
If the 𝜇! are assumed to be fixed-parameters to be estimated, it is enough to use ordinary 
least squares estimators. Formally, an ordinary least squares estimator should be used if the 
variance of the 𝜇! is 0, i.e. 𝜎!! = 0 for all i.  
This model is referred as Pool Ordinary Least Squares Model (Pooled OLS) for panel 
datasets.  
 
If the 𝜇! are assumed to be random parameters but linearly independent of other regressors, 
the model should use random effects estimators. Formally, a random effects estimator should be 
used if the variances of the 𝜇! are not 0, but the covariance between the 𝜇! and other regressors 
are 0, i.e. 𝜎!! ≠ 0 for some but all i,  
and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋!" , 𝜇!) = 0  
for all  𝑋!" ∈ {𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ,𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ,𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ,𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!" ,𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" ,𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" ,   𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" ,𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" ,𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" , 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! ,𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!}, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
    This model is referred as Random Effects Model.  
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If the 𝜇! are random and not linearly independent of other regressors, the model should use 
first-difference estimators. Formally, a first-difference estimator should be used if the variance of 𝜇! and the covariance between 𝜇! and other regressors can both be not 0, i.e. 𝜎!! ≠ 0 for some but all i,  
and 𝐶𝑜𝑣(𝑋!" , 𝜇!) ≠ 0  
for some  𝑋!" ∈ {𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ,𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ,𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ,𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!" ,𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" ,𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" ,   𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" ,𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" ,𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" , 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! ,𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟!}, 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
This model is referred as Fixed Effects Model. 
 
In order to explore how the government funding, prizes and tax credits are associated with 
the SMEs’ performance represented either by their revenue or net profit through their R&D or 
the issued IPRs from SIPO and registered software copyrights, besides the above 
main-effect-only models, product-term models are designed to include the interactions between 
the explanatory variables and the control variables representing the innovation-relevant 
information. The two-way effect models are estimated as the followings: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝛽!(𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁!"∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿!")+ 𝛽!"(𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!")+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇!+ 𝜈!"        (5) 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!"+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝛽!!(𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁!" ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿!")+ 𝛽!"(𝑅&𝐷𝐼!"∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!")+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (6) 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝛽!(𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁!"∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿!")+ 𝛽!"(𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!")+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇!+ 𝜈!"        (7) 
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 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝛽!!(𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁!" ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿!")+ 𝛽!"(𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!")+ 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (8) 
 
    where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 is a matrix including 𝑅&𝐷𝐼, 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 and 𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒. 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 is a 
matrix including 𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑, 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒, 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 and 𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡. Since government funding, 
subsidies, corporate tax credits and capital gains tax credits are usually authorized to the firms 
for supporting their innovation, 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 and 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 should be correlated with each 
other. The two-way interaction term, 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁 ∗ 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿, captures their interacted effects 
on the variation of the dependent variables and helps to clarify the association between the 
explanatory variables involved in 𝐶𝐴𝑃𝐼𝑇𝐴𝐿 and the dependent variables when the intervention 
of the control variables involved in 𝐼𝑁𝑂𝑉𝐴𝑇𝐼𝑂𝑁  is too significant to be ignored or 
circumvented.  
The standards of being qualified to entitle to corporate tax credits take account of both the 
number of IPRs, especially utility patents, and the ratio of R&D investment to revenue, which is 
another measure of R&D intensity other than the ratio of R&D investment to employee.188 
Corporate tax credits acquired by an SME must be relevant to its R&D intensity and number of 
issued utility patents acquired from SIPO, so a three-way interaction term, 𝑅&𝐷𝐼 ∗ 𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒, is also included in the product-term models.  
 
4.2. Difference-in-Difference Specifications 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	   Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Hexue	  Jishu	  Bu(中华人民共和国科学技术部)[The	  Ministry	  of	  Science	  and	  Tehnology	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Caizheng	  Bu(中华人民共和国财政部)[The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  and	  Guojia	  Shuiwu	  Zongju(国家税务总局)[The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Administration	  of	  Taxation],	  Gaoxin	  Jishu	  Qiye	  Rending	  Guanli	  
Banfa(高新技术企业认定管理办法)[Hi-­‐Tech	  Enterprises	  Certification	  Methods].	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There were tax policy changes happening in 2011 and regarding the industry of software 
and interpreted circuits (IC). Both the corporate tax policy and the capital gains tax policy were 
amended. To be consistent with the research questions, this part utilizes difference-in-difference 
(DID) regressions and the regressions adopt 2011 as the intervention year to capture the 
responses of the policy changes on innovation and market performance by SMEs. In other words, 
this is to test for the heterogeneous responses across SMEs to the two tax policy changes.  
The software or IC firms entitled to corporate tax credits or capital gains tax credits are the 
treated groups, in which they are entitled to higher rates of tax credits than the other firms.189 
Correspondingly, the other firms are the control groups. The difference-in-difference designs are 
estimated as the followings: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"#$#! =∝ +𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! + 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!)+ 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!"+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝛽!"𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇!+ 𝜈!"    (9) 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒 !"#$#! =∝ +𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! + 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!)+ 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!"+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝛽!"𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝜇!+ 𝜈!"  (10) 
 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!"#$#! =∝ +𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! + 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!)+ 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!"+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑧𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!!    (11) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  189	   Guojia	  Shuiwu	  Zongju(国家税务总局)[The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Admistration	  of	  Taxation]	  and	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Caizheng	  Bu(中华人民共和国财政部)[The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Guanyu	  Jinyibu	  Guli	  Ruanjian	  Chanye	  He	  
Jicheng	  Dianlu	  Chanye	  Fazhan	  Qiye	  Suodeshui	  Zhengce	  De	  Tongzhi(关于进一步鼓励软件产业和集成电路产业发展企业所
得税政策的通知)[The	  Notice	  of	  Corporate	  Tax	  Policy	  for	  Further	  Encouraging	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  Industries	  of	  Software	  
and	  Intergreted],	  2012.	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where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} ,   𝑡1 ∈ 𝑇! ={1, 2}, c ∈ 𝐶 = {1,2} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  !"#"$%"!"#$%&'' and !"#$%&'(#!"#"$%"   are the scaled revenue and surrogate for the ratio of revenue to 
employee and profit margin, used as financial definitions to represent firm performances. 
Besides revenue and net profit, the difference-in-difference designs estimate their average 
degree. 
Category fixed effects and the time horizon fixed effects representing the policy change are 
specified as 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! and 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!. 𝐹𝐼𝑁𝐴𝑁𝐶𝐸 is an index taking account of the amount of 
short-term loans and venture capital shareholder ratio to represent the capital resources that 
SMEs usually use other than government grants or subsidies.190 The regressions correct the error 
structure for heteroskedasticity using the White-Huber estimator. The coefficient of the 
interaction, 𝛽!, surrogates for the DID effect. Under the theory, it is predicted a positive value as 
an estimation result in the model 11. 
Following the panel data regressions to test the effects of tax credits on innovation and 
market performance by SMEs, the interaction between the DID effects and R&D intensity is 
controlled and the difference-in-difference-in-difference designs are estimated as the followings:  
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"#$#! =∝ +𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! + 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!)+ 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!"+ 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!")+ 𝛽!(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!")+ 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!")+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜈!"    (12) 
 𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!"#$#! =∝ +𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! + 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!)+ 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!"+ 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!")+ 𝛽!(𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! ∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!")+ 𝛽!(𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝!∗ 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!")+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"    (13) 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  190	   Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	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    where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} ,   𝑡1 ∈𝑇! = {1, 2}, c ∈ 𝐶 = {1,2} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
 
V. Results and Implications 
 
Implication 1: Corporate tax credits have an essenstial effect on improving the revenue and net 
profit of SMEs. The strength of the effect on improving net profit and revenue is stronger for the 
innovation-intensive SMEs.  
 
Sub-Implication 1.1: There is one exception for improving revenue that the effect of corporate 
tax credits turns to be negative when the innovation-intensive SMEs acquire too many issued 
utility patents in a year. 
 
Overall, inside each of the estimations of revenue or net profit which are shown in model 5 
and model 6 in Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, the coefficients on corporate tax credits are significant 
and higher than capital gains tax credits and government funding. On average, one more RMB 
dollar of tax credits in corporate tax contributes to a growth of ￥6.9 RMB in revenue and 
￥7.3 RMB in net profit. For the group of Beijing and Shanghai SMEs, the coefficients on 
corporate tax credits are also consistently significant and positive. Those regression results come 
to a conclusion that corporate tax credits have an important effect on improving the revenue and 
net profit of SMEs.  
To explore how this encouragement regime works corresponded to innovative activities, I 
turn to read the product-term models shown in Table 2.4 and Table 2.5. With the overall panel’s 
samples, the product-term models used to predict revenue in Table 2.4 suggest that the 
coefficients on R&D intensity and corporate tax credits are insignificant. To put it another way, 
the coefficients on R&D intensity and corporate tax credits do not represent the main effects on 
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revenue when they are considered separately, as they are traditionally thought to be in the 
hypothesis for the “main-effect-only” model in Table 2.2. By contrast, the coefficients on their 
interaction term yield a statistically significant and positive result, suggesting that the presence of 
an interaction effect. This interaction effect is consistently shown in the estimations for the 
groups of Beijing’s and Shanghai’s SMEs.  
In the overall panel shown by Model 4 in Table 2.4, for every 1 unit that overall R&D 
intensity increases, the slope of revenue on corporate tax credits is predicted to increase 0.99 
units when the number of issued utility patents equals zero. Taking the variation of issued utility 
patents into account, this positive effect still remains in the scale of issued utility patents in my 
samples, even when the three-way interaction term among corporate tax credits, R&D intensity 
and issued utility patents has a negative effect on estimating the growth of revenue. 
In the case of Shanghai in Model 3 in Table 2.2, the main-effect-only model cannot reflect 
the effects of R&D intensity on revenue. Compared to this model, Model 3 in Table 2.4 adds an 
interaction term between R&D intensity and corporate tax credits, and the interaction term 
roughly accounts for 6% of the variance in revenue. From the product-term model, even though 
the coefficient on corporate tax credits turn to negative or not statistically significant, rather than 
they are traditionally thought of, the coefficient on the interaction term is statistical significant 
and positive, shown by Model 3 in Table 2.4. Regardless of the statistically insignificant effects 
of R&D intensity alone on revenue that is reflected by this product-term model, for every 1 unit 
R&D intensity increases, the slope of revenue on corporate tax credits is predicted to increase 
3.97 unit. When R&D intensity is over 2.5, the overall coefficients on corporate tax credits yield 
a positive result. It suggests that only in innovation-intensive SMEs, corporate tax credits can 
make significant positive effects on revenue, and the effects can be larger when the R&D 
intensity of an SME is higher. In fact, there is a threshold that more than 50% of my Shanghai’s 
samples can achieve.  
In the estimations to predict net profit, the effects of corporate tax credits are consistently 
positive with the three panels. In the case of Beijing, Model 2 in Table 2.4 shows that the 
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coefficients of the interaction term still imply that the effects of the interaction between R&D 
intensity and corporate tax credits are statistically significant and positive. For every 1 unit that 
R&D intensity increases, the slope of revenue on corporate tax credits increase 0.71 units, when 
issued utility patents is 1.23 (mean of issued utility patent). However, there is a three-way 
interaction effect, which is negative, the coefficient on the three-way interaction effect suggests 
that for some SMEs which were with a high R&D intensity (roughly over 11.7 in this case) and 
acquired more than a particular number of issued utility patents (6 in this case) in a year, 
corporate tax credits could have negative effects on revenue through the interaction with the two 
moderator variables. There is a threshold that 95% of the Beijing samples cannot achieve. On the 
other hand, there is also a negative three-way interaction effects among corporate tax credits, 
issued patents and R&D intensity, and there is another transition of the positive effects of 
corporate tax credits on net profit, shown by Model 1 of Table 2.5. For the Beijing SMEs whose 
R&D intensity was over 0.99 and acquired on average more than 2 issued utility patents in a year, 
the positive correlation between corporate tax credits and net profit shown by the 
main-effect-only model in Table 2.3 turns to be negative.  
In short, the three panels under main-effect-only models consistently show that the strength 
of the effect of corporate tax credits on improving net profit is stronger among the 
innovation-intensive SMEs. The same trend also shows in the estimations to predict revenue in 
most of the circumstances. However, if we look into the subsidy mechanism corresponding to 
innovation activities, it is not be always true for a small group of innovation-intensive Beijing 
SMEs, which acquired utility patents in some amount higher than the average as well, and it is 
also not always true for over half of the Shanghai SMEs, which are innovation-intensive.  
 
Sub-Implication 1.2: Capital gains tax credits have a positive effect on improving the revenue 
and net profit of SMEs, but the strength of the effect is weaker compared to corporate tax credits. 
 
In both the estimations of revenue and net profit with the overall panel shown in model 5 
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and model 6 of Table 2.2 and Table 2.3, the coefficients on capital gains tax credits are 
statistically significant and positive. On average, one more RMB dollar of capital gains tax 
credits contributes to a growth of ￥3.13 RMB in revenue and ￥2.49 RMB in net profit when 
the models hold corporate tax credits as constant at their average level. However, those 
additional contributions by capital gains tax credits are equal to only half of the positive effects 
of corporate tax credits.  
While the estimations to predict net profit cannot reflect a direct effect of R&D intensity in 
the overall case, capital gains tax credits can help to explain the relationship between R&D 
intensity and net profit. The coefficients on interaction term for R&D intensity and capital gains 
tax credits in Model 3 and Model 4 of Table is statistically significant and positive. In other 
words, having capital gains tax credits can help the innovation-intensive SMEs to be more 
capable on improving net profit in the general case. For every ￥10,000 RMB that capital gains 
tax credits increase, the slope of net profit on R&D intensity is predicted to increase 0.49 units 
when government funding and corporate tax credits are zero. 
For the group of Beijing SMEs, while the estimations cannot show an interaction effect 
between R&D intensity and capital gains tax credits as the interaction effect between R&D 
intensity and corporate tax credits shown, the coefficients on capital gains tax credits and the 
coefficients on corporate tax credits reflect a consistent result with the overall case. That is, 
capital gains tax credits have a significant positive effect on revenue and net profit, but the effect 
is weaker than the effect of corporate tax credits. By contrast, for the group of Shanghai SMEs, 
the estimation results cannot imply a significant effect of capital gains tax credits on either 
revenue or net profit. Even though the coefficient on capital gains tax credits is statistically 
significant in Model 3 of Table 2.2, the statistical significance of the effect of capital gains tax 
credits does not remain after the estimation is improved by holding the significant interaction 
effect between corporate tax credits and R&D intensity,. 
The inconsistency of the effects of capital gains tax credits on revenue and net profit could 
be caused by a selection bias. Different from the rule of corporate tax credits which refer to the 
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R&D efforts by the firms, capital gains tax credits are only for the software industry’s products 
and integrated circuit products from the manufacturing in electronics.191 The Shanghai SMEs 
(n=29) in the industry of manufacturing in electronics are more than the Beijing SMEs (n=15), 
and t-test shows that the Shanghai SMEs on average invested more in R&D and achieved higher 
revenue. By contrast, in the software industry, the Beijing SMEs (n=194) are more than the 
Shanghai SMEs (n=63), and the results of t-test shows that the Beijing SMEs on average 
invested more in R&D and had larger R&D to revenue ratio. This can be the reason why the 
overall panel’s estimation results about the effects of capital gains tax credits on revenue and net 
profit are consistent with the Beijing panel’s estimations results, but inconsistent with the 
Shanghai panel’s.  
 
Sub-Implication 1.3: When there are no government financing supports, including corporate tax 
credits, capital gains tax credits, government funding and prizes, the effects of R&D intensity on 
improving SMEs’ revenue are not straightly clear. However, it is clear that improving corporate 
tax credits can significantly improve the effects of R&D intensity on improving the SMEs’ 
revenue, compared to capital gains tax credits, government funding and prizes. 
 
With the Beijing panel, the interaction-term models in Table 2.4 presents the contribution of 
covariance between R&D intensity and different types of government financing supports, 
including corporate tax credits, capital gains tax credits, government funding and prizes on the 
variation of revenue.  
Model 1 and Model 2 show that the coefficients of interaction term between prizes and 
R&D intensity are statistically significant but negative. Moreover, with the overall panel and the 
Shanghai panel, the interaction effects cannot explain the variance of revenue in a statistically 
significant degree.  	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   Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Caizheng	  Bu(中华人民共和国财政部)[The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  P.R.C.]	  and	  Guojia	  Shuiwu	  Zongju(国家税务总局)[The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Admistration	  of	  Taxation],	  Guanyu	  Guanjian	  Chanpin	  Zengzhishui	  Zhengce	  
De	  Tongzhi(关于软件产品增值税政策的通知)[The	  Notice	  About	  Software	  Products’	  Capital	  Gains	  Tax	  Policy],	  2011,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.chinatax.gov.cn/n810341/n810765/n812156/n812464/c1186045/content.html.	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By contrast, the coefficients on the interaction term between corporate tax credits and R&D 
intensity are statistically significant and positive with the three panels. While there is a negative 
three-way interaction effect among corporate tax credits, R&D intensity and issued patents, this 
two-way interaction effect stays positive on estimating the growth of revenue when issued utility 
patents are less than on average 4.54. For every ￥10,000 RMB that corporate tax credits 
increase, the slope of revenue on R&D intensity increases 1.39 units when there are no prizes 
and an SME does not acquire issued utility patents. When an SME acquires one utility patent, the 
slope of revenue on R&D intensity increases 1.22 units for every ￥10,000 RMB that corporate 
tax credits increase, which is positive but 0.17 units lower than the previous degree.  
If I take one-step back to explore the relationship between R&D intensity and revenue, 
Table 2.2 and Table 2.4 show that the coefficients on R&D intensity are not consistently 
statistically significant and positive. For the Beijing group, when corporate tax credit is held as 
constant in its average degree (￥8,187,400 RMB), 1 unit increase in R&D intensity goes with 
￥12,780,000 RMB increase in revenue. The effect of R&D intensity is obviously improved 
comparing to the coefficients on R&D intensity in the estimations that do not control for the 
interaction effect, shown in Table 2.2. Without taking account the interaction effect, 1 unit 
increase in R&D intensity only goes along with ￥8,539,000 RMB increase in revenue.  
For the Shanghai group, the main-effect-only models of Model 3 and Model 4 in Table 2.2 
cannot suggest a statistically significant effect of R&D intensity. After the interaction term 
between R&D intensity and corporate tax credits is added, even though Model 3 in Table 2.4 
reflects that the R&D intensity has a statistically significant and negative effect on the growth of 
revenue, the interaction effects help to moderate this negative effect of R&D intensity. When 
corporate tax credits equal zero, 1 unit increase in R&D intensity goes along with ￥19,430,000 
RMB decrease in revenue. However, when corporate tax credit is held as constant in its average 
(￥7,375,300 RMB), 1 unit increase in R&D intensity goes with ￥9,827,815.1 RMB decrease 
in revenue, which is only half of the decreasing extent in the circumstance of releasing the 
interaction effect between R&D intensity and corporate tax credits. 
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In the overall case, the interaction term between R&D and corporate tax credits is also 
important to explain how the effect of R&D intensity on improving revenue is realized. The 
statistical significance of the coefficient on R&D intensity does not remain when this interaction 
term between R&D intensity and issued utility patents and a three-way interaction term among 
the three factors are added. The coefficients of the three interaction terms are statistical 
significant, which means that there are both a two-way and a three-way effects. When corporate 
tax credits and issued utility patents equal zero, it is difficult to explain how R&D intensity has 
an effect on improving revenue. When corporate tax credits and issued utility patents are 
constant as their mean (￥7,875,400 RMB, 0.97), 1 unit increase in R&D intensity goes with 
￥7,025,565.59 RMB increase in revenue. This effect is only in a slightly lower degree than the 
effects of R&D intensity by its own, shown by Model 6 in Table 2.2. The difference of the 
estimation results in Model 6 of Table 2.2 and model 4 of Table 2.4 suggests that the positive 
effects of R&D intensity on improving the growth of revenue can be importantly through 
corporate tax credits.  
Therefore, in order to improve the SMEs’ revenue, especially when the SMEs do not 
acquire many utility patents from PTO, improving corporate tax credits can effectively improve 
the R&D intensity’s effects on improving revenue. These effects reflect the SMEs’ capabilities 
on the immediate transformation from R&D investment to revenue.  
 
Implication 2: Government funding in the forms of general government funding and public R&D 
funding is being used by SMEs in their business activities (e.g., investment), especially the weak 
innovative SMEs, even when net profits do not improve and the government is not able to make 
more tax income from the funded SMEs. The innovation-intensive SMEs are better at utilizing 
government funding to improve their net profit, so the government can make more tax income 
from the funded innovation-intensive SMEs.  
 
General government funding for SMEs is like an investment to incubate SMEs and help 
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their survival and growth. The “dividends” for the government are the tax payments by the 
funded SMEs. If the net profit of the funded SMEs is increased, they are able to collect more tax 
from the SMEs. Besides the goals on improving joint innovation among various entities or on 
developing particular types of innovation in the favor of public interests, public R&D funding for 
SMEs also aims to encourage SMEs to conduct R&D activities and help them to survive and 
grow in the market.  
Table 2.3 shows that the coefficients on government funding are always statistically 
significant with the three panels’ samples in predicting net profit. Moreover, the coefficients are 
positive in the cases of Beijing and the overall, but negative in Shanghai’s case.  
It is reasonable that when an SME acquired a big amount of capital from government as 
grants or R&D funding, the SME has the power to adjust an appropriate way to run the business 
with the capital and improve its net profit. Nevertheless, it is difficult to know if this process of 
promoting net profit involves the effect of R&D by the SMEs. The correlation coefficients of 
government funding on the increase of R&D expenditure of the SMEs are statistically significant 
but low. (r=0.33 for the group of Beijing, 0.27 for the group of Shanghai, and r=0.31 for the 
overall samples). Meanwhile, the coefficients on R&D intensity are not statistically significant in 
the case of Beijing and overall, shown by Model 1 and Model 6 in Table 2.3.  
The estimations in Table 2.5 suggest that there are interaction effects of government 
funding and R&D intensity on improving net profit in these two circumstances. The coefficients 
on the interaction term between government funding and R&D intensity yield statistically 
significant and positive results. Those results suggest that having higher level of R&D intensity 
can help the effects of government funding on improving net profit. For every 1 unit R&D 
intensity increases, the slope of net profit on government funding is predicted to increase 0.598 
units (￥5,980 RMB) in the Beijing’s case, and increase 0.496 units (￥4,960 RMB) in the 
overall case. When R&D intensity equals zero, the coefficients on government funding in the 
models of Table 2.5 suggest that government funding hardly has a positive effect on improving 
net profit. Even the worse, the effect of government funding on net profit is negative. For the 
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Beijing group, when the R&D intensity of an SME can achieve a degree of 6.44 and over, 
government funding can produce a positive effect on improving net profit. For the overall group, 
same positive government funding can be released when the R&D intensity of an SME can 
achieve a degree of 6.37 and over. Actually, there are only more than 25% but less than 50% of 
the sample SMEs that can achieve this degree of R&D intensity. 
For the group of Shanghai, even though the interaction term between R&D intensity and 
government funding cannot explain the variance of net profit in a statistical significant degree, 
the coefficients of R&D intensity consistently yield statistical significant and positive results in 
Model 3 of Table 2.3 and Model 2 of Table 2.5, suggesting that improving R&D intensity has a 
positive effect on improving net profit, along with the variance of government funding. In other 
words, when the Shanghai SMEs were using government funding in their business activities, the 
insensitive innovation ones in Shanghai could come out with higher net profit.  
In general, learned from the estimations results, government funding is significantly used by 
the SMEs in their business activities, especially the weak innovative SMEs, and the 
innovation-intensive SMEs are better at using government funding to improve their net profit. 
Therefore, in order to assist SMEs to improve their net profit through government funding, in the 
forms of either grants or R&D funding, paying the funding to the SMEs and monitoring the 
progress of their R&D projects should not be the end of the story. The government should 
consider monitoring the R&D activities in the SMEs and auditing their R&D expenditure to 
ensure that they are insensitively innovative to be able to improve net profit through the funding.  
 
Implication 3: while the more specified corporate tax policy, which has been admended in 2011, 
effectively induced the subsidized firms in the software and IC industry to conduct R&D, the 
broader and more unified capital gains tax policy after 2011 which is to strongly encourage the 
development of the software and IC industry, are ineffective to promote R&D commercialization 
and the growth of the SMEs in those two industries.  
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l The 2011 Amendments of Corporate Tax Policy and Capital Gains Tax Policy in China 
 
In 2011, both the capital gains tax policy and the corporate tax policy have been amended in 
China. The capital gains tax credits target the firms that sell software and integrated circuit (IC) 
related products. The scope of the capital gains tax credit is broadened to embedded software 
products and the rate of the tax credits is unified to the lowest level for all of them.192 After the 
entitled firms pay a tax rate of 17% on capital gains tax, their payment that is over a tax rate of 3% 
on capital gains tax can immediately get returned.  
On the side of corporate tax policies, the software and IC firms are entitled to at least 5% 
lower tax rate on corporate tax than other firms regardless of the entitlement of corporate tax 
credits for their technical innovation in other industries. The key software firms and the key IC 
firms are entitled to a corporate tax rate of 10%, 15% lower than the normal corporate tax rate, 
and 5% lower than the corporate tax rate for the national high-tech firms.193   
Before 2011, the IC companies that are entitled to corporate tax credits are required the 
same as the software companies by the government. 194 After 2011, the entitled IC firms are 
specified based on their R&D investment, size of their R&D department, the process of 
developing technology and commercializing the technologies and the supply chain.195 
 
l The Effects of the 2011 Capital Gains Tax Policy Change on the SMEs’ Revenue, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	   Ibid.	   	  193	   The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Admistration	  of	  Taxation	  and	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  P.R.C.,	  Guanyu	  Jinyibu	  Guli	  Ruanjian	  
Chanye	  He	  Jicheng	  Dianlu	  Chanye	  Fazhan	  Qiye	  Suodeshui	  Zhengce	  De	  Tongzhi(关于进一步鼓励软件产业和集成电路产业发
展企业所得税政策的通知)[The	  Notice	  of	  Corporate	  Tax	  Policy	  for	  Further	  Encouraging	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  Industries	  of	  
Software	  and	  Integrated	  Circuits].	  194	   Guojia	  Shuiwu	  Zongju(国家税务总局)[The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Admistration	  of	  Taxation]	  and	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Caizheng	  Bu(中华人民共和国财政部)[The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Guanyu	  Qiye	  Suodeshui	  Ruogan	  Youhui	  
Zhengce	  De	  Tongzhi(关于企业所得税若干优惠政策的通知)[The	  Notice	  about	  the	  Favorable	  Policies	  on	  Corporate	  Tax	  
Credits],	  2008,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.tax.sh.gov.cn/pub/xxgk/zcfg/qysds/200803/t20080317_286587.html.	  195	   The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Admistration	  of	  Taxation	  and	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  P.R.C.,	  Guanyu	  Jinyibu	  Guli	  Ruanjian	  
Chanye	  He	  Jicheng	  Dianlu	  Chanye	  Fazhan	  Qiye	  Suodeshui	  Zhengce	  De	  Tongzhi(关于进一步鼓励软件产业和集成电路产业发
展企业所得税政策的通知)[The	  Notice	  of	  Corporate	  Tax	  Policy	  for	  Further	  Encouraging	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  Industries	  of	  
Software	  and	  Intergreted	  Circuits].	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Revenue/Employee & Profit Margin 
 
Shown by Table 2.5, the difference of the average revenue generated by the SMEs not 
entitled to capital gains tax policies yields a statistically significant and positive result, 
suggesting that they improved their revenue in a statistically significant degree before and after 
2011; nevertheless, the variance of their average net profit is insignificant shown by Table 2.7. 
By contrast, the average revenue of the SMEs entitled to capital gains tax credits for their sales in 
the industry of software and IC industry did not vary in a statistically significant degree after the 
policy change. Even worse, the difference of the average net profit yields a statistically 
significant and negative result, suggesting that their average profitability became less after the 
policy change.  
Before 2011, the differences of the average revenue and net profit between the control 
group and treated group are not statistically significant. It cannot be proven that the degree of 
revenue and net profit of the two groups is different from each other. However, after the policy 
change in 2011, the treated group on average generates lower revenue and net profit than the 
control group in a statistically significant degree. More perspicuously, Figure 2.1 exhibits the 
variation of the mean of revenue of the two groups before and after the policy changes, 
suggesting the amended policy obviously impairs the market efficiency of the subsidized 
software or IC SMEs.  
Table 2.6 shows that the subsidized SMEs on average generated ￥157,656,980 RMB less 
revenue than the non-subsidized SMEs did. Shown in Table 2.7, the subsidized SMEs on average 
generated ￥48,000,000 RMB less net profit than the non-subsidized SMEs did.  
For the overall case, both the diff-in-diff effects shown in the two tables yield statistically 
significant and negative results, suggesting that the subsidized SMEs on average have a worse 
ability on generating revenue and net profit compared to the other SMEs after the capital gains 
tax policy change, the goal of which is to assist the subsidized firms to generate more revenue.  
The revenue in Table 2.8, which is also the dependent variable in Table 2.6, is on a scale of 
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employee and the results are consistent with the regression results in Table 2.6. More clearly, 
revenue per employee by the treated group became ￥102,200 RMB lower after the policy 
change, even when the control group’s revenue per employee has increased by ￥100,300 RMB. 
The subsidized software or IC SMEs on capital gains tax credits could not improve their revenue 
like the other SMEs, the revenue of which was growing in a statistically significant degree.  
Table 2.9 shows that the treated group’s profit margin (net profit/revenue) was 0.0958 units 
lower after the policy change. It was 0.0658 units higher than the control group’s before the 
policy change, but the profit margin of the two groups became identical after the policy change. 
The diff-in-diff effect yields a statistically significant and negative result, suggesting that the 
capital gains tax policy change results in a negative effect on improving the subsidized software 
or IC SMEs’ profit margin.  
The above results have testified Atkinson’s theory on designing tax credits to some 
extent.196 Atkinson suggests that the government expands R&D tax credits to drive innovation. 
Instead of stimulating a relocation of R&D activities,197 likewise, the SMEs may reorganize 
their business to refer to software products, which is not necessary to generate more revenue or 
profit compared to their original main business. What is worse that besides the firms being 
bewildering, a tax policy directing firms to conduct inefficient market activities can even hamper 
their growth as the other firms in a growing economy.  
 
l The Effect of the 2011 Corporate Tax Policy Change on Revenue and R&D Intensity 
 
The diff-in-diff regression in Table 2.10 tests the intervention by corporate tax policy’s 
change in 2011 for encouraging the Industry of software and ICs. The regression results are 
reminiscent of the diff-in-diff regression results in Table 2.6 representing the capital gains tax 
policy’s change, even though the treated group and the control group could target different 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  196	   Atkinson,	  “Expanding	  the	  R&E	  Tax	  Credit	  to	  Drive	  Innovation,	  Competitiveness	  and	  Prosperity.”	  197	   Lolita	  Paff,	  “State-­‐Level	  R&D	  Tax	  Credits:	  A	  Firm-­‐Level	  Analysis,”	  Topics	  in	  Economic	  Analysis	  and	  Poliy	  5,	  no.	  1	  (2005):	  1–27.	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observations.  
Dynamically, Figure 2.1 shows that the means of the subsidized software or IC SMEs 
before 2011 are higher than the other SMEs’, but the means turns to be lower than the other 
SMEs’ after the policy change. When controlling for R&D intensity and other individual 
characteristics as covariates, the diff-in-diff regression results in Table 2.10 shows that the mean 
of the revenue of the subsidized software or IC SMEs is ￥130 million RMB, only ￥36.76 
million RMB lower than the control group, subsidized for innovating in the industries other than 
software and IC and probably with a lower rate. 
The difference, however, between the means of the treated group and the control group is 
statistically insignificant before 2011. Therefore, it is hardly to prove the revenue of the two 
groups of SMEs is different and even to make a meaningful comparison before 2011. Basically, 
the revenue of the two groups of SMEs was identical before 2011. However, after 2011, the 
subsidized software or IC SMEs on average generated ￥206,825,230 RMB than the other 
SMEs. The DID effect also yields a statistically significant and negative result, suggesting that 
the software or IC SMEs entitling to a higher rate of corporate tax rate generated less revenue 
than the other SMEs after the revised corporate tax policy sets detailed requests for the IC SMEs.  
On the other hand, if the revenue is scaled by employee, the regression result suggests that 
there is no statistically significant DID effect of the corporate tax policy change. In other words, 
the corporate tax policy change in 2011 is not necessary to impose worse market performances 
by the subsidized software or IC SMEs. Their ratio of revenue to employee is always identical 
with the other SMEs during 2009 to 2013. In this situation, the reason why the policy change has 
a negative effect on the modulus of revenue of the subsidized software or IC SMEs may imply 
an industry adjustment of the software and IC industries. As the number of the units of the 
software or IC SMEs is growing, the size of the units presented by their revenue could be 
shrinking.  
Under this situation, to explore the dynamical effect of the corporate tax policy change in 
2011 on promoting R&D by the SMEs, Figure 2.2 shows that the mean of the R&D intensity of 
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the subsidized software or IC SMEs has became slightly higher than the other SMEs’ since 2010, 
and the difference grew to be obvious after 2011.  
Furthermore, the diff-in-diff effect on R&D intensity before and after the corporate tax 
policy change yields a statistically significant result, shown by Table 2.11. The difference of 
means of the R&D intensity between the treated group and the control group yields a statistically 
significant and negative result before 2011. More precisely, the R&D intensity of the subsidized 
software or IC SMEs on average is 1.34 lower than the other SMEs. After 2011, the difference is 
statistically significant, but turns out to be positive, suggesting that the R&D intensity of the 
subsidized software or IC SMEs on average is 1.28 higher than the other SMEs.  
Implied by the statistically significant and positive DID effect, even though the other firms 
have improved their R&D intensity in a statistically significant degree through the policy change, 
the subsidized software and IC SMEs improved their R&D intensity in statistically significant 
and higher degree than the other firms.  
After the policy change in 2011, the software market in China finally became rational so as 
to be consistent with the Mann’s analysis for the software industry: the Software industry’s R&D 
intensity should be higher than other industries. 198  Meanwhile, it is consistent with the 
Atkinson’s design on tax credit regime.199 Atkinson suggests that the government expands R&D 
tax credits and uses unified rate of tax credits to drive innovation. As a result, the firms, 
especially small firms, can be clearly instructed by the tax policy and acquire the maximum 
support from the government. For the software or IC SMEs subsidized with the highest tax credit 
rate on corporate tax compared to the SMEs in the other innovative industries, after the 
prerequisites for entitling that tax credit rate were further clarified by the amended tax policy in 
2011, the software and IC SMEs have materially improved their R&D intensity in an extent that 
is much stronger than the case of the other firms, even though the other firms have also improved 
their R&D intensity during the same period.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  198	   Ronald	  J.	  Mann,	  “Do	  Patents	  Facilitate	  Financing	  in	  the	  Software	  Industry?,”	  Texas	  Law	  Review	  83,	  no.	  4	  (2005):	  961–1030.	  199	   Atkinson,	  “Expanding	  the	  R&E	  Tax	  Credit	  to	  Drive	  Innovation,	  Competitiveness	  and	  Prosperity.”	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l Comparison of the Effects of Two Tax Policy Changes on the SMEs 
 
When comparing the two interventions both happening in 2011 together in the regressions 
in Table 2.12, the model 1 to predict revenue shows that the coefficients of the two interventions 
are statistically significant and negative, but diff-in-diff effect of the corporate tax policy’s 
change is stronger than diff-in-diff effect of the capital gains tax policy’s change. This is 
reasonable because the intervention of the firms’ business operation through corporate tax policy 
is stronger than the intervention through capital gains tax policy. Capital gains tax policy only 
requires that the entitled firms shall sell particular products relating to software, rather than 
controls the whole business chain of the subsidized firms as the corporate tax policy does. 
Therefore, when the tax policy’s intervention fails to improve the subsidized revenue, it is not 
surprise to see that the negative effect of the corporate tax policy becomes more obvious.  
Even though the new corporate tax policy may obviously induce SMEs to conduct R&D in 
the industry of software and ICs, increasing R&D intensity, however, it is not equal to increasing 
immediate R&D commercialization. The model 3 in Table 2.12 shows that the treated group 
used to be more capable to transform R&D into revenue and net profit than the control group 
before 2011. However, the three-way interaction terms among the intervention time, the dummy 
group for discriminating the corporate tax credit-entitled SMEs for the innovation in the software 
and IC industry and the other firms, and the R&D intensity of the SMEs yield a statistically 
significant and negative results, suggesting that the treated group is less capable to transform 
their R&D into revenue and net profit after the policy change in 2011. Therefore, even though 
the treated SMEs on average became more active on conducting R&D after 2011, it is still hard 
to conclude that the corporate tax policy in 2011 to specify the subsidized IC firms’ innovation 
activities is effective. On the opposite side, it cannot effectively improve the R&D 
commercialization of the firms in the software and IC industry.  
Moreover, the three-way interaction terms, controlling for the difference of R&D intensity 
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of the capital gains tax credit-entitled SMEs and the others before and after the policy change, do 
not show a statistically significant output for multi-collinearity, since the treated SMEs’ R&D 
intensity does not affect revenue or net profit differently from the control SMEs. The results are 
not surprising because the prerequisites of the entitlement only focus on the type of the products 
sold by the subsidized SMEs, rather than control for their innovation process. However, it is true 
that this broader and more unified capital gains tax policy after 2011 to strongly encourage the 
development of the software and IC industry are ineffective to promote immediate R&D 
commercialization and the growth of the SMEs in those two industries.  
It is hardly to find the effect of the policy on the R&D commercialization in the long run, 
due to the limitation of the five-year period. The further studies can keep tracking the growth of 
the SMEs to review the efficiency of the tax policy changes in 2011 in promoting the SMEs’ 
R&D commercialization.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
The Chinese government supplies multiple categories grants and subsidies to promote 
innovation by SMEs and their growth. The empirical evidence in this study implies that 
corporate tax credits and capital gains tax credits relatively have stronger association with 
revenue and net profit than the other types of both ex ante and ex post monetary supports. To be 
precise, in the process of directly funding SMEs and their R&D, it is not sufficient to only 
provide the capital support to the funded SMEs and check the progress of their R&D projects at 
the milestones. The government also needs to audit the funded SMEs, which could be realized 
through a third party, beyond simply checking their balance sheets.  
In addition, the corporate tax policy designed to encourage R&D activities can induce the 
SMEs to enhance their R&D intensity. With the firm-level data, the outcomes of R&D, either in 
the form of revenue or IP application filings, however, are deficiently impacted by this tax policy. 
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Moreover, one uniform tax policy addressed for different types of technologies, like the amended 
capital gains tax policy in China, could be rigid. This type of policies not only could not be 
exploited by SMEs, but also may intervene and even hamper their business development.  
Since R&D commercialization and patent commercialization are time consuming and risky, 
the duration of five years is still too short and some implications with respect to those two R&D 
outcomes could be rather equivocal. Therefore, it is valuable for further studies to follow up the 
data and keep studying the innovative behaviors of the SMEs funded or subsidized by the 
government.  
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VII. Tables and Figures 
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Figure 2.1. Difference of Average Revenue From 2009 to 2013 
 
Figure 2.2. Difference of Average R&D Intensity from 2009 to 2013 
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CHAPTER THREE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY REGIME & SMES’ TECHNICAL 
INNOVATION 
 
I. Literature Review – Intellectual Property 
 
This part reviews the literature on intellectual property. There is much literature 
theoretically discussing the interaction between intellectual property rights (IPRs) and innovative 
behaviors or showing the interaction with empirical evidence. This part presents their discussions 
of the issues on patents and copyrights to show the interaction in various countries, economies, 
and industries.  
Because patent regime is an important and representative form of IP protection for various 
technologies, Section 1 introduces arguments on the principles of law and economics on patents 
and general IPRs and their applications. Based on the issues discussed in Section 1, Section 2 
specifies the arguments among the scholars exploring an ideal form of protection for software, an 
important and even extraordinary form of technology compared to other traditional tangible 
products.  
 
1. Patents 
 
The interaction between patent and innovative activities is complex, especially the 
innovative activities in developing countries. At the beginning, Section 1.1 presents the literature 
discussing the reasons why having a patent or IP regime is important to spur innovation. This 
literature discusses how the rights of patents are valuable to technology developers directly or 
indirectly, how the content of the technology protected by patents is valuable to other innovators, 
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and what are the probable negative effects created by the patent or IP regime in the innovation 
market.  
After understanding whether a patent or IP regime can be an effective measure to encourage 
innovation, Section 1.2 presents the literature that evaluates the strength of the regimes in various 
countries and argues how governments should structure an effective patent or IP regime to this 
political goal, especially in developing countries.  
 
1.1. Patents and Innovation 
 
Recall the importance of innovation for economy in general and for small and 
medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) discussed in the Introduction, some governments of 
developing countries, such as China, have gradually recognized the role of patents in stimulating 
innovation in knowledge-based industries.200 However, some scholars in the reviewed literature 
doubt whether IPRs are capable of stimulating innovation efficiently, even if the IP system is 
designed to award and provide incentives to undertake innovation.201 
The traditional standard theory of patents and innovations, drawing on economics, argues 
that patents are absolutely necessary in order to solve a problem that, without patent protection, 
might result in there being very little innovation.202 The root of this problem is that it is costly to 
innovate, but it is inexpensive to copy and market an innovative product. This is because 
knowledge is nonrival and nonexcludable, so it cannot be used up and cannot be easily defended 
from imitators.  
Without some sort of property interest in the innovation that allows the innovator to protect 
himself or herself from unauthorized copying, innovators might be discouraged from incurring 
the costs of innovation. By contrast, patents grant them a monopoly right to exclude others from 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  200	   Li	  cited	  the	  Report	  on	  China’s	  Economic,	  Social	  Development	  Plan	  (2011),	  which	  shows	  that	  the	  Chinese	  government	  planned	  to	  raise	  their	  R&D	  spending	  on	  GDP	  in	  an	  obvious	  level.	  Li,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries	  in	  China,”	  264-­‐265.	   	  201	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  50.	   	  202	   Ibid.	  32-­‐34.	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practicing the technology for a limited time.203  
 
Under the assumption of a perfectly competitive market, looking at Figure 3.1, economists 
believe that the product innovators can produce Q* (quantity) at MC2 (marginal cost) = AC2 
(average cost), but sell at P2 (price) to acquire the maximum profits, as allowed by their patents 
for the product innovation.204 Without the monopoly from patents, at the beginning, they can 
only sell at P3.205 Alternatively, protecting the innovation by trade secrets, the innovators can 
also sell at P3, lower than the monopoly price P2.206  
To use the same figure to explain how process innovators are awarded for their patents from 
the market, economists assume that they produce and sell at P1 before the process innovation that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  203	   The	  duration	  of	  patent	  protection	  is	  typically	  twenty	  years	  from	  the	  date	  when	  the	  patent	  applicants	  filed	  the	  patent	  application.	  See	  35	  U.S.C.	  section	  154(a).	  Also	  see,	  the	  TRIPs,	  Article	  33.	   	  204	   Profit	  maximization	  occurs	  at	  MR	  (marginal	  revenue)	  =MC.	  205	   Ibid.	  9-­‐15.	  206	   Denicolò	  and	  Franzoni,	  “Weak	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  ,	  Research	  Spill-­‐Overs	  and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  Innovate.”	  118	  
P1
P2
P3
Q1 Q2 Q*
Price*(P)*
costs
MC2=AC2
MC1=AC1
Marginal*revenue*(MR) Demand*Curve
Quan?ty*(Q)
Figure*3.1.*Product*or*process*innova?on*with*patent*
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reduces their costs of production.207 P1=MC1 = AC1 is their lowest AC at that stage. After doing 
process innovation and acquiring patents on it, a firm can produce at MC2=AC2 and sell the 
product at P2 in the market or license to other producers at P2 – AC2 to obtain the most profits 
from the innovation. When the patents, and thus the monopoly, expire, the price falls to P3.   
Hence, if the innovator knows that he or she has a protectable interest in his or her invention, 
then, it makes sense to invest resources (and incur opportunity costs) in trying to innovate. If the 
innovation results in and receives patent protection, then the innovator can, through licensing or 
excludable sales, realize revenues that might provide a handsome reward for his or her efforts. 
Under the protection of patents, they can exclusively use the nonrival goods with the returns 
above the marginal cost of its production, which should create the incentives for continuous 
innovation. Hall and Ham thus conclude that this same underlying principle exists in the patent 
systems in all countries, no matter how their patent laws are different.208  
Moreover, this theoretical argument in favor of patent protection has additional refinements 
and is largely borne out by studies from the side of empirical studies. Bound et al. search around 
a panel of U.S. public firms from 1972 through 1978 and their samples show that the innovative 
firms, especially the small size ones, also file patents.209 However, unfortunately, further 
supportive empirical evidence is hard to develop. For example, an empirical study of 95 U.S. 
firms over years from 1979-1995 in the industry of semiconductor by Ziedonis and Hall cannot 
prove that the increase of patenting by the firms is not the result of the award appreciated by their 
R&D from the market, although the study suggests that the strengthening of the U.S. patent 
rights can provide incentives for firms to patent.210  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  207	   For	  example,	  based	  on	  the	  Arrow’s	  theory	  on	  that	  the	  competitiveness	  brought	  by	  patents	  can	  effectively	  stimulate	  innovation	  in	  an	  efficient	  market,	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers	  explain	  the	  rational	  with	  a	  figure	  like	  this	  in	  their	  book.	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  32-­‐34..	  208	   Bronwyn	  H	  Hall	  and	  Marie	  Ham,	  The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  Determinants	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  US	  Semiconductor	  
Industry,	  1980-­‐94,	  NBER	  Patent	  System	  and	  Innovation,	  1999,	  5.	   	   	  209	   John	  Bound	  et	  al.,	  “Who	  Does	  R&D	  and	  Who	  Patents?,”	  in	  National	  Bureau	  of	  Economic	  Research,	  1984,	  51.	  210	   Ziedonis	  and	  Hall,	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Strengthening	  Patent	  Rights	  on	  Firms	  Engaged	  in	  Cumulative	  Innovation:	  Insights	  from	  the	  Semiconductor	  Industry.”	  171.	  Also	  see,	  Hall	  and	  Ziedonis,	  “The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Semiconductor	  Industry,	  1979-­‐1995.”	  Both	  studies	  use	  the	  same	  database,	  and	  the	  latter	  one	  controls	  a	  narrower	  time	  period,	  from	  1982	  to	  1992	  but	  comes	  out	  with	  a	  consistent	  result	  with	  the	  former	  one.	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Hence, there are more theoretically normative analyses both in general circumstances and in 
specific industries holding positive perspectives on the effects of the patent protection on 
innovation. For example, an extended theoretical study of green technologies by Reichman, Rai, 
Newell, and Wiener supports IPRs in creating positive incentives for innovation and helping a 
firm or individual in any stage of its R&D.211  
Moreover, due to its relationship linked with market, Maskus and Okediji consider a patent 
system as a mechanism designed to foster dynamic competition through improvement of 
inventions and downstream innovation.212 In the view point of Lemley, this mechanism allowing 
selling or exclusively licensing patents can improve social economic efficiency when the 
commercialization of inventions is in the hands of those who are in a better market position.213 
Also, Li believes that the IP system is created to remedy the market failure of “free-rider” 
problem and to foster innovation.214  
Hence, Burk and Lemley conclude that “patent law is our primary policy tool to promote 
innovation, encourage the development of new technologies, and increase the fund of human 
knowledge.”215 However, there is considerable diversity of the situations and levels of the 
encouragement.  
On one hand, Roffe and Spennemann conclude that stronger exclusive rights of IP can 
produce higher levels of creativity and innovation.216 Based on their empirical study, Ziedonis 
and Hall agree with this argument because they imply that the expected benefits from patents by 
the firms overweighed their R&D costs on the patents when U.S. patent rights were 
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strengthened.217  
On the other hand, Glass realizes how weak IPR protection can compensate the cost of 
R&D of firms so as to encourage them to expand innovations, but he also sees that strong IP 
rights protection makes R&D more difficult because their R&D process involves higher costs 
created by the strong IPR protection regime.218 Moreover, a cross-national study done by Park 
shows that IPRs stimulate R&D investment indirectly.219 
The positive effects of patent systems to spur innovation, however, may not be proper to be 
directly applied to all places and industries. Li thinks that pro-innovation patent systems work 
positively in industrialized countries, but is hesitant about their significance or relevance in 
promoting innovation in developing countries.220 Scotchmer believes that IP can encourage 
development of new products, and he also agrees that more innovative countries will favor more 
extensive IP rights than less innovative countries. For example, even if R&D activities by 
industry in the E.U. and the U.S. are far from full participation, their R&D activities are still 
more active on some levels than those in certain developing countries of Latin America.221  
Because of the trend of globalization, Stiglitz believes that IP plays an important role in 
stimulating innovation, especially for developing countries, so their markets can flourish to 
induce more competition as the trigger of doing innovation.222 While his position here is positive, 
he and Dosi update their view to believing that strong IPRs may be harmful for innovation. 223 
Strong IPR would not only impede followers, but the incentives of innovation created by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  217	   Ziedonis	  and	  Hall,	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Strengthening	  Patent	  Rights	  on	  Firms	  Engaged	  in	  Cumulative	  Innovation:	  Insights	  from	  the	  Semiconductor	  Industry,”	  74.	   	  218	   Amy	  Jocelyn	  Glass,	  “Costly	  R&D	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  Protection,”	  International	  Journal	  of	  Technology	  
Management	  19,	  no.	  1–2	  (2000):	  192,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://econweb.tamu.edu/aglass/cos.pdf.	   	  219	   Walter	  G.	  Park,	  Do	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  Stimulate	  R&D	  and	  Productivity	  Growth?	  Evidence	  from	  Cross-­‐National	  
and	  Manufacturing	  Industries	  Data,	  2005,	  https://www.leadership.american.edu/cas/faculty/wgpark/upload/09-­‐induscan.pdf.	  40	  220	   Li,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries	  in	  China,”	  281-­‐2.	   	  221	   Scotchmer,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Treaties.”	  415,	  417-­‐418.	  In	  2002,	  only	  56%	  R&D	  spending	  in	  the	  E.U.	  was	  by	  industry,	  and	  68%	  in	  the	  U.S.,	  which	  are	  considerable	  departures	  from	  100%.	  222	   Olwan,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development :	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  117.	  223	   Dosi	  and	  Stiglitz,	  “The	  Role	  of	  IPRs	  in	  the	  Development	  Process,	  with	  Some	  Lessons	  from	  Developed	  Countries:	  An	  Introduction,”	  5,	  9,	  32.	   	  
	   80	  
monopolies could also be small. Hence, they predict that IPRs are not the best approach to 
encourage innovation, or could even be the worst sometimes because patent system can only 
provide compensation when R&D is successful. In a bigger map of the market, based on the 
result of an empirical study about Germany innovators, Blind et al. believe that patents can 
impede competition because patent owners are strategically use patents for offensive blocking 
their competitors.224 
Furthermore, Boehm and Silberston point out that the political goal of stimulating 
innovation just could not be properly reached by the patent regime created and designed 
specifically for that goal (in particular industries).225 Maskus believes that exclusive rights of 
patent owners under strong protection may impede transferring technologies to particular 
markets, such as in developing countries, and lack of attraction of these markets may not be 
caused by weak protection of IP because of lacking evidence to support a positive tendency of 
foreign direct investment (FDI) and technology transferring even in certain countries with strong 
patent protection.226 Heller and Eisenberg point out that patents for upstream products of the 
biomedical industry may deter innovation because of anticommons issue made by their abuse of 
patents.227  
Besides the anticommons problem, Shapiro criticizes the patent regime for its overreward 
because of his worries about the priors of the technologies of patents and its lack of meaning of 
instruction through the poor patent disclosure of patents, so the patent regime may kill many 
joint-inventions.228 Denicolo and Franzoni only support rewarding the first inventor by patents 
because they believe that rewarding late inventors may reduce the incentive scheme and cause 
duplicate social cost on R&D, even though they admit that patent rights are incentives for 
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innovation and the first-inventor rule has been abandoned in the U.S. law.229  
Moreover, an empirical study by Levin and other scholars, based on a survey around 650 
firms from 35 industries in the U.S., shows that many industries as a whole, not just the patent 
owners, think of patents as ineffective and that they have high duplication costs.230 Another 
empirical study, of the 1988 patent reforms in Japan, by Sakakibara and Branstetter cannot prove 
that “pro-patent” public policies would induce additional innovation.231 Chang observes this 
trend on the international level and concludes that private intellectual property could not 
necessarily be the incentive for innovative activities.232  
The 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey also shows a similar conclusion on startups.233 Graham et 
al. surveyed around 1,332 early-stage technology firms, which have been funded at most ten 
years, and they conclude that these technology startups acquire weak incentives for significant 
innovative activities, even though these firms are more likely to file for patents than the scholars 
believed.234  
Kortum and Lerner’s empirical study shows that the increase in patenting in the 1980s and 
1990s in the U.S. was driven by the innovative activities to link research productivity and 
research efforts, but those innovative activities are on innovative management, not on the amount 
of R&D.235 They suspect a rationale that the growth of innovation strengthens IP regime rather 
than the IP regime encouraging innovation. 
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stimulating R&D fluctuates among different economies and industries. Burk and Lemley believe 
that the patent statute is merely demanded by the industry-specific nature of innovation.236 Li 
agrees that patents are equally important or efficient in innovation for hardware companies, such 
as medical hardware and IT hardware, but are less important for software firms, so he 
encourages applying different patent laws for different industries.237  
He, however, concludes that the variance of importance of IP to innovation among different 
industries could be different among different countries, and the innovation in the industries in 
China should be the one having positive relationship with IP.238 Olwen also sustains that IP has 
a positive influence on domestic innovation in certain developing countries, but not in all 
countries with IP alone. In order to clarify, he suggests measuring both IP law and the 
enforcement of IP for producing better empirical results than the results of some previous 
studies.239  
 
1.2. Construction of patent environment to stimulate innovation 
 
In the times and the environment of globalization, 188 countries are members of WIPO (the 
World Intellectual Property Organization).240 They provide exclusive rights of protection for IP, 
either stronger or weaker. In this world where it is inevitable to have IPRs protection, my 
meaningful discussion should focus on how the IPR regime is built to stimulate innovation 
efficiently rather than on whether we should have an IPR regime, especially at the time when 
many countries are criticizing China for lacking the strength of IPR protection241.  
With the knowledge that IPR is necessary for the development of a country, Hu and Jaffe 
conclude that lack of innovation in developing countries might not be caused by weak IPR but by 	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their limited buying power on the market.242 However, while they understand that the extension 
of strong IPR to all countries is unlikely globally efficient because harmonization based on the 
model of the U.S. IP regime only favors developed countries, they also emphasize that if IPR 
protection in developing countries is too weak, their IP system will inhibit innovation because of 
too little compensation.  
For the technology-follower countries, the increased dynamic competition through IPRs can 
promote technology transfer helping IPRs to spur the growth of economy indirectly, so Maskus, 
Dougherty and Mertha encourage strengthening IPRs in developing countries, like China. 
Meanwhile, in the case study of Lebanon, Maskus reminds that stronger IPRs expand leading 
foreign technologies that feed Lebanon’s production and technology development in a dynamic 
process of spillover or competition.243 However, Correa believes that the weak IP regime of 
developing countries can favor local firms.244 They can develop minor innovations under 
liability rule or utility models to optimize social benefits. 
In the interior of the regime, Li thinks that developing countries should learn from the 
broadest subject matter protection in the U.S. model of IP regime, which makes it successful.245 
However, Cimoli, Dosi, Mazzoleni and Sampat think that the extension of patentable subject 
matters has negative potential effects on future rate of innovation.246 While Sakakibara and 
Branstetter examined the expansion of patent scope in Japanese patent regime in 1988 with 
empirical evidence and expected a positive reflection of R&D expenditure or patent filings for 
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this reform, the result does not provide evidence to support this assumption.247  
Through a simulation of the dynamic effects of IP protection, Panagopoulos and Park 
conclude that sustainable innovations and the strength of IP protection have an inverted U-shape 
relationship, so takeover agreements between incumbents and startups can motivate startups’ 
innovation only if the IP protection is appropriate but not excessive.248  
About the diversity of industries, Denicolo and Franzoni conclude that weak IPRs are 
required for the development of few industries, but not all. For example, strong IPRs are 
appropriate in the pharmaceutical section but not in the software and semiconductor industries, 
such as in Silicon Valley, because of their study result showing that “large R&D spill-overs favor 
non-exclusive protection.”249 Also, Maskus, Dougherty and Mertha suggest expanding the 
effects of spillover of state owned enterprises, the strongest innovative subjectives in China, 
through enhancing IPR protection.250 
In the pharmaceutical industry, which demands basic science to develop new products, 
Coriat and Orsenigo prove an inverted U-shape relationship to describe the relationship between 
pharmaceutical innovations and pharmaceutical patent laws, presenting that strong patent 
protection harms innovation, especially in developing countries.251  Also, while Ganslandt, 
Maskus and Wong agree that IPRs can provide compensation of the drug and vaccine research, 
they predict that strong IPRs in poor countries cause inefficiency through high prices to 
compensate innovators from rich countries but dull the incentives of local innovators.252  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  247	   Sakakibara	  and	  Branstetter,	  “Do	  Stronger	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  More	  Innovation?	  Evidence	  from	  the	  1988	  Japanese	  Patent	  Law	  Reforms,”	  30-­‐33.	   	  248	   Andreas	  Panagopoulos	  and	  In-­‐Uck	  Park,	  Patent	  Protection,	  Takeovers	  ,	  and	  Startup	  Innovation:	  A	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  Approach,	  2004,	  19-­‐20,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.bristol.ac.uk/media-­‐library/sites/cmpo/migrated/documents/wp201.pdf.	   	  249	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  and	  Franzoni,	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  ,	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  and	  the	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  to	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  115-­‐116.	  250	   Keith	  E.	  Maskus,	  Sean	  M.	  Dougherty,	  and	  Andrew	  Mertha,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Economic	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  in	  China,”	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	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  Lessons	  from	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  Economic	  Research,	  ed.	  Carsten	  Fink	  and	  Keith	  E.	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  (The	  World	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  University	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  2005),	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  in	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  Post-­‐2005	  TRIPS	  Agenda,	  ”	  234.	  252	   Mattias	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  E.	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  to	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  in	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  and	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  ed.	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  and	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  (The	  World	  Bank	  and	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	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The empirical study done by Fink about Indian pharmaceutical supports that effective 
competition can restrain the excessive price of on-patent drugs. While developing countries will 
move toward stronger patent rights under globalization, he reminds the Indian government to 
deal out measures, such as to grant compulsory licenses, restraining the price of exclusive rights 
of patents.253 In the case of China, Li realizes that while patent filings in its biotech and 
pharmaceutical sectors are significantly increasing in recent years, the quantity and quality of 
these patent applications are still relatively lower than those in developed countries.254  
In the manufacturing industry, Fink’s empirical study shows that stronger IPRs in Germany 
facilitate inventions and patent activities.255 In agriculture, while patents are available and can be 
effectively used in its areas, such as agricultural machinery, Nuvolari and Tartari see many 
successful strategies that do not rely on formalized IPRs, and conclude that stronger IP 
protection for plant varieties may degenerate anticommons tragedy.256 Swanson and Goeschl 
believe that the nature of the gap of the innovative capability in agriculture between developing 
countries and developed countries is not their input on innovation, but the efficiency that is 
higher in developed countries.257 Thus, their prediction model for agricultural yields shows how 
strong IPR regime generates greater rate of innovation in developed countries, but their data of 
the impact of stronger IPR in China shows a reduced rate of positive effect on its growth of 
innovation. 
Therefore, when understanding these arguments, Cimoli et al. conclude that to structure a 
better IPR regime which fosters more innovation and more access to knowledge in developing 	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  in	  Intellectual	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  Recent	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  Research,	  ed.	  Carsten	  Fink	  and	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  E.	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  (The	  World	  Bank	  and	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  245-­‐251.	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  and	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  A	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  of	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  in	  China,”	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  Press,	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  280,	  281.	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countries is an issue of its appropriate design rather than merely strengthening or weakening it.258 
Meanwhile, Ziedonis reminds that it is not enough just to structure a “pro-patent” regime. In her 
empirical study investigating 72 U.S. semiconductor firms from 1980 to 1994, the data cannot 
prove how this regime encourages R&D, even though there is a trend showing that this regime 
does effectively improve patenting behaviors of innovators.259  
Broader than an idea controlling the IPR regime alone or solely relying on traditional 
theories, such as static competition, industry-level analysis, and single-invention innovation 
model, Teece suggests that it is vital for legislatures and policymakers to count dynamic 
competition and the dynamic performance of firms independently or under corporation in the 
ecosystem of the market.260  
 
2. IPRs for Software 
 
It is inevitable to discuss software in the issues of innovation because incredible innovations 
serve the information intensive industry and software-related industries.261  
“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a 
known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection,” so software could be 
patentable in the U.S.262 In a broader scope, TRIPS also supports the patentability of software.263  
One software product may need to encompass hundreds of technologies of others, probably 
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  in	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  Press,	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  Strategies	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in the forms of patents.264 In this case, for inventors, patents enable them to incorporate others’ 
technologies into their products through licensing or incorporate their own technologies into 
others’ further products through assigning their software patents.265 
 Some software products may demand substantial investment to develop, so the investors, 
especially venture capital investors, in the software industry consider the value of patents 
importantly.266 For example, the 2008 Berkeley Patent Survey around 1332 technology startups 
shows that 53% angel investors, 60% venture capital investors and 36% investment banks 
consider patents when they looked for target firms.267 Even though the survey also shows that 
the levels of importance in software industry are much lower that in other industries, such as 
biotechnology industry,268 Kesan believes that patents retain an important role of technology 
development in the software industry.269  
Because of the subject matter restriction of patent,270 however, software is usually difficult 
to get patent protection in many patent regimes in practice. For instance, before 2010, in the U.S., 
to fundamentally test for the patentability of a process claim, the courts usually applied the 
“machine-or-transformation” test, which is used to restrict the patentability of software.271 After 
2010, even though the Supreme Court does not merely rely on the test for patent applications on 
process and software is not barred from patent protection solely for its form of existing, it may 
not be protected under patent law as an abstract idea in some circumstances rather than a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  264	   Jay	  P	  Kesan,	  “Economic	  Rationales	  for	  the	  Patent	  System	  in	  Current	  Context,”	  Geo.	  Mason	  L.	  Rev.,	  no.	  15	  (2015):	  916.	   	   	  265	   Ibid.	  917.	  266	   Ibid.	  916-­‐917.	  267	   Graham	  and	  Merges,	  “High	  Technology	  Entrepreneurs	  and	  the	  Patent	  System:	  Results	  of	  the	  2008	  Berkeley	  Patent	  Survey,”	  1308.	  268	   Ibid.	  1308.	  269	   Kesan,	  “Economic	  Rationales	  for	  the	  Patent	  System	  in	  Current	  Context,”	  917.	  270	   See	  35	  U.S.C.S.	  §	  101,	  n.d..	  271	   “[M]ere	  field-­‐of-­‐use	  limitations	  are	  generally	  insufficient	  to	  render	  an	  otherwise	  ineligible	  process	  claim	  patent-­‐eligible.	  …	  [M]ental	  processes,	  like	  fundamental	  principles,	  are	  excluded	  by	  35	  U.S.C.S.	  §	  101	  because	  phenomena	  of	  nature,	  though	  just	  discovered,	  mental	  processes,	  and	  abstract	  intellectual	  concepts	  are	  the	  basic	  tools	  of	  scientific	  and	  technological	  work.	  …	  [A]dding	  a	  data-­‐gathering	  step	  to	  an	  algorithm	  is	  insufficient	  to	  convert	  that	  algorithm	  into	  a	  patent-­‐eligible	  process.” See	  In	  re	  Bilski,	  545	  F.3d	  943	  (2007).	  957,	  960.	  966.	  See	  also,	  Nancey	  Silvers	  v.	  Sony	  Pictures	  entertainment,	  Inc.,	  402	  F.3d	  8	  (2005).	  
	   88	  
process.272  
In the E.U., the European Patent Convention, Article 52(2)(c), excludes programs for 
computers from patentability.273 Hartnack concludes that under European law pure software is 
not an invention and would not be capable of industrial patents.274 While the EPO’s Boards of 
Appeal in T 1173/97 Computer Program Product/IBM (OJ EPO 10/1999, 609) held that software 
are patentable when they have “technical character,” Macedo et al. argue that the EPO do not and 
is not able to provide guidance and clarity to the limits of patent eligibility of software under the 
EPC, especially after the EBoA dismissed the EPO President’s referral on the issues about 
patentability of software based on the inconsistency of relative court decisions.275 In China, 
because the restrictive requirements of patentability of software include “features, means and 
effects,” gradually, Chinese inventors do not favor patents to protect their software, especially 
when their main technologies or main businesses are not pure software.276  
Hence, some software innovations that are not eligible to apply for patents will pursue the 
protection under copyright. 277  Comparing to copyrights, patent protection is costly for 
innovators in the software industry.278 Moreover, a model using copyrights to protect software is 
simpler than using patents for software industry.279 Even though some programs are qualified to 
apply for patents, the time and cost of obtaining patents may not be economic, “particularly if the 
product [of the programs] is not expected to have a long life cycle.”280 Therefore, the software 	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industry in a country, such as Lebanon, would heavily rely on the protection under copyrights.281  
In the U.S., although copyright is automatically created when the code of software is 
written,282 only the owners of registered copyrights with Copyright Office can bring allegations 
against infringers of their copyrights.283 Hence, Granham and Mowery use the data of registered 
copyrights of software to research the IP protection of software.284  
Responding to the history of the U.S. software industry during 1988-96, when software 
firms preferred patents to copyrights to protect their innovation for the strengthened patent 
regime, Granham and Mowery define the exploded volume of patents as junk patents because 
they believe that patent is only a tool for expanding the protection of the software of the firms 
and protecting them from others circumventing their software.285 Moreover, Graham and 
Sichelman’s interview with a general counsel of a software firm in 2004 shows that software 
companies may not consider patents as valuable assets for them.286  
In fact, comparing to other industries, such as the biotech industry, the statistics compelled 
by Mann and Sager show that software firms acquire fewer and fewer patents.287 Moreover, they 
observe that software start-ups in an early stage were more likely to obtain patents than the firms 
in other maturer stages, so they conclude that patents are used by entrepreneurs to defend against 
the investors of these firms.288  
The imperfection of patent protection for software does not mean that the copyright is the 
optimal approach of protection for software. On the one hand, Denicolo and Franzoni remind 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1076.	   	   	  281	   Maskus,	  “Strengthening	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  in	  Lebanon,”	  263.	   	  282	   See	  17	  U.S.C.S.	  §	  201,	  n.d.	  283	   17	  U.S.C.S.	  §	  411,	  n.d.	  (a).	   	  284	   Stuart	  J.H.	  Graham	  and	  David	  C.	  Mowery,	  Intellectual	  Property	  Protection	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Software	  Industry,	  Patents	  in	  the	  
Knowledge-­‐Based	  Economy,	  2000,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.87.6776&rep=rep1&type=pdf.	  29-­‐30.	   	  285	   Ibid.	  31-­‐34.	   	  286	   Stuart	  J.	  Graham	  and	  Ted	  Sichelman,	  “Why	  Do	  Start-­‐Ups	  Patent,”	  Berkeley	  Techn.	  Law	  J.	  23,	  no.	  3	  (2008):	  1065.	  287	   Ronald	  J.	  Mann	  and	  Thomas	  W.	  Sager,	  “Patents,	  Venure	  Capital,	  and	  Software	  Start-­‐Ups,”	  Research	  Policy	  36	  (2007):	  206.	  (“[R]elatively	  small	  number	  of	  patents	  held	  by	  the	  firms	  that	  do	  acquire	  patents:	  an	  average	  of	  three	  in	  the	  software	  industry	  compared	  to	  an	  average	  of	  almost	  10	  in	  the	  biotech	  industry.”).	  288	   Ibid.	  206-­‐207.	   	  
	   90	  
that copyright only protects expressions rather than ideas and reverse engineering of copyright 
could be allowed.289 On the other hand, Menell believes that the shift from copyright to patent 
protection in the U.S. software industry during the 1980s could be helpful to adjusting a more 
proper scope of IP protection of software than solely a protected scope under copyright because 
of the high threshold of obtaining patents.290 Even though Menell admits the cost and delay 
under patent make it not ideal for obtaining the protection, the high threshold shields many 
computer programs from the exclusive IP protection.291  
Alternatively, opposing to strong IP protection that may slow the pace of technical advance 
in general, Levin et al. remind that technical advance usually demands cumulative 
relationships.292 No matter how software developers pursue protection on their software under 
IP laws, an ideal balance between the software developers and the general technological advance 
should provide the former group sufficient lead time to exploit the market and teach public to 
continue developing around the software.293  
Responding to the puzzle of balancing between appropriate compensation for software 
developers and potential technical development, Osterloh and Rota argue that free and open 
source licenses of software copyrights allow and encourage collective or cumulative 
innovation.294 Taking the example of Silicon Valley, Denicolo and Franzoni emphasize the 
importance of large R&D spill-overs and collective inventions contributed more or less by each 
firm on its final success.295  
Moreover, Rajani et al. remind developing countries that education and experience of 
developed countries can significantly be communicated to developing countries through free and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  289	   Denicolò	  and	  Franzoni,	  “Weak	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  ,	  Research	  Spill-­‐Overs	  and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  Innovate,”130.	   	  290	   Menell,	  “An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Scope	  of	  Copyright	  Protection	  for	  Applications	  Programs,”	  1103.	   	  291	   Ibid.	  1083.	  292	   Levin	  et	  al.,	  “Appropriating	  the	  Returns	  from	  Industrial	  Research	  and	  Development,”788.	   	  293	   Menell,	  “An	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Scope	  of	  Copyright	  Protection	  for	  Applications	  Programs,”	  1080.	  294	   Osterloh	  and	  Rota,	  Open	  Source	  Software	  Development-­‐Just	  Another	  Case	  of	  Colletive	  Invention?	  3.	   	  295	   Denicolò	  and	  Franzoni,	  “Weak	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  ,	  Research	  Spill-­‐Overs	  and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  Innovate,”	  115.	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open source software (FOSS).296 Because it can be a valuable tool for improving the local 
software industry, developing countries have realized the importance of FOSS.297 Therefore, 
when structuring an appropriate IP law for the development of the software industry, Olwan 
suggests that policy markers in developing countries treat FOSS preferably for their social and 
economic development.298  
 
II. Problems That Remain in the Literature 
 
This part discusses two problems remaining in the reviewed literature and presents what this 
research can possibly contribute based on these studies. Problem 1 explores the issues remaining 
in the connection between IPRs and innovation by SMEs. Problem 2 looks into the puzzles of 
improving IP regimes in developing countries. 
 
1. Lack of Clear Evidence on the Connection between IPRs and Innovation by SMEs 
 
It is clearly understood the traditional logic of the effects of patent and other IPRs on 
innovations under economic analysis. The legal monopoly rights of IP, that is, how IPRs 
compensate the expended R&D costs, decrease the marginal cost of innovation and award patent 
holders with an extra price on their products to ultimately increase their profits on the whole 
business relating to the IPRs.299 Based on this economic rationale, there are scholars who have 
realized both the effectiveness and limitations of the power of the temporary monopoly provided 
by IPRs, due to the variation of the power of the market in different areas and industries. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  296	   Niranjan	  Rajani,	  Juha	  Rekola,	  and	  Timo	  Mielonen,	  Free	  as	  in	  Education:	  Significance	  of	  the	  FLOSS	  for	  the	  Developing	  
Countries,	  2003,	  79,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	   	   http://www.itu.int/wsis/docs/background/	  themes/access/free_as_in_education_niranjan.pdf.	   	  297	   Olwan,	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development :	  Theory	  and	  Practice,	  270,	  277,	  283.	  298	   Ibid.	  362.	   	  299	   Fisher,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  Theoretical,	  Empirical,	  and	  Historical	  Perspectives,”	  5.	  See	  also,	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  32-­‐34..	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However, most of them have merely done theoretical analysis on the existence and the scale of 
the limitations and necessity of monopoly created by IPRs.300  
Overall, the literature review presents enough theoretical debates on the pros and cons of 
the economic efficiency of IPRs and IP laws in innovation.301 However, the theoretical literature 
still has no clear evidence on how the traditional understanding of the function of IPRs awarding 
firms or individuals is effective. If, in the perspective of innovative firms, IPRs do compensate 
R&D, another question will be how efficient is the compensation in encouraging the incentives 
of innovation of the firms?  
These realistic questions require answers from empirical studies.302 Recall the empirical 
evidence in the literature, but note that the scholars are hardly able to show that IPRs can directly 
create significant effective incentives to do R&D by R&D-intensive firms, especially by 
SMEs.303 Most of these empirical studies are in the form of doing surveys among firms or 
comparing the patent data at country-level among the applicants from different countries. This 
could be problematic because without firm-level data reflecting realistic performances of 
innovative firms, these studies also lack the information of detailed factors relating their R&D 
and patent activities. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  300	   Maskus	  and	  Konan	  believe	  the	  monopoly	  effects	  are	  always	  overstated	  in	  realities.	  Keith	  E.	  Maskus,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  in	  Encouraging	  Foreign	  Direct	  Investment	  and	  Technology	  Transfer,”	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  
and	  Development:	  Lessons	  from	  Recent	  Economic	  Research,	  ed.	  Carsten	  Fink	  and	  Keith	  E.	  Maskus	  (The	  World	  Bank	  and	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  41–74.	  Maskus	  just	  thinks	  that	  the	  IPRs	  do	  not	  necessarily	  create	  the	  kind	  of	  monopoly	  locking	  the	  access	  of	  technologies	  and	  setting	  high	  prices.	  See	  also,	  Maskus,	  “Strengthening	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  in	  Lebanon,”	  264.	  See	  also	  Roffe	  and	  Spennemann,	  “Preferential	  Trade	  Agreements	  and	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights,”	  459.	   	  301	   For	  examples,	  IPRs	  or	  IP	  laws	  can	  foster	  dynamic	  competition	  and	  help	  to	  solve	  free-­‐rider	  problems,	  but	  also	  can	  create	  anti-­‐commons	  problems.	  Maskus	  and	  Okediji,	  “Legal	  and	  Economic	  Perspectives	  on	  International	  Technology	  Transfer	  in	  Environmentally	  Sound	  Technologies,”	  397.	  See	  also	  Li,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries	  in	  China,”	  268.	  See	  also	  Heller	  and	  Eisenberg,	  “Can	  Patents	  Deter	  Innovation?	  The	  Anticommons	  in	  Biomedical	  Research,”	  198.	   	  302	   Ziedonis	  also	  appreciates	  the	  importance	  of	  using	  patent	  data	  to	  do	  empirical	  research	  on	  learning	  the	  connection	  between	  IP	  and	  innovation	  after	  she	  organized	  all	  important	  relevant	  literature	  from	  1986	  to	  2006.	  Rosemarie	  H.	  Ziedonis,	  “Chapter	  10.	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation,”	  in	  Handbook	  of	  Technology	  and	  Innovation	  Management,	  ed.	  Scott	  Shane	  (John	  Wiley	  &	  Sons,	  Ltd,	  2008),	  295–333.	  303	   Ziedonis	  and	  Hall,	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Strengthening	  Patent	  Rights	  on	  Firms	  Engaged	  in	  Cumulative	  Innovation:	  Insights	  from	  the	  Semiconductor	  Industry.”	  See	  also,	  Hall	  and	  Ziedonis,	  “The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Semiconductor	  Industry,	  1979-­‐1995.”See	  also,	  Sakakibara	  and	  Branstetter,	  “Do	  Stronger	  Patents	  Induce	  More	  Innovation?	  Evidence	  from	  the	  1988	  Japanese	  Patent	  Law	  Reforms.”	  See	  also	  Levin	  et	  al.,	  “Appropriating	  the	  Returns	  from	  Industrial	  Research	  and	  Development.”	  See	  also,	  Kortum	  and	  Lerner,	  “Stronger	  Protection	  or	  Technological	  Revolution:	  What	  Is	  Behind	  the	  Recent	  Surge	  in	  Patenting?”	  See	  also,	  Park,	  Do	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  Stimulate	  R&D	  
and	  Productivity	  Growth?	  Evidence	  from	  Cross-­‐National	  and	  Manufacturing	  Industries	  Data.	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In cross-national studies, the country-level data inevitably are too broad to focus in on 
particular SMEs, the local markets, or local policies facilitating IP enforcement or encouraging 
innovation. These studies thus may have limitations on accounting for the environmental 
disturbances, which may cause a disconnection between their obscure or negative results and so 
many existing positive predictions in the theories. Even though some scholars theoretically claim 
an indirect relationship between innovation and IPRs or show it with empirical evidence, it is 
difficult to show the factors constructing the bridges between IPRs and innovation, and their 
degrees.304 
The flaw in these studies could be the country-level data that they use. Country-level data, 
which may strongly relate to a more complex mechanism, such as the economy and market, must 
have some inherent relationship with competition in the market305 and other implied and 
unexplored instrumental factors. Besides the factors relating to the IPR regime itself, as other 
literature theoretically deduced and my literature review has discussed, these factors could be 
long-term or short-term local policies, beneficial or restrictive, or these factors could be about the 
capital markets supporting the operations of the innovative firms and their R&D spending. Hence, 
it is not sufficient to explore this inherent relationship merely based on country-level data.  
Recall the series of firm-level studies about the semiconductor firms in the U.S., a single 
country. 306  Hall and Ziedonis successfully testify how a “pro-patent” legal environment, 
including those detailed factors in an economy, improves the degree of patenting by firms. 
Nevertheless, with the same failure of the discussed country-level studies, they also cannot prove 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  304	   In	  Park’s	  empirical	  study	  through	  country-­‐level	  data,	  he	  concludes	  that	  IPRs	  encourages	  R&D	  investment	  indirectly,	  but	  he	  cannot	  clearly	  define	  the	  direct	  factors	  encouraging	  R&D	  investment.	  Other	  scholars	  have	  discussed	  that	  the	  spillover	  effects	  of	  having	  IP,	  attractions	  of	  IPRs	  to	  FDI	  investors	  and	  local	  venture	  capital	  investors.	  Ibid.	  See	  also,	  Fink,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  U.S.	  and	  German	  International	  Transactions	  in	  Manufacturing	  Industries.”	  See	  also,	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth.	  305	   Teece,	  “Next-­‐Generation	  Competition:	  New	  Concepts	  for	  Understanding	  How	  Innovation	  Shapes	  Competition	  and	  Policy	  in	  the	  Digital	  Economy.”	  306	   Hall	  and	  Ziedonis,	  “The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Semiconductor	  Industry,	  1979-­‐1995.”	  See	  also	  Ziedonis	  and	  Hall,	  “The	  Effects	  of	  Strengthening	  Patent	  Rights	  on	  Firms	  Engaged	  in	  Cumulative	  Innovation:	  Insights	  from	  the	  Semiconductor	  Industry.”	  See	  also,	  Ziedonis,	  When	  the	  Giants’	  Shoulders	  Are	  Crowded:	  
Fragmented	  Rights	  and	  Patent	  Strategies	  in	  Semiconductors.	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a direct connection between innovation and patents.307 Not only can they not find that patenting 
by the firms is based on their R&D outcomes, but they also cannot conclude that the patent 
regime encourages innovation by the firms through the compensation and awards from the 
market.  
Their studies are semiconductor industry-oriented, which means that they focus their 
samples on one industry in which the technology develops rapidly and firms quickly innovate 
based on each others’ innovations. While they control for the size of the firms, their studies do 
not explore any effective information from this control. Meanwhile, the data resource is from 
listed firms and the interviewees in these studies are from large manufacturers. Thus, not 
surprisingly, when revisiting these studies, Hall and Ham conclude that the result in this series of 
studies with semiconductor firms is more helpful for large firms.308  
The main findings of the Yale and Carnegie Mellon surveys may explain that larger firms 
are better at adopting patent strategies than smaller firms, and the only exception of this situation 
could be the R&D-intensive SMEs, which value patents importantly.309 
Actually, based on another firm-level study by Agarwal and Audretsch, firm size can be a 
critical factor relating to innovation for the firms in a relatively early stage of their life cycle, but 
may not affect high-technology firms or the firms in the mature stage of their life cycle.310  
Thus, this could explain the remaining issues in the empirical studies by Hall and Ziedonis. 
All the objects of their studies are high-technology firms and basically the firms in the stage of 
maturity.  
Graham and Sichelman, however, theoretically studying start-up patent strategies, present 
that the same issue also exists in most of the previous literature.311 Then, with the 2008 Berkeley 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  307	   Hall	  et	  al.	  believe	  that	  all	  the	  previous	  firm-­‐level	  studies	  have	  this	  defect,	  not	  limited	  to	  this	  one.	  They	  believes	  that	  the	  reason	  why	  these	  studies	  cannot	  find	  an	  effective	  relationship	  between	  innovation	  and	  IP	  protection	  mechanisms	  is	  lack	  of	  exogenous.	  Hall	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Choice	  between	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Intellectual	  Property:	  A	  Review.”	  308	   Hall	  and	  Ham,	  The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  Determinants	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  US	  Semiconductor	  Industry,	  1980-­‐94.	  309	   Hall	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Choice	  between	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Intellectual	  Property:	  A	  Review,”	  405-­‐406.	  310	   Rajshree	  Agarwal	  and	  David	  B	  Audretsch,	  “Does	  Entry	  Size	  Matter?:	  The	  Impact	  of	  the	  Life	  Cycle	  and	  Technology	  on	  Firm,”	  The	  Journal	  of	  Industrial	  Economics	  49,	  no.	  1	  (2001):	  21–43.	  311	   Graham	  and	  Sichelman,	  “Why	  Do	  Start-­‐Ups	  Patent.”	  1088-­‐1089.	  They	  list	  several	  studies	  having	  this	  issue.	  At	  least	  two	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Patent Survey that they and other scholars conducted, they prove their previous prediction.  
Similarly, my research, using both firm-level and country-level data, is size-oriented rather 
than industry-oriented. When SMEs are considered as important to the economy in both 
employment and technology development, the size of firms is also an important measure to be 
involved when their R&D activities are studied.312 This study is original within Chinese 
literature. Because there is limited access of reliable data about Chinese SMEs, the empirical 
studies researching R&D activities by Chinese scholars are only around big firms or at 
country-level.313 
For SMEs, Teece theoretically proves that intensifying competition through IPR regimes 
prohibits innovation by SMEs but only benefits large enterprises.314 Solely based on innovation 
rather than other market powers or capabilities, SMEs are less likely to be able to profit enough 
from a perfectly competitive market, and the Schumpeter theory could support this analysis.315 
While Hsu, Ziedonis, and Hochberg et al. theoretically present how the signaling effects of 
patents are important to attract investors or lenders for start-ups and show the empirical 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  of	  these	  studies	  have	  been	  reviewed	  by	  us.	  Sakakibara	  and	  Branstetter,	  “Do	  Stronger	  Patents	  Induce	  More	  Innovation?	  Evidence	  from	  the	  1988	  Japanese	  Patent	  Law	  Reforms.”	  See	  also,	  Levin	  et	  al.,	  “Appropriating	  the	  Returns	  from	  Industrial	  Research	  and	  Development.”	  312	   Bound	  et	  al.,	  “Who	  Does	  R&D	  and	  Who	  Patents?”	  49-­‐51.	  This	  empirical	  study	  proves	  that	  small	  and	  large	  firms	  are	  more	  R&D	  intensive	  than	  average-­‐size	  firm	  after	  they	  control	  for	  the	  size	  as	  an	  independent	  variable	  in	  their	  estimations.	  313	   Zhongchang	  Chen	  (陈仲常)	  and	  Xiang	  Yu(余翔),	  “The	  External	  Effects	  of	  R&D	  in	  Enterprises:	  A	  Panel	  Data	  Analysis	  In	  Industrial	  Level[企业研发投入的外部环境影响因素研究——基于产业层面的面板数据分析],”	   Keyan	  Guanli(科研管
理)[Science	  Research	  Management]	  28,	  no.	  2	  (2007):	  78–84.	  Also	  see,	  Yali	  Bian	  (卞雅莉),	  Jishu	  Zhuanli,	  R&D	  Touru	  Yu	  
Zhuanli	  Gongxian-­‐Jiyu	  Shijian	  Xulie	  Shuju	  De	  Shizheng	  Yanjiu(技术转移、R&D投入与专利贡献—基于时间序列数据的实证
研究)[Technology	  Transfer,	  R&D	  Investment	  and	  Patent	  Contribution-­‐An	  Empirical	  Analysis	  Based	  on	  Time	  Series	  Data],	  2010.	  Also	  see,	  Pingfang	  Zhu	  (朱平芳)	  and	  Weimin	  Xu	  (徐伟民),	  “Zhengfu	  De	  Keji	  Jili	  Zhengce	  Dui	  Dazhong	  Xing	  Gongye	  Qiye	  R&D	  Touru	  Jiqi	  Zhuanli	  Chanchu	  De	  Yingxiang(政府的科技激励政策对大众型工业企业 R&D投入及其专利产出的影
响——上海市的实证研究)[Government	  Technical	  Stimulated	  Policies’	   Effects	  on	  R&D	  and	  Outputs	  in	  Patent	  by	  Big	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Industr,”	   Jingji	  Yanjiu(经济研究)[Economic	  Study]	  6	  (2003):	  45–53.	  Also	  see,	  Weimin	  Xu	  (徐伟民),	  
“Zhengfu	  Zhengce	  Dui	  Gaoxin	  Jishu	  Qiye	  Zhuanli	  Chanchu	  De	  Yingxiang	  Jiqi	  Menkan	  Xiaoying-­‐Laizi	  Shanghai	  De	  WeiGuan	  Shizheng	  Fenxi(政府政策对高新技术企业专利产出的影响及其门槛效应–来自上海的微观实证分析)[Government	  Policies’	   Effects	  and	  Threshold	  on	  the	  Output	  of	  Patents	  by	  High-­‐Tech	  Enterp,”	   in	  Guoji	  Jinrong	  Weiji	  Yu	  Zhongguo	  Qiye	  
Fazhan(国际金融危机与中国企业发展)[Glable	  Financial	  Crisis	  and	  Chinese	  Enterprises	  Development],	  2012,	  400–407.	  Also	  see,	  Chen	  and	  Yu,	  “The	  External	  Effects	  of	  R&D	  in	  Enterprises:	  A	  Panel	  Data	  Analysis	  In	  Industrial	  Level[企业研发投
入的外部环境影响因素研究——基于产业层面的面板数据分析].”	  314	   David	  J.	  Teece,	  “Reflections	  on	  ‘Profiting	  from	  Innovation,’”	  Research	  Policy	  35	  (2006):	  1131.	   	  315	   Ibid.	  1143.	  See	  also,	  Joseph	  A.	  Schumpeter,	  Capitalism,	  Socialism,	  and	  Democracy,	  Routledge	  (London	  and	  New	  York:	  George	  Allen	  &	  Unwin,	  1943).	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evidence,316 these patent strategies may function as the means to save some parts of the 
deadweight loss of their IP.317  
Alternatively, recall the importance of innovation to a country and a firm in Chapter 1. 
These interior patent strategies may show the incentives of patenting by firms, but they still 
cannot answer the doubts raised about the theoretical predictions and the political goals of many 
countries about the efficiency of IPR regimes in encouraging innovation by firms, especially 
SMEs. 
In my research, I look into the particular innovative SMEs in China and learn their R&D 
activities and patent or copyright behaviors to understand the efficiency of the IPR regime in 
innovation in SMEs. When considering the factors of patenting incentives relating to the 
financial strategies, my research helps to not shirk the uncertified efficiency of the IP regime in 
stimulating innovation by SMEs in China. This could also be meaningful for responding to some 
American legal scholars, such as Lemley, who worry that IPRs create extra transaction costs to 
the society and impede innovation.318 By combining the firm-level data and country-level data, 
my research will help to explain this conflict between theory and practice.  
 
2. Strengthen or Not Strengthen the IP Regimes in Developing Countries   
 
As presented in the literature review, there are an enormous number of arguments for 
constructing the strength of the IP regimes in developing countries. The inconsistent strength of 
IP regimes between developed countries and developing countries is because the TRIPs, the 
Paris Convention and other International IP conventions or covenants have some transitional 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  316	   David	  H.	  Hsu	  and	  Rosemarie	  H.	  Ziedonis,	  “Resources	  as	  Dual	  Sources	  of	  Advantage:	  Implications	  for	  Valuing	  Entrepreneurial-­‐Firm	  Patents,”	  Strategic	  Management	  Journal	  34	  (2013):	  761–81.	  See	  also,	  David	  Hsu	  and	  Rosemarie	  H.	  Ziedonis,	  “Patents	  as	  Quality	  Signals	  for	  Entrepreneurial	  Ventures,”	  in	  DRUID	  Summer	  Conference	  on	  Appropriability,	  
Proximity,	  Routines	  and	  Innovation,	  2007.	  See	  also,	  Ziedonis,	  “Chapter	  10.	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation.”	  See	  also,	  Yael	  V.	  Hochberg,	  Carlos	  J.	  Serrano,	  and	  Rosemarie	  H.	  Ziedonis,	  Patent	  Collateral,	  Investor	  Commitment,	  and	  the	  Market	  for	  
Venture	  Lending,	  2014,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.nber.org/papers/w20587.	  317	   Denicolò	  and	  Franzoni,	  “Weak	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  ,	  Research	  Spill-­‐Overs	  and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  Innovate.”	  318	   Mark	  A.	  Lemley,	  “The	  Economics	  of	  Improvement	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  Law,”	  Tex.	  L.	  Rev.	  75	  (n.d.):	  989–1084.	  996-­‐997.	  See	  also,	  Wendy	  Gordon,	  “Fair	  Use	  as	  Market	  Failure:	  A	  Structural	  and	  Economic	  Analysis	  of	  the	  Betamax	  Case	  and	  Its	  Predecessors,”	  Columbia	  Law	  Review	  82,	  no.	  8	  (1982):	  1653.	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provisions for developing countries and require them to be less restricted than those in developed 
countries. This staggered system has been established to help developing countries implement 
the obligations of TRIPs and other conventions.319  
For example, the Article 31 of the TRIPs, authorizing compulsory licensing, attempts to 
create a balance between two opposing interests: “the interests of inventors and of 
technologically advanced countries and those of licensees and of technologically less advanced 
countries.”320 Also, developing countries indeed care about compulsory licenses to compensate 
their domestic markets.321 However, technology developers or FDI investors from developed 
countries prefer to enter an environment with strong IP protections to secure and compensate 
their investments in that market. This is a common consensus that can be derived from all of the 
scholars322 mentioned in the literature review based on either their theoretical analysis or 
empirical studies in various countries, especially in China, and in various industries, such as in 
manufacturing industries.  
When we understand the importance of FDI on technology transfers and spillovers; on 
fostering dynamic competition in the market, capital, management skills and other resources 
from developed countries; and, finally, on the economic development in developing countries323, 
we should not ignore that these factors were originally formulated within the interior system of 
developing countries. In this case, the proper strength of IP regimes in developing countries is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  319	   Daniel	  C.K.	  Chow	  and	  Edward	  Lee,	  International	  Intellectual	  Property:	  Problems,	  Cases,	  and	  Materials	  (Thomson	  West,	  2006),	  63.	   	  320	   Mitsuo	  Matsushita,	  Thomas	  J.	  Schoenbaum,	  and	  Petros	  Mavroidis,	  The	  World	  Trade	  Organization:	  Law,	  Practice	  and	  
Policy	  (New	  York:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  429.	   	  321	   Ibid.	  428.	  Some	  scholars,	  such	  as	  Correa	  and	  Fink,	  mentioned	  by	  our	  literature	  review,	  remind	  developing	  countries	  of	  the	  opportunities	  left	  in	  these	  International	  conventions	  to	  favor	  their	  local	  firms	  by	  a	  weak	  IP	  regime.	   	  322	   When	  I	  discuss	  the	  interact	  of	  IP	  and	  finance,	  I	  presented	  the	  opinions	  of	  Olwan,	  Lu,	  et	  al.,	  Hu	  and	  Jaffe,	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Park	  and	  Lippoldt,	  Maskus,	  Chatterrjee	  et	  al.	  Coriat	  and	  Orsenigo,	  and	  the	  results	  of	  the	  empirical	  studies	  in	  China,	  Brazil,	  or	  multiple	  developing	  countries	  by	  Javorcik,	  Mansfield,	  and	  Fuller.	  Those	  scholars	  all	  agree	  that	  FDI	  investors	  can	  be	  merely	  attracted	  by	  stronger	  IP	  regimes.	  Even	  when	  we	  consider	  the	  IP	  environment	  alone,	  Maskus	  takes	  Lebanon	  as	  a	  case	  to	  persuade	  other	  developing	  countries	  to	  adopt	  a	  stronger	  IP	  regime	  attract	  leading	  foreign	  technologies.	   	  323	   The	  literature	  review	  presents	  that	  Heffernan	  and	  Wachtel,	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  and	  Lu	  et	  al.	  show	  FDI	  is	  an	  important	  type	  of	  international	  financial	  flows	  and	  have	  significant	  effects	  on	  parts	  of	  these	  areas.	  As	  supplements,	  the	  scholars	  who	  support	  to	  strengthen	  IP	  regimes	  in	  developing	  countries	  to	  attract	  FDI	  discuss	  the	  significant	  effects	  on	  the	  rest	  parts	  of	  these	  areas.	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still an ambiguous question under discussion in the previous literature. 
On the one side, for local innovators, an IP system is an important platform to obtain 
compensation. If the system is too weak, their compensation will be too little.324 Regardless of 
FDI or other foreign technologies, recalling the economics analysis of the importance of having 
IPRs and the successful experience of the IP systems in the U.S.325 and other developed 
countries326, it is reasonable to understand the perspectives of the scholars who strongly suggest 
that developing countries should strengthen their IP regimes for encouraging technology 
transfers and constructing a dynamic competitive market, which will ultimately create resources 
and incentives for innovation.327  
On the other side, as I have organized in the literature review, there are obviously more 
scholars who doubt whether or not these ideal goals could be successfully accomplished in 
developing countries. At least, they question whether the relationship between the strength of IP 
protection and innovation is strictly positive. The economics theory on dynamic effect of IP 
protection predicts and simulates an inverted U-shape relationship between IP protection and 
startups’ innovation because of an imbalance benefit that a system with excessive IP protection 
provides to incumbents on the market.328  
Furthermore, regardless of how the scholars did statistics or did empirical studies, focusing 
on general industries or particular industries, such as the pharmaceutical industry, the agriculture 
industry, and the software and semiconductor industries, and the duration of their studies, they 
usually found negative effects of strong IP protection on local innovations, or they could not find 
its positive influences on local innovations in developing countries.329 For developing countries, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  324	   Hu	  and	  Jaffe,	  “Lessons	  from	  the	  Economics	  Literature	  on	  the	  Likely	  Consequences	  of	  International	  Hamonization	  of	  IPR	  Protection.”	  325	   Li,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries	  in	  China.”	  326	   For	  example,	  the	  Germany	  IP	  regime	  is	  comparatively	  strong	  in	  the	  world,	  and	  our	  literature	  review	  mentions	  that	  Fink	  uses	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  prove	  it	  facilitates	  innovations	  in	  German.	  Fink,	  “Patent	  Protection,	  Transnational	  Corporations,	  and	  Market	  Structure:	  A	  Simulation	  Study	  of	  the	  Indian	  Pharmaceutical	  Industry.”	   	  327	   Maskus,	  Dougherty,	  and	  Mertha,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  China.”	  328	   Panagopoulos	  and	  Park,	  Patent	  Protection,	  Takeovers	  ,	  and	  Startup	  Innovation:	  A	  Dynamic	  Approach.	  19.	  Also	  see,	  Coriat	  and	  Orsenigo,	  “IPRs,	  Public	  Health	  and	  the	  Pharmaceutical	  Industry:	  Issues	  in	  the	  Post-­‐2005	  TRIPS	  Agenda,”234.	  329	   In	  the	  section	  of	  construction	  of	  patent	  environment	  to	  stimulate	  innovation	  in	  our	  literature	  review,	  I	  have	  listed	  
	   99	  
they indeed question whether FDI and technology transfer can be successfully increased to offset 
the cost of strengthening the enforcement of IP laws.330  
The discrepancy between the theoretical positive effects of a strong IP regime on innovation 
and the undesirable results across several industries in developing countries could be due to two 
reasons, which are problematic but ignored by the previous literature. First, defining a strong IP 
regime as the degree and the breadth of the protection provided by an IP regime to technology 
developers is too rigid, especially for developing countries.331 Second, a key difference between 
the markets in developing countries and the markets in developed countries is that few 
developing countries are market-oriented economies, so developing countries usually lack 
efficient competition in their markets.332 
Based on different innovation strategies and innovative abilities, innovators can be 
categorized as initial innovators or innovation followers.333 Their costs and benefits of doing 
innovation are different, and their incentives could also be different.334 For example, Kitch 
believes that process innovations are more rapid and are demanded by all firms, not only by 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Cimoli	  et	  al.,	  Sakakibara	  and	  Branstetter,	  Denicolo	  and	  Franzoni,	  Coriat	  and	  Orsenigo,	  and	  Fink	  as	  the	  scholars	  who	  are	  hesitant	  to	  admit	  a	  positive	  relationship	  between	  the	  strength	  of	  IP	  regime	  in	  a	  developing	  country	  and	  the	  innovation	  there	  because	  of	  their	  empirical	  or	  statistical	  results.	  Particularly,	  Heald	  raised	  the	  doubts	  on	  the	  positive	  relationship	  between	  levels	  of	  IPRs	  and	  FDI	  decisions	  because	  of	  the	  vague	  and	  broad	  definition	  of	  FDI	  by	  Mansfield.	   	   	  330	   Paul	  J	  Heald,	  “Misreading	  a	  Canonical	  Work :	  An	  Analysis	  of	  Mansfield’	  S	  1994	  Study,”	  Journal	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  
Law	  10	  (2003):	  309.	   	  331	   In	  our	  literature	  review,	  I	  have	  discussed	  the	  studies	  of	  Cimoli	  et	  al.,	  Sakakibara	  and	  Branstetter,	  Ganslandt	  et	  al.,	  and	  Nuvolari	  and	  Tartari.	  They	  studied	  the	  patentable	  subject	  matters	  in	  developing	  countries,	  and	  suggest	  that	  they	  should	  expand	  that	  to	  strengthen	  their	  IP	  regimes,	  or	  use	  that	  to	  evaluate	  the	  strength	  of	  their	  IP	  regimes.	   	  332	   Besides	  the	  strength	  of	  IP	  protection,	  technology	  transfer	  also	  depends	  on	  other	  critical	  conditions,	  such	  as	  the	  regulatory	  transparency,	  market	  openness	  in	  a	  country.	  See,	  Reichman	  et	  al.,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Alternatives:	  Strategies	  for	  Green	  Innovation.”	  374.	  “Many	  countries	  have	  negotiated	  trade	  agreements	  with	  TRIPS	  ‘extra’	  and	  ‘plus’	  provisions.”	  Based	  on	  these	  behaviors	  of	  the	  countries,	  Burlamaqui	  and	  Cimoli	  understand	  the	  function	  of	  TRIPS	  agreement	  on	  market	  access.	  Thus,	  they	  suggest	  that	  effective	  industrial	  policies	  should	  consider	  the	  elements	  of	  economy’s	  degree	  of	  openness,	  macroeconomic	  governance,	  and	  competition	  policies.	  See	  also,	  Burlamaqui	  and	  Cimoli,	  “Industrial	  Policy	  and	  IPR:	  A	  Knowledge	  Governance	  Approach,”	  496.	   	  333	   Initial	  innovators	  are	  also	  called	  technology	  development	  leaders,	  innovation	  leaders,	  initial	  innovators	  or	  pioneer	  innovators.	  Innovation	  followers	  are	  also	  known	  as	  follow-­‐on	  innovators.	  “A	  leader	  pursues	  innovations	  by	  investing	  in	  R&D	  and	  attempts	  to	  protect	  these	  innovations	  using	  IPRs.	  A	  follower	  relies	  on	  adopting,	  imitating,	  or	  inventing	  around	  new	  innovations	  developed	  by	  others.”	  See	  Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  
Growth,	  120.	  334	   Fisher	  reminds	  us	  that,	  besides	  the	  cost	  of	  R&D,	  pioneer	  innovators	  also	  have	  a	  similar	  high	  cost	  of	  competition	  costs	  because	  of	  the	  big	  number	  of	  follow-­‐on	  technologies.	  In	  the	  perspective	  of	  Fisher,	  pioneering	  patents	  have	  the	  capability	  to	  raise	  the	  development	  of	  an	  industry.	  See,	  Fisher,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  Theoretical,	  Empirical,	  and	  Historical	  Perspectives.”	  Burk	  and	  Lemley	  see	  a	  lower	  cost	  of	  R&D	  by	  follow-­‐on	  innovators	  parts	  of	  whose	  process	  of	  R&D	  are	  easy	  replications.	  Burk	  and	  Lemley,	  “Policy	  Levers	  in	  Patent	  Law.”	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technological pioneers.335 Currently, even in the U.S. market, there are increasingly fewer initial 
innovators, so some scholars suggest shrinking the scope of IPRs for the public interests of 
various parties, including the users of the technologies and other technology developers, and 
encouraging cumulative innovations.336 Comparatively, developing countries largely relying on 
imported technologies have even fewer initial innovators and merely have 
innovation-followers.337  
Are they necessary to “strengthen IPRs” in order to encourage the development of 
following technologies, or to foster the incentives and the abilities of initial innovation? Is it 
economically efficient to request developing countries to broaden the scope of their IPR 
protection and strengthen the enforcement of IPR protection simultaneously? At this point, the 
second question I raise, the inefficiency of the competition in the markets of developing 
countries, is strongly relevant.  
In most developing countries, besides the trade restrictions eliminated by the TRIPs and 
other International agreements, their markets are not open enough and still have a variety of 
interior and exterior trade restrictions left.338 Moreover, many monopolies in the markets of 
developing countries are state owned enterprises (SOEs) because the governments use state 
owned enterprises to decrease the risk and uncertainty in the markets.339 With their immature 
markets of patent commercialization, if I expand some theoretical analysis of some scholars in 
the literature review, they will suggest that these governments need to provide more government 
subsidies and subsidized policies than the countries with an efficient free-market in order to aid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  335	   See,	  Kitch,	  “The	  Nature	  and	  Function	  of	  the	  Patent	  System,”	  289.	  336	   Many	  scholars,	  such	  as	  Fisher,	  Lemley,	  and	  Chang,	  have	  realized	  this	  trend	  and	  the	  importance	  of	  innovation	  followers	  so	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  IP	  regime	  should	  be	  adjusted	  to	  provide	  innovative	  opportunities	  and	  markets	  to	  follow-­‐on	  innovators.	  Howard	  F	  Chang,	  “Patent	  Scope,	  Antitrust	  Policy	  ,	  and	  Cumulative	  Innovation,”	  Innovation	  26,	  no.	  1	  (2012):	  34–57.	  See	  also,	  Lemley,	  “Should	  Patent	  Infringement	  Require	  Proof	  of	  Copying.”c.	  See	  alsoFisher,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  Theoretical,	  Empirical,	  and	  Historical	  Perspectives.”	  337	   Maskus,	  “Transfer	  of	  Technology	  and	  Technological	  Capacity	  Building.”	  See	  also	  Robert	  E.	  Evenson	  and	  Larry	  E.	  Westphal,	  “Technological	  Change	  and	  Technology	  Strategy,”	  in	  3A	  Handbook	  of	  Development	  Economics,	  ed.	  Jere	  Behrman	  &	  T.N.	  Srinivasan	  Eds.	  (Amsterdam:	  North-­‐Holland,	  1995),	  2209–2341.	  338	   Possible	  reasons	  for	  interior	  trade	  restrictions	  could	  be	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  countries	  is	  different	  as	  capitalism,	  socialism	  or	  democracy,	  and	  that	  the	  legal	  environments	  are	  different	  as	  civil	  law	  system	  or	  common	  law	  system.	   	  339	   Lu	  et	  al.	  use	  China	  as	  an	  example	  to	  explain	  these	  economic	  effects	  of	  SOEs	  in	  the	  market.	  Haitian	  Lu,	  Yi	  Tan,	  and	  Gongment	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China,”	  Hong	  Kong	  L.	  J.	  37	  (2007):	  229–71.	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their local firms to survive and develop.340  
Therefore, due to the two issues, it is necessary to do empirical study with a case of one 
developing country, China, and analyze the weaknesses of the IP regime in this particular 
emerging market. This is similar to how Cockburn and MacGarve suggest that one industry, the 
software industry, should be studied alone for the effects of the U.S. IP regime by using 
empirical methods, where the reaction of the software industry could be opposite to that of other 
industries on the market.341  
Only if we learn the efficiency of IP regimes with empirical methods, can we evaluate the 
regime and improve it, rather than simply strengthen or weaken it. Recall the inverted U-shape 
simulation by Panagopoulos.342 The data for the simulation is from the U.S. firms. In the 
Chinese market, excessive IP protection could benefit the incumbents more, but the innovative 
foreign firms are likely to be the incumbents against domestic firms. Hence, the vertex could be 
different with different observations and an empirical study can be helpful to understanding how 
the domestic firms innovate and survive.  
For understanding the efficiency, this study considers and balances the direct and indirect 
effects of the IP regime on stimulating innovation by local SMEs. The direct effects are from the 
designs of the IP regime itself, and the indirect effects are created by FDI investors, other 
technology developers from developed countries in the local market and other economic 
instruments by governments or the local financial market. Therefore, I look through the heavily 
debated parts of the design of the IP regime in China, and evaluate them statute-by-statute rather 
than roughly suggest strengthening it as a whole.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  340	   For	  example,	  Scotchmer	  agrees	  that	  national	  treatment	  increases	  incentives	  to	  innovate,	  especially	  in	  an	  environment	  where	  local	  markets	  are	  not	  large	  enough	  to	  support	  invention.	  See	  Scotchmer,	  “The	  Political	  Economy	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Treaties.”	  Kitch	  and	  Olwen	  also	  discuss	  the	  importance	  of	  government	  supporting	  besides	  providing	  IP	  protection	  in	  the	  markets,	  especially	  in	  the	  markets	  which	  cannot	  efficient	  compensate	  the	  innovators.	  See	  Olwan,	  
Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development :	  Theory	  and	  Practice.	  See	  also	  Kitch,	  “The	  Nature	  and	  Function	  of	  the	  Patent	  System.”	  341	   Im	  Cockburn	  and	  Mj	  MacGarvie,	  Patents,	  Thickets	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Early	  Stage	  Firms:	  Evidence	  from	  the	  Software	  
Industry,	  NBER	  Working	  Paper	  Series,	  vol.	  13644,	  2007,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1530-­‐9134.2009.00228.x/full.	  342	   Panagopoulos	  and	  Park,	  Patent	  Protection,	  Takeovers	  ,	  and	  Startup	  Innovation:	  A	  Dynamic	  Approach.	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III. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
In this part, the research questions are based on the discussed problems remaining in the 
prior literature and regard the connections between the innovation SMEs and their IPRs or the IP 
regime. The precise research questions breaking down the general questions as listed below:  
What is the efficiency of IPRs, such as utility patents, utility models, design patents and 
software copyrights, in stimulating innovation by SMEs when China is strengthening its IP 
regime? Can IPRs owned by SMEs effectively improve their R&D commercialization? In other 
words, are the number of IPRs owned by SMEs associated with their R&D outcomes in revenue 
and net profits?  
In addition, what is the propensity of innovation-intensive SMEs to file the three types of 
patent applications, including the utility patents, utility models and design patents? In precise, 
how does the variation of the number of patent filings associated with the internal factors, such 
as R&D intensity (a rate of R&D investment over employee), R&D investment amount and 
revenue, and the external factors, such as government funding, corporate tax credits and 
subsidies for patent application fee? 
One hypothesis is that revenue, net profit and asset turnover ratio (a rate of revenue over 
total assets) would vary as the function of R&D intensity, the number of issued utility patents, 
utility models, design patents and copyrights, and the number of issued IPRs in previous years. 
Another hypothesis is that SMEs make patent strategies with different degrees of R&D 
investment amount and R&D intensity and have different patenting propensity on the three types 
of patents, including utility patents, utility models and design patents, and the propensity of an 
SME is consistent on the three types of patents. The last hypothesis is that both revenue, which is 
the outcomes of holding patents, and pro-patent grants or subsidies, such as government funding, 
corporate tax credits and subsidies for patent application fee are associated with patenting 
propensity of SMEs, but the association could be in degree.  
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IV. Data and Methodology 
 
As Problem 1 in Section II presents, the prior studies have considered country-level data and 
firm-level data to understand the relationship between IPRs and innovation, but the firm-level 
data only in the respect of particular industries and the country-level data usually cannot provide 
a direct or substantial correlation.343 With regard to Problem 2, learning how to strengthen or not 
strengthen IP regimes in a developing country, my country-level data are about China and my 
firm-level data are collected from some public firms in Zhongguan-Cun Science Park and 
Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park. The background of the two science parks and the enterprises locating 
there has been introduced in Chapter 2.  
In this chapter, Section 1 introduces the country-level data in IP and their sources. 
Consistent with the data in Chapter 2, the range of the data is from 2009 to 2013. Section 1 
explains the variables that are selected and the process of collecting and coding the data into the 
variables. The firm-level data in IP, the individual firm characteristics and their sources have 
been introduced in Chapter 2. Section 2 discusses the models employing the data.  
 
1. Country-Level Data in IP  
 
The country-level data in IP reflect the IP environment of China and its variance between 
2009 and 2013. Hall et al. criticize the previous firm-level empirical studies that did not control 
for exogenous differences so that these studies could not explain the relationship between 
innovation and the protection mechanism, and they agree on the importance of evidence from 
litigation in the previous studies.344 Hence, it is necessary to utilize the data to understand the 
frequencies of IP applications, IP transactions and IP enforcement in China.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  343	   For	  example,	  Hall	  and	  Ziedonis,	  “The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Semiconductor	  Industry	  ,	  1979-­‐1995.	  ”	  See	  also,	  Carsten	  Fink,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  U.S.	  and	  German	  International	  Transactions	  in	  Manufacturing	  Industries,”	  in	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Development:	  Lessons	  from	  Recent	  
Economic	  Research,	  ed.	  Carsten	  Fink	  and	  Keith	  E.	  Maskus	  (The	  World	  Bank	  and	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005)	  344	   Hall	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Choice	  between	  Formal	  and	  Informal	  Intellectual	  Property:	  A	  Review,”	  408-­‐410.	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In the branch of understanding the IP enforcement in China, I adopt the data showing the 
development of IP courts in China and the frequencies of various litigations initiated by IP 
owners and other IP disputes. Because the results of litigations and arbitrations are merely 
selectively public by the courts, it is not reasonable to directly apply these results in my variables 
to represent the enforcement of IP in China for its incompleteness.  
Alternatively and indirectly, I collect the data of the number of all filed civil patent cases 
litigated in China per year, the number of litigated administrative patent cases in China per year 
and the number of all utility patent applications. Because people, especially technology 
developers, can rely on the patent litigation system more heavily to protect their interests when 
they rely on the patent regime more frequently and usually, the variance of these data can reflect 
the effects of the improvement of patent regime both in the litigation system and in the SIPO and 
the improvement of the market involving transactions of technologies.  
In precise, based on the category of the goal of litigation, the number of civil patent 
litigations exhibits how people or companies treat their technology under the patent regime 
effectively on the market, and the number of administrative patent litigations denotes how 
inventers manage problems with the SIPO.345 When patent applicants are not satisfied with the 
final rejection by the SIPO, they can appeal the result to a court by filing an administrative 
litigation against the SIPO. Here, to denote the satisfaction of general patent applicants with the 
examination by the SIPO, I divide the number of administrative litigations by the number of 
utility patent applications. This appeal rate over all utility patent applications merely count for 
the appeal of utility patent rejections because utility model regime is a registration regime and 
does need to appeal for acquiring a utility model right, and it is also a measure to present the 
strictness of patent regime in China.  
Moreover, this study also adopts other variables to describe the IP enforcement in China. 
These variables include the mediation rate over all filed IP cases per year, the number of public 
court decisions on IP cases per year, the number of trial courts having the jurisdiction of patent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  345	   Because	  SIPO	  is	  a	  government	  agency,	  disputes	  on	  its	  decisions,	  including	  the	  denials	  or	  authorizations	  of	  patents	  are	  administrative	  cases	  rather	  than	  civil	  cases	  in	  China.	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litigations, and the number of appellate courts with the jurisdiction of the patent litigations. They 
express the efforts of the court system to strengthen its legal environment and to make more 
reasonable and challenging decisions. 
Among these variables, the number of trial courts for patent suits denotes the availability of 
patent litigations for various interest parties. Moreover, for the mediation rate, on the one side, it 
reflects the legal culture of courts on IP cases and the perspective of innovators and the market 
on IP. On the other side, because the mediation rate over all filed civil cases is one standard of 
evaluating judges for the efficiency of jurisdiction in China, the judges encourage mediation 
between the disputed parties.346 Hence, the mediation rate over all filed IP cases can tell the 
endeavor of the judges in these cases and the effects of their subjective endeavor on the results of 
these cases.347 For the court decisions, they are not required to be public in China, even though 
the public concerns it for the consistence and the fairness of the jurisdiction.348 Therefore, the 
number of public court decisions on IP cases can tell the improvement of the fairness of the IP 
jurisdictions and the reliability of the IP regime.349  
Before the court decisions, the courts can authorize some kinds of temporary orders based 
on the pleadings of the plaintiffs. These orders include the temporary restraining orders or 
preliminary injunctions, pretrial preservation of evidence and pretrial preservation of property. In 
this research, I collect the data of the number of all admitted applications of temporary 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  346	   Hui	  Liu(刘辉),	  “Minshi	  Jiancha	  Jiandu	  Shijiaoxia	  De	  Qiangshi	  Susong	  Tiaojie	  (民事检察监督视角下的强势诉讼调
解)[Civil	  Prosecurating	  View:	  Forced	  Mediation	  in	  Litigations],”	   Guojia	  Jianchaguan	  Xueyuan	  Xuebao(国家检察官学院学
报)[National	  Prosecutor	  Academic	  Paper],	  no.	  4	  (2008),	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_45270.shtml.	  347	   However, a drawback to use MD is that it compromise all public IP relevant cases, including the cases of patents, copyrights, 
trademarks, technology contracts, and antitrust because the P.R.C.	  People’s	  Supreme	  Court does not discriminate the categories 
of IP cases in their publication,	  so	  I	  can	  only	  adopt	  the	  integrity	  number	  to	  present	  the	  status	  of	  the	  whole	  IP	  regime.	   	  348	   For	  example,	  the	  news	  says	  that	  the	  courts	  in	  Beijing	  publish	  their	  decisions	  on	  IP	  cases.	  However,	  in	  practice,	  the	  process	  to	  acquire	  the	  cases	  could	  be	  time	  consuming.	  Moreover,	  the	  courts	  in	  the	  cities	  other	  than	  Beijing	  do	  not	  have	  this	  function	  because	  they	  have	  the	  freedom	  to	  publish	  or	  not.	  The	  law	  only	  requires	  the	  P.R.C.	  People’s	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  publish	  all	  of	  their	  decisions,	  and	  has	  been	  enacted	  since	  2013.	  See“Fayuan	  Panjueshu	  Heshi	  Nenggou	  Quangongkai	  (法院
判决书何时能够全公开?)[When	  the	  All	  Court	  Decisions	  Can	  Be	  Public?],”	   2013,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://news.ifeng.com/gundong/detail_2013_11/28/31619654_0.shtml.	   	  349	   Just	  like	  issuing	  in	  the	  mediation	  rate	  (MD),	  the	  P.R.C.	  People’s	  Supreme	  Court	  does	  not	  provide	  the	  statistic	  of	  public	  court	  decisions	  on	  patent	  cases,	  copyright	  cases,	  trademark	  cases,	  technology	  transaction	  contract	  cases	  and	  trade	  secret	  cases	  separately,	  so	  I	  can	  only	  adopt	  the	  integrity	  number	  to	  present	  the	  status	  of	  the	  whole	  IP	  regime.	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restraining orders and preliminary injunctions on IP cases per year, the rate of the admissions 
over all the applications, the number of all admitted applications of pretrial preservation of 
evidence on IP cases per year and their admission rate.350 Combining with the discussed 
variables in the above paragraphs, these variables directly tell the enforcement of IP laws in 
China.351  
The sources of country-level data are the SIPO (State Intellectual Property Office of the 
R.R.C.) database and the reports by the P.R.C. Supreme People’s Court.352 Moreover, in this 
research, I only collect and adopt the data between 2009 and 2013.  
 
2. General Data Descriptions 
 
Chapter 2 describes the data regarding R&D, IP issuance and government funding and 
compares the data of the Beijing SMEs with the data of the Shanghai SMEs. Following the 
comparison between the two cities, this section describes their data regarding IP applications.   
Between 2009 and 2013, in general, the numbers of utility model applications were similar 
between the SMEs in the two cities, but the Beijing SMEs were more likely to apply for utility 
patents than the Shanghai SMEs. In precise, shown by the summary statistics in Table 3.1, the 
Beijing SMEs yearly filed 6.08 patent applications on average, and the Shanghai SMEs yearly 
filed 3.06 patent applications on average.  
Among all the industries, the industry of information technology, electronic manufacturing, 
mechanical manufacturing, petroleum and plastic manufacturing, and pharmaceutical 
manufacturing are the five largest groups of SMEs in the samples. Looking into those specific 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  350	   The	  temporary	  restraining	  orders	  and	  preliminary	  injunctions	  are	  enforcement	  orders	  on	  particular	  behaviors	  before	  the	  decisions	  on	  merits	  so	  as	  to	  be	  not	  discriminated	  under	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  China.	   	  351	   The	  injunctions	  including	  preliminary	  injunctions	  and	  permanent	  injunctions	  can	  directly	  tell	  the	  enforcement	  of	  courts	  in	  IP	  cases.	  Because	  of	  the	  incompleteness	  of	  the	  public	  court	  decisions,	  I	  can	  only	  acquire	  the	  information	  of	  preliminary	  injunctions.	  Moreover,	  the	  P.R.C.	  People’s	  Supreme	  Court	  does	  not	  discriminate	  the	  categories	  of	  IP	  disputes	  in	  these	  data.	  Therefore,	  I	  can	  only	  adopt	  to	  use	  the	  integral	  data	  to	  represent	  the	  enforcement	  of	  IP	  regime	  as	  a	  whole.	   	  352	   The	  P.R.C.	  Supreme	  People’s	  Court,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  Protection	  by	  Chinese	  Courts	  in	  2013,”	  2014,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.court.gov.cn/zscq/bhcg/201404/t20140425_195314.html.	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industries, in the industry of information technology, the Shanghai SMEs filed more software 
copyright registrations than the Beijing SMEs during 2009 to 2013. However, the Shanghai 
SMEs on average filed more software copyright registrations than the Beijing SMEs. In the 
industry of petroleum and plastic manufacturing, the difference in the number of the filed patent 
applications between the SMEs from Beijing and Shanghai is statistically significant. 
As Chapter 2, by the reasons that the Beijing SMEs and the Shanghai SMEs performed 
differently in R&D and patenting between 2009 and 2013, it is important to investigate the SMEs 
with the differences between the two cities. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
3.1. Panel Data Regressions 
 
To explore the research questions in Section III, the models in this part keep utilizing the 
panel dataset in Chapter 2 with the above-presented variables and estimate a series of panel data 
models for them. This part introduces the design of the empirical models to test on the collected 
data. The sources of the firm-level data are from two different science parks, and the duration of 
the data is five years, from 2009 to 2013, covering at latest three years’ data of the public SMEs 
before the IPO year.  
Accordingly, the data are coded into five panel datasets for the difference between the two 
cities where they register and headquarter and the difference of their status of IPO. The panel 
datasets are constructed for the 82 and 58 enterprises and their general information in the market.  
To explore the association among the three types of patent applications, R&D, issued 
patents and registered software copyrights in SMEs, and the strength of IP enforcement in China 
and the strictness of examination of the patent regime, following other studies that have tested 
for the impacts of R&D on patenting propensity,353 the OLS, random-effects or fixed-effects 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  353	   Hall	  and	  Ham,	  The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  Determinants	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  US	  Semiconductor	  Industry,	  1980-­‐94.	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models are estimated in one-way error component as the followings:354 
 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (1) 
 𝑈𝑀!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦!+ 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (2) 
 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦!+ 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (3) 
 
    where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
i denotes the individual SME. t denotes the year in which the SMEs innovate to apply and 
acquire patents, and f denotes the industry type. 𝜇! is an individual effect and varies across 
individual SMEs, but not across time. The remainder disturbance 𝜈!"  denotes the residual 
varying with individuals and time. In different individuals or levels of time, ∝ denotes the 
intercept and 𝛽!, 𝛽!,..., 𝛽!" denote the slopes. 𝑅&𝐷𝐼 and 𝑅&𝐷 are the explanatory variables to signify the R&D intensity and the R&D 
investment amount. 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡, 𝑈𝑀 and 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 are the numbers of utility patent, utility model 
and designs patent filings. They are chosen to be dependent variables to capture the patenting 
propensity of SMEs. The number of patent application filings, 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡, is also controlled in 
model 2 and model 3 as an explanatory variable for tracking the consistency of patenting 
behaviors of SMEs.  
Section 1 introduces the models controling for the IP enforcement by the numbers of 
preliminary injunctions and litigations. Since these two variables show multi-collinearity with 
the number of patent courts and the number of patent courts grows for the increased demand of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  354	   Shown	  by	  the	  regression	  results,	  the	  lagging	  effects	  of	  R&D	  intensity	  and	  R&D	  investment	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  patenting	  propensity	  better	  than	  their	  immediate	  effects,	  so	  the	  model	  designs	  finally	  do	  not	  include	  the	  lagging	  effects.	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patent litigations, the number of patent courts can represent the strength of IP enforcement as the 
function of the other two variables. Accordingly, the models left with the number of patent 
courts (𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡).  𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 indicates the appeal rate of the patent applications by SIPO for the 
rejection to represent the strictness of examination of the patent regime. The two country-level 
variables only vary across time, the five years, but not across individual SMEs.  𝑃𝐴𝑇𝐸𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 representing the three types of issued patents in total in an SME from SIPO 
is another control variable to capture the effect of obtaining patents on the further patenting 
behaviors of the innovative SMEs. The total amount of government grants (𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡) and the total 
amount of various types of tax credits (𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) are also added as control variables to capture 
the government intervention into the SMEs’ patenting behaviors other than the IP regime. Those 
data resources and data description have been introduced in Chapter 2. 
The other variables representing individual firm’s characteristics and time are also included 
as control variables. The number of employees (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒) surrogates for the size of the SMEs. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 is a dummy variable to control for the category of industries where an SME is, so it 
only varies across individuals, but not across time. The categories of industry have been 
introduced in Chapter 2.  
To explore the efficiency of IP commercialization among the SMEs, the models are 
estimated in one-way error component as the followings: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!!+ 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!"!! + 𝛽!"𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!!+ 𝛽!!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!"!!+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!"𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 17𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"      (4) 
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𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!!+ 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!"!! + 𝛽!"𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!!+ 𝛽!!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!"!!+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!"𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 17𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"  (5) 
 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑅!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!!+ 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!"!! + 𝛽!"𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!!+ 𝛽!!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"!! + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡!"!!+ 𝛽!"𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!"𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 17𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"      (6) 
 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
Revenue (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒), net profit (𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) and asset turnover ratio (𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑇𝑅) of the SME 
are chosen as the dependent variables to capture the performance and competitiveness in the 
market by the SME. Asset turnover ratio of the SME is measured as a ratio of asset over 
employee. Also, asset turnover ratio of an SME can be measured as a ratio that capital intensity 
is divided by one. Capital intensity of an SME is a measure usually used by prior literature.355  𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒, 𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒, 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 and 𝐶𝑜𝑝𝑦𝑟𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡 are the explanatory variables, 
indicating the number of issued utility patents, utility models design patents that an SME 
acquires from SIPO and the number of registered software copyrights. Their one-year and 
two-year lagging effects are also controlled in the models as the explanatory variables, since the 
term of patent and copyright protection lasts over two years and IPRs should bring benefits to the 
SME during the term. The models also add a dummy variable as a control to categorize the 
SMEs acquired issued utility patents from SIPO or not, since most of the SMEs cannot annually 
acquire issued utility patents from SIPO. 
The other variables representing individual firm’s characteristics and time are also included 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  355	   Hall	  and	  Ziedonis,	  “The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  An	  Empirical	  Study	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  U.S.	  Semiconductor	  Industry,	  1979-­‐1995.”	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as the control variables, including the R&D intensity (𝑅&𝐷𝐼), the total amount of government 
grants (𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡) and the total amount of various types of tax credits (Taxcredit). 
Beyond model 6, the interaction between the number of issued utility patents from SIPO 
(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒) and the appeal rate (𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒) is also controlled in a product-term model 
because the appeal rate could affect the number of the issued utility patents from SIPO.    
To explore the association between the SMEs’ patenting behaviors and the government 
funding or subsidizes that they acquired, the models are estimated in one-way error component 
as the followings: 
 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡! + 𝛽!𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒!+ 𝛽!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇!+ 𝜈!"        (7) 
 𝑈𝑀!"! =∝ +𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡!+ 𝛽!𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"          (8) 
 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑅&𝐷!" + 𝛽!𝐶𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑡!+ 𝛽!𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒! + 𝛽!𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡! + 𝛽!𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"              (9) 
 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,642 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,193    , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
The amount of the subsidies for patenting (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦) is an explanatory variable to 
indicate a direct government intervention in patenting behaviors of the SMEs under the goal of 
pro-patenting. Since the pro-patenting policy should be relevant to the development of the patent 
market in China, the total number of utility patent application filings (𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡) is added as 
a control variable in the models. It only varies across the five years, from 2009 to 2013, but not 
across the individual SMEs. 
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3.2. Difference-in-Difference-in-Difference Specifications 
 
In 2012, there was one policy change regarding patent subsidies in Shanghai. 356 By 
contrast, during 2009 to 2013, the Beijing government adopts one identical patent subsidy policy 
to administer the patent applicants living or being registered in Beijing. Accordingly, in order to 
explore how the patent subsidy policies impact on SMEs’ efficiency of commercializing patents, 
this part utilizes difference-in-difference-in-difference regressions. The regressions adopt 2012 
as the intervention year to capture the responses of the amendment of the Shanghai patent 
subsidy policy on the market performance of the SMEs. The group of Beijing is adopted as the 
control group and the group of Shanghai is adopted as the treated group. The regressions 
compare the effects of their utility patents on improving the revenue of the SMEs and are 
designed as the followings: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"#$#! =∝ +𝛽!𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! + 𝛽!𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! + 𝛽! 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽! 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽! 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽! 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!! ∗ 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! ∗ 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"      (10) 
     
    where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} ,   𝑡1 ∈𝑇! = {1, 2}, c ∈ 𝐶 = {1,2} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
Category fixed effects and the time horizon fixed effects representing the policy change are 
specified as 𝐶ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒!!  and 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑝! . 𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒  and 𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒  are control variables to 
capture the two forms of patents acquired by the SMEs from SIPO, other than utility patents. The 
coefficient of the three-way interaction, 𝛽!, surrogates for the diff-in-diff-in-diff effect.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356	   Shanghai	  Shi	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Ju(上海市知识产权局)[Shanghai	  Intellectual	  Property	  Administration],	  Shanghai	  Shi	  
Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Fazhan	  “Shierwu”	   Guihua(上海市知识产权发展“十二五”规划)[The	  Shanghai’s	  “Twelveth	  Five-­‐Year”	  
Plan	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  Development],	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.sipa.gov.cn/gb/zscq/node2/node25/userobject1ai9309.html.	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V. Results and Implications 
 
Implication 1: There is a positive relationship among all industries between the increase of R&D 
investment amount and the strength of propensity of SMEs on utility patents, shown by their 
utility patent applications, even though some innovation-intensive SMEs do not file any utility 
patent applications.  
 
Overall, in the estimation to predict utility patent propensity, shown in model 7 of Table 3.1, 
the coefficient on R&D investment by SMEs is statistical significant and positive, suggesting 
that the SMEs file on average 5.32 more utility patents when their R&D investments are 
increased by ￥10,000 RMB and R&D intensity, employee size, and the strictness on patent 
examination are held as constant at their average level. On the other side, when focusing on the 
effects of R&D intensity on utility patent propensity and holding R&D investment and the other 
factors as constant at their average level, the coefficient on R&D intensity also yields a 
statistically significant and positive result, suggesting that R&D intensity has a positive effects 
on the increase of SME’ propensity on utility patents. Because the industry category is held as 
constant in the estimation, the positive trend between R&D, represented by R&D intensity and 
R&D investment, and the propensity of SMEs on utility patents remains as consistent among all 
industries.  
Those results, however, are not consistent in the estimations with different panels of 
samples, shown by model 1, model 4 and model 7 of Table 3.1. If we look into the two groups of 
Beijing and Shanghai, the significant positive effects of R&D investment and R&D intensity on 
improving utility patent propensity only remains in the results of the random-effect GLS 
estimation with the Beijing’s panel.  
By contrast, in model 4 in Table 3.1, the fixed-effect model that is selected by Hausman test 
	   114	  
and to estimate utility patent propensity with the Shanghai’s panel,  the coefficients on the two 
factors are insignificant, even though they are statistically significant correlated with the increase 
of utility patent propensity (r=0.15 in R&D investment, r=0.21 in R&D intensity). Meanwhile, 
the fixed-effect model cannot control for industry categories, which is time-invariant. While the 
model passes the F-test, the coefficients may suggest that there is another significant fixed effect, 
which is the bias in an estimation with fixed effects least squares, also known as least squares 
dummy variable (LVDS).  
The Shanghai SMEs on average have weaker incentives to apply for utility patents in a 
statistically significant degree compared to the group of Beijing SMEs, shown by the t-test. The 
estimation in model 2 of Table 3.2 adopts random effects least squares and excludes the 
Shanghai SMEs which did not file utility patent applications. Under this estimation, the 
coefficient on R&D investment yields a statistical significant result, suggesting a positive effect 
of R&D investment on the propensity of the SMEs on utility patents when controlling for 
industry category as fixed and holding R&D intensity as constant. In other words, regardless of 
R&D intensity, R&D investment alone has a significant positive effect on improving utility 
patent propensity of SMEs among all industries.  
The Beijing samples’ story is consistent with Shanghai’s. While the coefficient on R&D 
intensity in model 1 of Table 3.1 yields a statistically significant result, the statistical significance 
of the coefficient is weak (p<0.1). The estimation in model 1 of Table 3.2 excludes the Shanghai 
SMEs which did not file utility patent applications and the coefficient on R&D intensity turns to 
be insignificant, even though the coefficient on R&D investment remains a statistical significant 
and positive result.  
Across the estimations with the three panels, the value of the coefficients on R&D 
investment is close, suggesting that the effects of R&D investment on improving the propensity 
of SMEs on utility patents are positive in an even degree regardless of geographic differences. 
The limitation is that it is difficult to estimate the degree of the exact effects, because the 
coefficients on R&D intensity involving R&D investment amount are insignificant.  
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In Table 3.7, the coefficients on R&D investment to predict the filings of utility patent 
application yield statistically significant and positive results. The coefficient for the panel before 
IPO is larger than the coefficient for the panel after IPO in a statistically significant degree of 
95%. Those results suggest that the positive association between R&D investment and utility 
patent applications is stronger among the SMEs before IPO than after.  
Therefore and overall, the strength of propensity of SMEs on utility patents could be an 
effective factor for governments or investors to evaluate or monitor the level of R&D investment 
by an SME other than its R&D investment amount. The strength is especially strong before IPO 
when limited disclosed information is acquainted with an SME, regardless of the size and the 
industry category of the SMEs.  
 
Implication 2: The utility patent propensity of SMEs is consistent with their propensity on utility 
models, but lower than their propensity on utility patents. Innovation-intensive SMEs have a 
significantly lower propensity on utility models. 
 
In Table 3.1, model 2, model 4 and model 8 are the estimations to predict the propensity of 
the SMEs on utility models. Consistently in the three models, when industry category is 
controlled as a fixed effect, the coefficients on R&D intensity yield a statistically significant and 
negative result, suggesting that the increase of R&D intensity of the SMEs varies with a decrease 
of utility model applications. In other words, when R&D intensity of SMEs is higher, their 
propensity on utility models is lower.  
On the other hand, in those three models, the coefficients on utility patent propensity of 
SMEs yield  statistically significant and positive results, suggesting a uniform variation of the 
propensity of the SMEs on utility patents and utility models. As the results shown by the overall 
panel samples, when an SME files one more utility patent, it files 0.35 more utility models 
simultaneously, which is less than 1. Meanwhile, the coefficients on the utility model propensity 
of the SMEs equal to 0.33 and 0.60 for the groups of Beijing and Shanghai, respectively. Both of 
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them are also lower than 1, suggesting that the SMEs on average have a higher propensity on 
utility patents compared to their propensity on utility models. When the SMEs got an outcome of 
their innovation and demanded an IP protection for that, they prefer to pursue the protection 
under utility patents rather than utility models, even though an application for utility models 
without a substantive examination is cheaper, quicker and easier than a utility patent application.  
The previous analyses conclude that a significant positive relationship between R&D 
investment amount and utility patent propensity and a low propensity of innovation-intensive 
SMEs on utility models. Accordingly, the estimations to predict utility model propensity with the 
predictor of utility patent propensity suggest that the SMEs actively conducting R&D prefer to 
apply for utility patents than utility models for their innovation outcomes.   
In addition, even though the dual-application is allowed, which means that an applicant can 
file a utility patent application and a utility model application for a same piece of technology, the 
SMEs do not really file a dual-application for their innovation and technology. One possibility is 
that they do not make appropriate patent strategies, so they cannot realize utility models as a 
bottom for their utility patent applications. Another possibility is that they on average file more 
utility patents for methods, which are not protected under utility models. Because I did not 
control for the subject matter of the utility models, so there is a limitation to make this statement. 
However, the SMEs hardly make incomes from patent licensing, which means that they usually 
use the patents for their own. If they only use the patents negatively, they have not realized the 
higher costs of enforcing a method patent rather than a product patent, which also suggest that 
they do not make appropriate patent strategies.  
An alternative possibility is that SMEs make patent strategies. They value the stronger 
protection under utility patents more than the weaker protection under utility models for their 
innovation and technology, and they do not want to waste the application fee to apply for utility 
models. Governments, lenders and investors may value utility patents more than utility models to 
decide to fund them so the SMEs may make patent strategies in the perspectives on attracting 
external financing. However, learning from the overall research, this is not the happening story 
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in this case.  
 
Implication 3: Net profit of SMEs is associated with the variation of their issued utility patents 
and utility models. 
 
Implication 3.1: The effect of issued utility models on the variation of net profit is not through 
their effects on directly or indirectly generating revenue, and the immediate effect is weaker 
compared to the effect of issued utility patents on improving net profit. 
 
In the estimations to predict net profit, shown by model 3, the model 6, and model 9 in 
Table 3.3, the coefficients on issued utility models and the lagged issued utility models show 
statistical significance, but only in certain circumstances. For the overall group, the coefficients 
on issued utility models and one-year lagged issued utility models yield statistically significant 
results. However, the value of the coefficients is opposite, suggesting that the effects of issued 
utility models in a long term and in a short term are opposite. The coefficient on issued utility 
models is negative, and the coefficient on issued utility models lagged by one year is positive 
and bigger. Therefore, the accumulated effects of issued utility models on improving net profit is 
positive. While the positive effect of issued utility models on improving net profit is lagged, 
lagged issued utility models cannot contribute to directly improve revenue, so the positive effect 
on improving net profit could not be realized through revenue.  
For the group of Beijing, the accumulated effects of issued utility models on improving net 
profit is also positive. In detail, the coefficient on issued utility models lagged by one year yields 
a statistically significant and positive result, but the coefficient on issued utility models suggests 
that the immediate effect of issued utility models is insignificant. On the other side, in model 1 of 
Table 3.3, the coefficient on issued utility models yields a statistically significant and positive 
result, suggesting that issued utility models have a positive effect on immediately improving 
revenue, but it is not clear about their lagged effects on improving revenue. Therefore, this 
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circumstance is consistent with the overall panel’s result that the positive effect of issued utility 
models on net profit is not realized through its positive effect on directly generating revenue.  
For the group of Shanghai, the coefficient on issued utility models lagged by two years 
yields a statistically significant and negative result, suggesting that the lagged effect of issued 
utility models is negative on improving net profit of the SMEs. In this case, issued utility models 
not only cannot improve net profit, but also have a negative effect on improving net profit. 
Meanwhile, the coefficient on issued utility models is insignificant to predict revenue, shown by 
model 4 of Table 3.3. Therefore, it is unclear how the negative effect of issued utility models on 
improving net profit through their direct effects on revenue.  
On the other hand, the estimations to predict asset turnover ratio, shown by model 2, model 
5 and model 8, come out with insignificant coefficients on issued utility models, suggesting that 
it is unclear how utility models affect the efficiency of deploying total assets of the SMEs in 
generating revenue when their R&D intensity is hold as constant in its average degree. In other 
words, it is unclear how utility models are utilized by the SMEs inside their business running and 
combined with these processes, such as their management and production. Therefore, the effect 
of issued utility models on the variation of net profit is also not through their indirect effects on 
generating revenue. 
Compared to the effects of utility models on net profit, in model 3, model 6 and model 9 in 
Table 3.3, the coefficients on issued patents yield statistically significant and positive results, and 
are higher than the coefficients on one-year lagged issued utility models, which is the positive 
effect of utility models contribute to the increase of net profit of the SMEs. On the other hand, 
the estimation with the overall samples suggests that issued utility patents have a lagged but 
negative effect on improving net profit. The positive coefficient on issued utility patents is lower 
than the negative coefficient on issued utility patents lagged by one year, so the sum of the 
coefficients suggests that the overall effects of utility patents on improving net profit is negative.  
Viewing the immediate effects of issued utility patents and issued utility models on 
improving net profit, however, the coefficient on issued utility patents is positive and three times 
	   119	  
larger than the negative value of the coefficient on issued utility models, suggesting that utility 
patents have a stronger positive effect on improving net profit shortly compared to utility models. 
If we look into the two groups of samples, this result is consistent because only coefficients on 
issued utility patents yield statistically significant and positive results, rather than the results of 
the coefficients on issued utility models, shown by model 3, model 6 of Table 3.3. Overall, the 
effects of issued utility models on improving net profit of SMEs are weaker than the effects of 
issued utility patents.  
 
Implication 3.2: Most SMEs could not efficiently deploy utility patents and transform them into 
revenue. Even worse, too many issued utility patents could impede SMEs on their business 
running, reflected by the revenue, net profit or asset turnover ratio, especially when the strictness 
of patent examination is higher. 
 
With the overall panel’s samples in model 7 of Table 3.3 to predict revenue, the coefficient 
on issued utility patents is not statistically significant, suggesting an insignificant effect of issued 
utility patents on generating revenue. Therefore, even though the coefficients on issued utility 
patents are statistically significant and positive in the estimations to predict net profit, shown by 
model 3, model 6 and model 9 in Table 3.3, the positive effect of utility patents on improving net 
profit is not through generating revenue. 
Furthermore, not only can utility patent not be proved to contribute to the increase of 
revenue of the SMEs either in a short term or in a long term, but utility patents also cannot 
effectively improve the net profit of the SMEs. The overall value of the coefficients on the issued 
utility patents in the ongoing year and the utility patents issued one year ago is negative, 
suggesting that accumulated utility patents have significantly negative effect on the increase of 
net profit of the SMEs, shown by model 9 of Table 3.3. Net profit could decrease ￥468,000 
RMB when an SME acquired one more utility patent issued in the previous year and acquired 
one more issued utility patent in the current year. In other words, when an SME consistently 
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acquired more utility patents than other SMEs, it may not have the capability to manage the 
accumulated utility patents efficiently and transform them into net profit through generating 
revenue. Not only were the SMEs poor at utility patent commercialization, but the utility patents 
may also impede their business running. Moreover, it is a phenomenon across all industries 
because the estimations have controlled for industry categories as fixed.  
If we take a look into the two cities’ difference, it seems that Beijing SMEs have weaker 
capabilities of utility patent commercialization in order to transform issued utility patents into 
revenue and net profit than Shanghai SMEs do. For example, in the estimations to predict net 
profit, the coefficient on issued utility patents in model 3 with the Beijing panel is significantly 
lower than the coefficient in model 6 with the Shanghai panel. On average, a Shanghai SME 
issued with one more utility patent in a year acquires ￥1,862,000 RMB more on net profit than 
a Beijing SME does, shown by model 3 and model 6 of Table 2. On the other side, the 
coefficients on issued utility patents in the estimations to predict revenue, shown by model 1 and 
model 4 of Table 3.3 yield inconsistent yet opposite results.  
For the group of Shanghai, the estimation in model 4 suggests a positive effect of issued 
utility patents on improving revenue. When a Shanghai SME acquired one more issued utility 
patent, its revenue can be ￥24,670,000 RMB in that year. By contrast, for the group of Beijing 
with a bigger size of samples than the Shanghai’s group, the estimation in model 1 suggests a 
negative effect of issued utility patents on improving revenue. When a Beijing SME acquired 
one more issued utility patent in a year, its revenue decreased by ￥4,265,000 RMB.  
According to the opposite effects of utility patents on improving revenue between the 
Beijing SMEs and the Shanghai SMEs, one possibility is that the ways or strategies in which the 
SMEs use utility models in their business activities could be significantly different. For example, 
the capabilities of Shanghai SMEs to transform utility patents to more revenue are comparatively 
stronger than the capabilities of Beijing SMEs. This is a consistent result with their stronger 
effect of utility patents on improving net profit than Beijing SMEs’.  
Unfortunately, under the patent strategies of the SMEs, overall, the effectiveness of their 
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capabilities in transforming utility patents to more revenue is still weak. The issued utility 
patents lagged one or two years cannot contribute to the increase of revenue in a statistically 
significant degree, shown by the estimations to predict revenue in model 1 and model 4 of Table 
3.3. Meanwhile, the coefficients of the estimations to predict net profit on the lagged issued 
utility patents with the Beijing panel’s and the Shanghai panel’s samples are insignificant, shown 
by model 3 and model 6. These estimations suggest that it is unclear how the SMEs transform 
their utility patents issued in the previous years to revenue and net profit. While the correlation 
coefficient between utility patents issued two years ago and the current revenue yields 
statistically significant and positive result, the statistical significance does not remain when the 
other significant types of IPRs, such as utility models, design patents and software copyrights, 
are controlled as constant, suggesting that the lagging effect of utility patents on improving net 
profit of the Shanghai SMEs is unclear when we assume the SMEs made IP strategies involving 
the IPRs other than solely utility patents.  
Actually, SMEs do make IP strategies, at least for the Shanghai SMEs. However, under 
their IP strategies, the Shanghai SMEs may be still unable to transform utility patents to net 
profit, even though the coefficient on utility models yields a statistically significant and positive 
effect in the estimation to predict net profit. For the group of Shanghai, the correlation 
coefficient (r=-0.02) between issued utility patents and net profit suggests that they do not 
directly correlated in a statistically significant degree. However, when the estimation controls for 
the lagging effects of IPRs, including issued utility patents and issued utility models and 
registered software copyrights, shown by model 6 of Table 3.3, the effect of issued patents on 
improving net profit turns to be significantly positive, suggesting a positive effect of the 
accumulated IPRs acquired by the SMEs through their IP strategy.  
On the other side, for both the group of Beijing and the group of Shanghai, in most of the 
time, the correlation coefficients between utility patents and revenue are going up (for the 
Shanghai group, r = 0.193, r of one-year lagged=0.068 r of two-year lagged=0.139; for the 
Beijing group, r=0.075, or of one-year lagged=0.021, r of two-year lagged=0.002), even though 
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the degree of the correlation could not be as high enough as to be statistically significant. 
Therefore, it is difficult to believe that the SMEs can effectively transform their accumulated 
utility patents into revenue, because even their issued utility patents in the ongoing year could 
not provide strong effects on generating revenue, which is also suggested by the estimation with 
the overall panel’s sample, shown by model 7 of Table 3.3.  
If the effect of issued utility patents on improving net profit of the SMEs is not through 
effectively generating revenue, I am interested in how the issued utility patents are deployed with 
other tangible assets of the SMEs so as to affect the increase of their revenue and net profit. In 
the estimation to predict asset turnover ratio with the overall panel’s samples, shown by model 8 
of Table 3.3, the coefficient of issued utility patents yields a statistically significant and negative 
result, suggesting a negative effect of issued utility patents on improving asset turnover ratio. In 
other words, an SME on average holding more issued utility patents has a lower efficiency in 
deploying its asset in generating revenue.  
This estimation is with fixed effects least squares; nevertheless, the industry categories 
cannot be controlled and it has a bias, suggesting another significant fixed effect other than 
issued utility patents. This released significant fixed effect could be industry categories because 
ANOVA testing the variance of asset turnover ratio is statistically significant across the various 
industry categories. While the bias is a limitation for clearly understanding the effect of issued 
utility patents on improving asset turnover ratio, when R&D intensity of the SMEs is controlled 
as constant in its average degree, the negative coefficient on issued utility patents suggests that 
the SMEs may not effectively deploy their total assets in generating revenue through acquiring 
more utility patents. In other words, the SMEs cannot effectively deploy their utility patents to 
adjust with other assets and finally improve net profit.  
On the other hand, the estimations of asset turnover ratio in Table 3.4 have coefficients on 
the interaction term between issued utility patents and the strictness of patent examination, which 
is an instrument variable of issued utility patents and presented by the appeal rate of the utility 
patent applications, being statistically significant and negative. In the overall case, in the year 
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when the strictness of patent examination increases one unit, the slope of asset turnover ratio on 
issued utility patents decreases 0.598 units, shown by model 3. This result is consistent with the 
result of the estimation with the Beijing panel’s samples.  
Even though the coefficient on issued utility patents in model 2 of Table 3.4 with the 
Shanghai panel’s samples yields a statistically significant and positive result, the coefficient on 
the interaction between the strictness of patent examination yields a negative result, and this 
negative value is bigger than the positive coefficient on issued utility patents. Involving the 
interaction effect, the coefficient on issued utility patents decreases to -0.064 when the strictness 
of patent examination increase is controlled as constant in its average level (0.14%), suggesting 
that when an SME acquires one more issued utility patent, its asset turnover ratio decreases by 
0.064, and it has lower efficiency in deploying its total assets in generating revenue.  
Overall, not only can the SMEs not effectively deploy their accumulated utility patents in 
generating revenue and net profit, but also these issued utility patents may directly and indirectly 
impede the efficiency of their business running and become their burdens. They lack the 
capabilities to efficiently manage their intangible assets and explore their value from 
commercializing them. Therefore, it is important to induce them to make efficient IP strategies, 
rather than blindly encourage them to produce more utility patents.  
 
Implication 3.3: Design patents and software copyrights could be the encumbrance for the 
business running of SMEs, rather than making positive contributions to their net profit. 
 
While the estimations suggest that the effects of design patents and software copyrights on 
improving revenue and asset turnover ratio are insignificant, shown by model 1, model 2, model 
4, model 5, model 7, and model 8 of Table 3.3, most of the coefficients on issued design patents 
and registered software copyrights in the ongoing year, and lagged issued design patents and 
registered software copyrights yield statistically significant and negative results. In other words, 
when it is unclear how the SMEs deploy their design patents and software copyrights in 
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generating revenue directly or indirectly, they may become encumbrance for their business 
running and impede the increase of their net profit.  
In the overall case, the coefficients on issued design patents in the ongoing year and issued 
design patents lagged by one year and two years present statistically significant and negative 
results, suggesting that the effect of issued design patents is consistently negative on improving 
net profit of the SMEs in either a short-term and a long-term.  
For the group of Beijing, in model 3, the estimation to predict net profit suggests that the 
lagging effect of issued design patents is insignificant, and the immediate effect of issued design 
patents is negative on improving net profit of the SMEs in a statistically significant degree. By 
contrast, for the group of Shanghai in model 6, the estimation to predict net profit suggests that 
the immediate effect of issued design patents is insignificant, but the effects of issued design 
patents lagged by one year and two years are negative on improving net profit of the SMEs.  
On the other hand, the estimations to predict net profit cannot clearly suggest how the 
registered copyrights affect net profit of the SMEs, shown by model 3, model 6 and model 9 of 
Table2. Only do the coefficients on the two-year lagged registered software copyrights yield 
statistically significant and negative result in the estimation to predict net profit with the overall 
samples and with the group of Beijing samples. Moreover, in the estimation with the group of 
Shanghai samples, the coefficients on registered copyrights in the ongoing year and lagged 
registered copyrights are insignificant, suggesting that the effects of registered software 
copyrights on improving net profit of the Shanghai SMEs are insignificant in both a short-term 
and a long-term. Therefore, registered software copyrights cannot effectively contribute to 
improving net profit of the SMEs.  
According to the P.R.C. Copyright Law, software copyright registration is not a 
pre-condition to enforce copyrights in China. The most important reason for the SMEs to register 
for software copyrights is that they need to show the copyrights to the governments and acquire 
prizes, subsidies from the governments. For example, to be entitled as the key software 
companies for acquiring at least 15% corporate tax credits, the applicants need to have some 
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registered copyrights as the application material.357 Therefore, the SMEs may not only develop 
software as their products or management supports, but also accumulate software to acquire 
prizes and subsidies from the governments. The extra developed and registered software 
copyrights could waste some resources of the SMEs, but cannot effectively contribute to 
improving their revenue or net profit. Meanwhile, some accumulated but useless software could 
waste more resources of the SMEs in the process of their management so as to be encumbrance 
for their business running. 
Since the governments are encouraging enterprises to acquire more IPRs, as a reflection, the 
SMEs acquire design patents, even though the designs are not their main products in their 
business. However, they do not have the capabilities to effectively transform the design patents 
into revenue or improve their net profit through the design patents. One possibility is that their IP 
strategies are inefficient, which is consistent with my previous implications. Therefore, it is not 
enough to only encourage SMEs to acquire more IPRs by the governments. Instead, the 
governments should induce SMEs to manage their IPRs efficiently and improve the 
commercialization of various types of IPRs, including software copyrights and design patents.  
 
Implication 4: The pro-patent-quality policies applied in 2012 may not be suitable for SMEs to 
effectively improve their utility patent commercialization. 
 
In the sense of the overall case, most SMEs could not efficiently deploy utility patents and 
transform them into revenue and too many issued utility patents could impede SMEs on 
improving revenue. However, for the Shanghai SMEs, they on average had stronger capabilities 
to transform utility patents into revenue compared to the Beijing SMEs, especially before the 
Chinese governments adjusted their policies on administrating IPRs in 2012. Therefore, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  357	   Guojia	  Shuiwu	  Zongju(国家税务总局)[The	  P.R.C.	  State	  Admistration	  of	  Taxation]	  and	  Zhonghua	  Renmin	  Gonghe	  Guo	  Caizheng	  Bu(中华人民共和国财政部)[The	  Ministry	  of	  Finance	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Guanyu	  Jinyibu	  Guli	  Ruanjian	  Chanye	  He	  
Jicheng	  Dianlu	  Chanye	  Fazhan	  Qiye	  Suodeshui	  Zhengce	  De	  Tongzhi(关于进一步鼓励软件产业和集成电路产业发展企业所
得税政策的通知)[The	  Notice	  of	  Corporate	  Tax	  Policy	  for	  Further	  Encouraging	  the	  Development	  of	  the	  Industries	  of	  Software	  
and	  Intergreted].	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governments may meddling serve the SMEs' utility patent commercialization through the 
pro-patent-quality subsidies based on the discriminated standards.  
 
l The Shanghai Patent Subsidy Policy Change in 2012 
 
In 2012, for executing the twelfth Five-Year Plan, the central government and the two local 
governments designed a series of new policies on strengthening the IP regime.358 Before 2012, 
the Beijing government had applied the policies on strengthening the capabilities of IP 
commercialization by enterprises and encouraging them to acquire more IPRs through subsidies 
and prizes.359 After 2012, the Beijing government decided to involve their guidance more in the 
IP activities of the Beijing enterprises. Not only did it explore the administration methods on the 
process of recognizing IP as collateral, it sustained to encourage the enterprises, especially SMEs, 
to acquire more IPRs through increasing the subsidies for patent applications and services, and to 
strengthen their capabilities of IP commercialization.  
On the other side, before 2012, the Shanghai government had applied the policies on 
recognizing IP as collateral and subsidizing IP applications.360 After 2012, under the guidance of 
the central government’s policy on strengthening the IP regime, like the Beijing government, the 
Shanghai government decided to involve their guidance more in the innovation by the Shanghai 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  358	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  Guojia	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Ju(中国国家知识产权局)[State	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  “Guojia	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Shiye	  Fazhan	  ‘Shierwu’	   Guihua-­‐Yaodian	  Jiedu(《国家知识产权事业发展‘十二五’规划》要点解读)[The	  Key	  Explanation	  of	  the	  National	  IP	  Career	  Development	  in	  the	  ‘Twelveth	  Five-­‐Year’	  Plan],”	  State	  Intellectual	  Property	  
Office	  of	  the	  P.R.C.,	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	   	   http://www.sipo.gov.cn/zcfg/zcjd/201310/t20131025_863255.html.	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   Beijing	  Shi	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Ju(北京市知识产权局)[Beijing	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office]	  and	  Beijing	  Shi	  Fagaiwei(北京
市发改委)[Beijing	  Municipal	  Commission	  of	  Development	  and	  Reform],	  Beijing	  Shi	  “Shierwu”	   Shiqi	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  
(Zhuanli)	  Shiye	  Fazhan	  Guihua(北京市“十二五”时期知识产权（专利）事业发展规划)[Beijing’s	  Plan	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  IP-­‐Patent	  Career	  
Development	  in	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局)[Beijing	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  Property	  Office]	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  Municipal	  Commission	  of	  Development	  and	  Reform],	  Guanyu	  Yinfa	  《Beijing	  Shi	  “Shierwu”	   Shiqi	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  (Zhuanli)	  Shiye	  Fazhan	  Guihua》
De	  Tongzhi	  (关于印发《北京市“十二五”时期知识产权（专利）事业发展规划》的通知)[The	  Notice	  About	  Printing	  and	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  accessed	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   Shanghai	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  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Ju(上海市知识产权局)[Shanghai	  Intellectual	  Property	  Administration],	  Shanghai	  Shi	  
Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Fazhan	  “Shierwu”	   Guihua(上海市知识产权发展“十二五”规划)[The	  Shanghai’s	  “Twelveth	  Five-­‐Year”	  
Plan	  on	  Intellectual	  Property	  Development].	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enterprises. For example, the government planned to improve the degree of R&D investment 
over GDP, increase the subsidies and prizes for IPs and inventions, and induce the Shanghai 
enterprises to acquire more IPRs.  
Beyond the enhanced encouragement of acquiring more IPRs by enterprises, in the process 
of involving their IP activities, both governments would gather the IPRs across different IP 
owners and structure IP alliances. However, the real goal behind that is to induce the production 
of patents in high quality. 
After 2012, the amount of the subsidies provided by the Shanghai government for each of 
the patent applications is less, especially the subsidy for utility models and design patents.361 
However, under the new policy, the patent subsidy will offset part costs of patent prosecution 
and offset more PCT’s fees compared to the earlier edition of the pro-patent policy executed in 
2007.362  
 
l The Beijing Patent Subsidy Policy 
 
Compared to the Shanghai patent subsidy policy, the Beijing patent subsidy policy is 
discriminated for the patent applicants and always designed for promoting the quality of patents. 
Some parts of the policy is more relaxed than the Shanghai’s, but parts of the policy is more 
restricted than the Shanghai’s. More precisely, only the big and middle sized research institutes 
or enterprises’ patent application costs could be fully offset. For those patent applicants, the 
scope and the extent of the subsidy is exactly the same as the 2007’s Shanghai patent subsidy 
policy. If the small firms request for the subsidy, they have to be consistently conducting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  361	   Shanghai	  Shi	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Ju(上海市知识产权局)[Shanghai	  Intellectual	  Property	  Administration],	  Shanghai	  Shi	  
Zhuanli	  Zizhu	  Banfa	  (2012	  Xiuding)(上海市专利资助办法(2012修订))[The	  Methods	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Patent	  Subsidies	  
(Amended	  in	  2012],	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	   	   http://www.lungtin.com/content/2011/11-­‐08/145150051.html.	  362	   Shanghai	  Shi	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Ju(上海市知识产权局)[Shanghai	  Intellectual	  Property	  Administration],	  Shanghai	  Shi	  
Zhuanli	  Zizhu	  Banfa	  (Fu	  Shishi	  Xize)（2007	  Nian	  3	  Yue	  1	  Ri	  Fabu)(上海市专利资助办法(附实施细则)(2007年 3月 1日发
布))[The	  Methods	  of	  the	  Shanghai	  Patent	  Subsidies	  (Application	  Details	  Attached)(Published	  in	  Mar.	  1st,	  2007)],	  2007.	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innovation and filing patent applications for at least three years.363 In addition, the Beijing 
government requires that the applicants for the subsidy should have at least three people 
managing their IP and regularly train their R&D people on IP knowledge. Their R&D over net 
profit ratio and the size of their market should also be higher than the average level in the market. 
Otherwise, only half of the substantial examination fee could be offset by the subsidy, and the 
utility patents and design patents’ application cost could be offset as one fourth of the other 
heavily subsidized firms in Beijing, which is also lower than the firms in Shanghai.  
Therefore, overall, compared to the Shanghai patent subsidy policy, the extent of the 
subsidy for the Beijing SMEs is polarized into two situations, expected to strongly support the 
patents with high quality. Only a few of SMEs in my samples are entitled to the full subsidy. 
This shows a paradox in the Beijing’s pro-patent policies. On the one side, the government 
announces that it is going to help SMEs to conduct patent activities; on the other side, the 
government is strongly helping the firms and research institutes, which are voluntarily doing well 
in IP area.  
 
l Diff-in-Diff-in-Diff Estimations to Compare the Effects of the Two Policies 
 
To explore the variance of the efficiency of those policies on improving the capabilities of 
utility patent commercialization by SMEs, I adopt difference-in-difference-in-difference 
estimations, shown in Table 3.5.  
Being consistent with the results of the estimations in model 1 and model 4 of Table 3.3, the 
estimation shown by model 1 of Table 3.5 suggests that the Shanghai SMEs on average have 
higher efficiency in improving revenue through issued utility patents than the Beijing SMEs, and 
the efficiency of the overall SMEs on average decreases after 2012. Both of the differences of 
area and the interventions are in a statistically significant degree, suggested by the coefficients 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  363	   Beijing	  Kewei(北京科委)[Beijing	  Municipal	  Commission	  of	  Science	  and	  Technology],	  <Beijing	  Shi	  Zhuanli	  Shenqing	  
Zizhu	  Jin	  Guanli	  Zanxing	  Banfa>Jiedu(《北京市专利申请资助金管理暂行办法》解读)[The	  Explanation	  of	  <The	  Temporary	  
Methods	  of	  Administrating	  Beijing	  Patent	  Application	  Subsidies],	  2007,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.bjkw.gov.cn/n8785584/n8904761/n8904840/n9128829/9128992.html.	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on the interaction term between issued utility patents and the dummy variable controlling for the 
Shanghai group, and the interaction term between issued utility patents and the dummy variable 
controlling for the year after 2012.  
If we look into those two differences, shown by model 2 and model 3 of Table 3.5, the 
coefficients on the interaction term among issued utility patents, the group of Shanghai and the 
time before 2012 yield statistically significant and positive results, suggesting that the efficiency 
of issued utility patents deployed by the Shanghai SMEs on generating revenue before 2012 is 
higher than their efficiency after 2012 and also the Beijing SMEs’ efficiency of issued utility 
patents in generating revenue.  
At Figure 3.2, the graphs show the slopes of revenue on issued utility patents. The slopes 
representing the regression returned by the Shanghai’s group are always higher than the slopes 
representing the regression returned by the Beijing’s group, suggesting that before and after 2012 
the Shanghai SMEs that acquired same number of utility patents as the Beijing SMEs could 
generate more revenue than the Beijing SMEs. The slopes in the 2009-2011 graph as the 
controlled groups for the effects of the 2012 policies in the two cities are higher than the slopes 
in the 2012-2013 graph as the treated groups, suggesting that after 2012 the increase of issued 
utility patents in both the Beijing SMEs and the Shanghai SMEs has less effect on generating 
revenue.  
Overall, the Shanghai SMEs can deploy their issued utility patents more efficiently on 
generating revenue than the Beijing SMEs, but the strength of the efficiency was weaker in 2012, 
when the new pro-policies were applied. Moreover, after 2012, the SMEs’ capabilities of utility 
patent commercialization became weaker, even for the Shanghai SMEs, whose capabilities of 
utility patent commercialization was always stronger than the Beijing SMEs from 2009 to 2013.  
Alternatively, another diff-in-diff-in-diff regression to explore the difference between 
Beijing and Shanghai’s SMEs’ efficiency of transforming issued utility patents into revenue is 
shown by Table 3.6. Since there was a patent subsidy policy change only in Shanghai in 2012, 
the regression adopts the samples before 2012 as the control group, and the samples after 2012 as 
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the treated group.  
The diff-in-diff-in-diff effect of the 2012 patent subsidy policy change in Shanghai shows a 
slightly statistically significant and negative difference result. Before 2012, the coefficient on 
issued utility patents of the Shanghai SMEs to estimate revenue yields a statistically significant 
and positive result when the regression controls issued utility models and registered copyrights 
as constant in their average degree (mean of issued utility models= 2.56, mean of registered 
copyrights= 3.08), suggesting that there is a positive association between the issued utility 
patents and revenue. However, the statistically insignificant coefficient on issued utility patents 
of the Beijing SMEs cannot suggests the association to resemble the Shanghai SMEs’ case.  
On the other hand, the difference between the coefficients on issued utility patents to 
estimate revenue with the Shanghai and the Beijing panels yields a statistically significant result, 
suggesting that the Shanghai SMEs’ issued utility patents have stronger positive association with 
revenue than the Beijing SMEs’. In other words, the Shanghai SMEs on average have a stronger 
ability to transform their issued utility patents into revenue than the Beijing SMEs. However, 
after 2012, their ability on utility patent commercialization became weaker so that their issued 
utility patents’ effect on improving revenue became insignificant, and there was no more 
difference between their utility patent commercialization ability and the Beijing SMEs’.  
The difference between the coefficients before and after the policy change in Shanghai 
yields a statistically significant and negative result with the Shanghai panel, suggesting that the 
positive association between Shanghai SMEs’ issued utility patents and generating revenue 
became weaker after the policy change.  
At Figure 3.3, the slope of revenue on issued utility patents in the side of Shanghai panel is 
lower after the policy change, and they became identical with the Beijing SMEs. Of course, the 
increased constants after 2012 suggest that the SMEs in the two cities on average had higher 
degree of revenue, but it could be affected by the growth of the economy or other reason. In short, 
pro-patent policies applied in 2012 may not be suitable for SMEs to effectively improve their 
utility patent commercialization, even though improving SMEs’ patent commercialization is also 
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one of the goals of having patent subsidy. 
 
l The Inefficacy of the Ex Post Patent Subsidy Policies 
 
Probably, when the governments decide to involve in the IP activities of enterprises for 
public interests, such as improving the quality of the innovation in the market, encouraging IP 
transformation for particular projects, or constructing IP alliances, the interests of SMEs could be 
disregarded or not be treated properly. In addition, the alternative explanation could be that an ex 
post policy cannot instruct the nature of the quality of the innovation and the employment of 
patents in SMEs.  
The patent subsidy policy seems as ex ante because the government subsidizes the patent 
applicants before their patents get issued, but actually, it is still ex post. The patent applicants 
have to show the evidence to support the value and creativity of their patents from the market 
ahead or they have to foresee a light future of their patents globally, then can request as much as 
subsidy from the government. Therefore, for patent applicants, patent subsidy is endogenous but 
ex post. They have to make clear patent strategies ahead, like how to deploy their patents in their 
management and market development, and then file patent applicants and request the patent 
subsidy from the government. In this process, the subsidy policy cannot really facilitate the 
SMEs to make efficient patent strategies.  
To further prove the robustness of this conclusion, the regressions in Table 3.7 are based on 
a division with respect to the status of IPO. Among the SMEs after IPO, the coefficients on 
patent application fee’s subsidy to predict the number of utility patent filings and design patent 
filings yield statistically significant and positive results, suggesting that there are positive 
correlations between patent subsidy and the number of utility patent applications or design patent 
applications. By contrast, shown by the insignificant coefficient on the subsidy, the effects of 
patent subsidy on improving the three types of patent applications are insignificant before IPO, 
even though the p-values of the difference between the coefficients on patent subsidy for the two 
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groups, before and after IPO, are consistently too high to be statistically significant.  
As an endogenous effect, acquiring patent subsidy is part of the patent strategy of the SMEs 
when they are applying for patents. When they are not as successful as the public SMEs, the 
maximum amount of the patent subsidies that they can acquire from the government is lower 
than the public SMEs who have relatively maturer patent strategies.  
In Table 3.7, the coefficients on revenue to estimate the filings of utility patent applications 
yield statistically significant results. However, the association between utility patent applications 
and revenue among the SMEs after IPO is opposite to the association among the SMEs before 
IPO with a statistically significant degree of 90%. The p-value of the t-test of the difference 
between two coefficients is 0.062. Among the SMEs after IPO, the association is positive, 
suggesting that the SMEs file for more utility patent applications when they grow larger. By 
contrast, before IPO, the association is negative, suggesting that the SMEs file for more utility 
patent applications even when they generate less revenue than the other SMEs or themselves in 
the other years. To some extent, the patent strategy of the SMEs before IPO could be 
comparatively immature than the SMEs after IPO.  
Here, patent subsidy could not significantly affect the patent strategy employed by those 
private SMEs to file more of the three types of patent applications or not, especially when the 
patent subsidies are not substantial for them. However, when the public SMEs are more capable 
on voluntarily making efficient IP strategies, it could be meaningless for having intervention by 
the government, which also has costs from the public interest.  
Therefore, since patent subsidy is endogenous for the SMEs, in order to improve SMEs’ 
patenting propensity and patent commercialization, the government should provide more 
supports to SMEs, in the forms of education and substantial facilitation of their patent 
management, other than the mere patent subsidy with an underlying discrimination of patent 
quality by the government itself.   
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VI. Conclusion 
 
Patents can be a significant measure of promoting innovation by SMEs, but it does not mean 
that patents are the optimal measure to compensate their R&D and continuously supply 
innovation incentives to them. Nevertheless, patents are popular as an economy strategy 
undertaken by the Chinese government for the last ten years. No matter what IPRs mean to the 
SME applicants, my empirical results imply that under the Chinese government’s instruction 
through grants or subsidies, China has already had an environment where R&D investment of 
SMEs is positively associated with their patent applications, in the categories of both utility 
patent and utility model. 
Unfortunately, my empirical results also suggest that most SMEs fail to undetake appropriate 
IP strategies. On the one hand, they cannot efficiently deploy their patents to generate revenue 
from the market. On the other hand, they cannot wisely employ the patent policies to acquire as 
much protection as they can under the patent law with the same degree of R&D spending. 
Therefore, the government should understand the difference of the demands of SMEs and large 
firms for IP protection to adjust its pro-patent policies. Otherwise, the proliferation of patent 
application filings by SMEs could create unpredictable transaction costs to impede their growth, 
innovation and even others players’ innovation in the market.  
Alternatively, when directly funding or subsidizing SMEs’ R&D and patenting activities, the 
government can contemplate to further educate them on IP strategies. Cash contributions from 
the government, either ex ante or ex post for the patent applications, are significant but also 
limited to promote SMEs’ innovation. It will be useful to strengthen the ex ante non-cash 
contributions, like IP-content education by the government or the market involving the third 
parties that provide services regarding IP strategies. The effects of the third parties on facilitating 
SMEs’ IP commercialization worths to be further explored.  
It is possible that not enough evidence is collected in the short five-year duration showing 
that the SMEs could make successfully IP commercialization. Therefore, it is meaningful to 
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track the R&D spending and patenting activities of the SMEs in the following years.  
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Figure 3.2.  
 
Figure 3.3. 
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CHAPTER FOUR EXTERNAL FINANCING & SMES’ TECHNICAL INNOVATION 
I. Literature Review  
     
Either equity financing or debt financing could become a crucial source of capital to support 
R&D by SMEs. Meanwhile, innovations, in the form of R&D expenditure or IPs, are critical 
characteristics that equity or debt investors consider when they decided to invest in SMEs. This 
part discusses how the literature explains the connection between innovation and the financial 
market. Section 1 introduces the importance of equity financing and debt financing to the 
portfolio SMEs and their innovation, and the innovative SMEs’ financing difficulties with those 
two capital resources. Section 2 explains the interplay of the various types of investors on IP 
activities by the portfolio SMEs.  
Since Chapter 2 has introduced the monetary subsidies by governments, in Section 3, the 
literature discusses the existing and suggested policies and regulations to structure a reasonable 
financial market so as to indirectly support innovative SMEs.  
 
1. Equity Financing and Debt Financing 
 
Besides the compensation of technology development through the market by IP, discussed 
by the literature review in Chapter 1, Section 1 presents the literature about another capital 
resource for firms, that is, investment. The literature in Section 1.1 discusses how private equity 
investment through venture capital or private equity funds effect on the innovation by SMEs in 
developing countries. To understand the incentives of these private investors better, Section 1.2 
presents the literature that discusses IPO, an important way of exit of their investment. 
Meanwhile, the literature in this part will also show how IPO and public equity market are 
important to the portfolio firms and their innovation activities.  
Then, I categorize the resources of investments by countries to introduce international 
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financial flows in Section 1.3. In this part, the literature specifically discusses a crucial type of 
international investment, foreign direct investment (FDI), and how FDI and these foreign VC 
investors affect the R&D of firms in the domestic market.  
Section 1.4 presents the literature about debt financing. Comparing with equity investment 
discussed earlier in this part, I try to explore whether or not debt financing is an efficient 
financing measure to firms, especially to innovative SMEs, through the literature in this part. The 
literature also argues on how the efficiency of debt financing would be in various economic 
environments and legal environments.  
 
1.1. Venture Capital or Private Equity 
 
Much literature theoretically shows how venture capital or private equity is important to 
stimulate R&D in various countries and industries, or shows empirical methods to support that. I 
thus present this literature first in Section 1.1.1 to provide the basic rationales for why I have this 
part when I consider stimulating R&D by SMEs. Then, Section 1.1.2 presents the literature that 
discusses the important meaning of VC/PE to SMEs and the difficulties for SMEs to acquire 
them. Because the difficulties could be bigger in immature VC/PE markets, the literature in 
Section 1.1.3 introduces successful and failed experiences in select countries and discusses the 
key obstacles of structuring a proper and successful VC/PE market in developing countries.  
 
1.1.1. VC/PE and Innovation 
 
After the success of Silicon Valley and Route 128 regions, generally, almost all scholars 
agree that venture capital is an important engine of innovation by high-tech firms.364 Barkoczy 
and Edmundson define venture capital as the investment “specifically targeted at companies with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  364	   Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  Cycle,	  273.	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the potential for rapid growth.”365 Jeng and Wells believe that venture capital stimulates 
innovation to commercialize at a rapid speed so as to create growth of economy, employment 
and further technical innovations.366 
Moreover, Gilson concludes that the venture capital market significantly connects finance 
and innovation.367 Also, Gulinello recognizes that venture capital market contributes to the 
growth and development of high-technology industries, particularly for high-risk, high potential 
return business. 368  Barkoczy and Edmundson explain that innovative business requires 
significant investment from venture capital to develop and commercialize new products and 
technologies.369  
In an empirical study with German SMEs, Mueller and Reize note that venture capital is 
suitable only for few SMEs in Germany, and the high R&D intensity or continuous R&D activity 
happening in these SMEs require high share of investment from venture capital.370 Gompers and 
Lerner conducted an empirical study to learn the U.S. manufacturing industry, and its result 
suggests that venture capital stimulates R&D and patent production.371 In the U.S., venture 
capital shared eight percent of industrial innovations from 1983 to 1992, and accounted for nine 
percent of industrial innovations in 1992372 and fourteen percent of the U.S. innovative activity 
by 1998.373  In Canada in 1996, 62 percent of the 525 companies financed by venture capital 
were technology-based business.374 
The Chinese scholars in Chinese Academy of Science and Technology for Development 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  365	   Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  58.	  366	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  242.	   	  367	   Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience,”	  55.	   	  368	   Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience,”	  845.	  369	   Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  58.	   	  370	   Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  Can	  Innovative	  Companies	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(CASTED) announce that the venture capital market in China was born to the goal of 
encouraging the development of technology.375 Actually, many other countries, such as Israel, 
Singapore, and the member nations of the E.U., agree that venture capital can spur innovation, 
especially high-tech R&D activities.376  
After learning the reasons of the substantial reduction in investment and R&D in many U.S. 
manufacturing firms during the 1980s, Hall reminds us that investment and R&D investment are 
distinguished to the considerations of investors.377 Arrow explains that the risk of moral hazard 
is the biggest obstruction of acquiring external financing in R&D intense firms, which has been 
agreed by many other scholars.378 However, for high-tech SMEs, either type of venture capital 
investment is an essential approach to assist them, because it is difficult for them to enter 
high-risk nature of high-technology industries and survive there.379 Also, the operation and 
business of portfolio companies are connected with venture capital.380 In order to understand 
this connection in a map broader than the innovation activities of the SMEs, we should learn how 
venture capital funds impact on the interior of SMEs.  
 
1.1.2. VC/PE and SMEs 
 
Because the establishment or development of innovative SMEs is highly risky, Ptacek 
believes that it deters private financing and formalizes a large “equity gap” between angel 
investors and venture capital funds in European countries.381 Actually, besides the issue of the 	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limited scope and amount of support by angel investors, the high-risk situation always creates a 
considerable gap between sources of capital and the demands of SMEs,382 especially for the 
small firms at the inception stage.383 Hence, Barkoczy and Edmundson believe that venture 
capital funds are important to the development of SMEs.384  
Comparing to debt financing with a lower cost than equity financing385, Barkoczy and 
Edmundson conclude that venture capital finance is much more appropriate and manageable for 
SMEs because of the restricting barriers of the obligation of regular interest repayments.386 Jeng 
and Wells agree that this will conflict with the demands of high cash flow of SMEs on R&D and 
other activities, and they emphasize that most of SMEs are even unlikely to obtain loans 
successfully because of their lack of tangible assets as collateral.387 Hence, regarding this 
situation, as Rousseau concludes, equity capital is more feasible to SMEs, especially in the 
knowledge-based industries.388  
When discussing the possibility of other types of equity financing, Jeng and Wells believe 
that the resources from angel investors and large corporations are limited in amounts and in the 
possibility of success.389 Moreover, the regulations of financial institutions in the U.S. outlined 
by Roe suggest that banks, insurance companies and mutual funds in the U.S. are restricted from 
holding large equities of one company and being active on their business as directors of 
boards.390 The empirical study conducted by Puri and Zarutskie also confirms that the U.S. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Private	  Partnership	  L.	  2012	  (2012):	  278.	   	  382	   Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  56.	   	  383	   Pizzacalla,	  “SME	  ‘Life	  Cycle’	  Imperative,”	  191.	   	  384	   Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  56.	   	  385	   Jack	  S.	  Levin	  and	  Donald	  E.	  Rocap,	  Structuring	  Venture	  Capital,	  Private	  Equity,	  and	  Entrepreneurial	  Transactions	  (Wolters	  Kluwer	  Law	  &	  Business,	  2012),	  1-­‐7.	   	  386	   Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”59.	   	  387	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  245-­‐256.	  Also	  see,	  Sibbitt,	  “Law,	  Venture	  Capital,	  and	  Entrepreneurism	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	  Generation	  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses,”	  95.	   	  388	   Rousseau,	  “The	  Future	  of	  Capital	  Formation	  for	  Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises:	  Rethinking	  Initial	  Public	  Offering	  Regulation	  after	  the	  Restructuring	  of	  Canadian,”	  666.	   	  389	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  246.	   	  390	   Mark	  J	  Roe,	  “Political	  and	  Legal	  Restraints	  on	  Ownership	  and	  Control	  of	  Public	  Companies,”	  Journal	  of	  Financial	  
Economics	  27	  (1990):	  7.	   	   	  
	   147	  
companies particularly demand venture capital funds for the scale of investment and 
production.391  
Actually, other than proving financial support to portfolio companies through contracts, 
venture capital investors can also play a value-adding role on the business of SMEs through 
non-contractible inputs.392 Hence, many scholars remind that venture capital funds also provide 
non-financial support, such as management assistance, and access to better suppliers, lenders, 
employees and investment bankers.393 Gilson agrees that when venture capital funds intensively 
monitor the performance of the portfolio companies in an objective view, they make and are 
expected to make non-cash contributions, including the use of the reputation of the fund to attract 
potential customers, going beyond the duties by the formal legal documents between the funds 
and the portfolio companies.394 Comparatively, pension funds, insurance companies and money 
managers actively invest in the business of portfolio companies due to their legal structures and 
customs.395 
Beyond the above theoretical evidence, Nahata conducted an empirical study with the 
public U.S. companies having initial VC funding between 1991 and 2001, and its results show 
that venture capital funds make the most contributions to these companies than any other types 
of financing.396  
While many scholars agree the important role that venture capital plays in the survival and 
growth of SMEs, they argue about the measures to induce venture capital investors to SMEs 
properly. For SMEs, acquiring equity financing is a huge business decision to make carefully 	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because they must pay a large premium to the investors based on the success of their high-risk 
programs.397 Also, while venture capital funds are understood as financial intermediaries to fill 
the gap between investors and high-tech SMEs,398 because of the unbalanced development of 
venture capital market around the world, the venture capital markets in many countries other 
than the U.S. are immature so as to be still inefficient.399  
 
1.1.3. Developing a VC/PE market in developing countries 
 
Gilson believes that the U.S. venture capital structures investment to make early stage 
financing feasible.400 Because the countries other than the U.S. have relatively less experienced 
VC investing, Kaplan and Stromberg suggest that the U.S. style contracts are optimal structures 
in a VC market.401 However, they and Martel also realize that not all countries adopt the U.S. 
style of contracts.402 Similarly, Bottazzi, Da Rin and Hellmann claim that the U.S. is the market 
leader in venture capital, but they also emphasize the importance of understanding cross-country 
differences in financial intermediary.403  
Looking into the VC markets in various countries, Jeng and Wells conclude that Japanese 
and German venture capital funds are not actively involved in monitoring their investments as 
those in the U.S.404 The U.S. used to have the greatest amount of private equity, but the amount 
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of fund flowing into private equity in U.K. was slightly exceeding it.405 Therefore, in order to 
understand which road is the most appropriate one for developing countries, in addition to 
understanding their failures, it is also necessary to review and understand the arguments among 
the scholars on different styles of management in different economies and the structures of 
venture capital environments in these economies.  
The discrimination of analyzing venture capital market is reasonable under the statistics of 
eighty countries over 1960-1989 by Levine who observed that the financial environment 
including bank, non-bank, private share and stock market but not limited in VC environment are 
developing as the economies grow.406 When only focusing on VC or PE markets, Lerner, 
Hardymon and Leamon conclude that the implementation of PE in developing countries is 
obviously distinguished from that in developed countries, while fund structures like limited 
partnership and capital sources in these countries are similar under globalization.407 Concretely, 
the different investment processes in developing and developed countries include the types of 
deals, the process of identifying and evaluating, the investment structures and valuation.408  
About deal structure, investors in developed countries use common stock, preferred stock, 
debt and convertible preferred stock.409 As Kaplan and Stromberg describe, over 95 percent of 
private equity investment in the U.S. are dominated by convertible preferred stock.410 Under a 
statistic by Lerner and Schoar, not more than 10 percent of private equity deals in the U.S. use 
common stock.411 Comparatively, the developing countries in their statistics show 54 percent 
using common stock in private equity transactions, over double the amount of using convertible 
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  no.	  1	  (2005):	  231,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.jstor.org/stable/25098735.	   	  
	   150	  
preferred stock.412 Lerner, Hardymon and Leamon explain this phenomena as that many of these 
countries, especially Asian ones, do not allow different classes of stock with different voting 
powers,413 which results in these developing countries not being able to possess the advantages 
of a common law system like the U.S. “The rare use of convertible preferred stock prevented 
active involvement in underperforming assets and often led to weaker liquidation and exit rights 
for foreign venture capitalists.”414  
Truly, besides the economic reasons that only the increase of economy can make more 
capital available, many scholars, like Gulinello, also recognize other obstacles of the growth of 
VC market in these countries, such as political reasons and legal forms.415 Similarly, Ptacek 
taking the example from Czech Republic explains that the amount of venture capital investment 
does not depend on the level of economy of a country but rather depends on its local laws.416 
Czech Republic used to merely have concentrated investment on buyout, replacement and 
growth segment, but its venture capital market expanded after the law of collective investment 
was amended.417 Jackson explains that the different financial regulations among different 
countries could arise out of the differences on their political goals or the identical levels of 
regulatory intensity.418  
When comparing the return of PE funds in common law developing countries and civil law 
developing countries, Lerner and Schoar find empirical evidence to show that the former one 
was on average 19 percent higher than the return in socialist and civil law countries in 2004, and 
they believe the reason is that common law countries have better legal enforcement, especially 
on contracts, so the investors there prefer using convertible preferred stock to using common 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  412	   Ibid.	  230.	  413	   Lerner,	  Hardymon,	  and	  Leamon,	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Book,	  250.	  414	   Ibid.	  250.	   	  415	   Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	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  Ordering:	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  Taiwan	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  858,	  846.	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  to	  SMEs	  in	  a	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  Way:	  The	  Seed	  Fund,”	  279.	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   Ibid.279.	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  E	  Jackson,	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stock or straight debt.419 The empirical evidence shows that equity investment transactions in 
common law countries are more likely to include contractual protection.420 In contrast, Lerner 
and Schoar suggest that the limitation of civil law system is its weak enforcement of contacts 
dividing cash flow and control rights. 421  Thus, the investors pursuing flexible capital 
management hardly rely on the portfolio companies and they could only choose debt investment 
instead of equity investment.422 The empirical study conducted by Bottazzi, Da Rin and 
Hellmann, who defining common law system as a better legal system than civil law system, find 
that investors provide more non-contractible support in common law countries because common 
law countries provide better downside protection for them.423  
While Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg agree that the U.S. has the best legal regime to enforce 
contracts when VC funds in other areas are less likely to use contingency or convertible 
preferred stock, they find that the reason why the experienced VC funds in the U.S. are more 
likely to use tough contracts could be not about efficiency but about practice.424 In their 
empirical study across 23 countries, they prove the efficiency of the U.S. style contracts under 
both common law regime and civil law regime.425 Without a testified causality, they still firmly 
believe that it is the U.S. style contracts rather than the common law regime that result in the 
success of VC funds because the investments in these countries could be more similar to the U.S. 
style contracts. 426  This result could prove the efficiency of the U.S. style contracts. 427 
Meanwhile, because the experienced venture capital funds use the U.S. style contracts under any 
legal regime and VCs from trusting culture do not need them, Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg do 	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not think that enforcement of law in civil law countries is a major problem.428   
The extremely effective contracting structure429 is not limited to the connection between 
venture capital funds and portfolio companies, but also includes the connection between 
investors and venture capitalists. In this side, Gomper finds that restrictive covenants are too 
costly to be used in a high frequency, especially when the market has high demand of venture 
funding.430 On the one hand, Jeng and Wells view the reduction of covenants as an increased 
compensation for venture capitalists so as to encourage their incentives.431 On the other hand, in 
order to encourage the incentives of investors, Bottazzi, Da Rin and Helmann suggest that 
policymakers from the countries other than the U.S. should realize the importance of the U.S. 
style venture capital model and the contracting system under its common law system.432  
Although Gilson agrees with the success of the U.S. style contracts, he suggests a different 
path and involving assistance of government in policies and regulations to cure market failure 
problems to other countries that are emulating the design of VC market developing in the U.S.433 
At this point, Jackson does not recommend these countries to take too many of the U.S. style 
policies and regulations because they are not optimal for their local VC markets.434  
While there is no common consensus among scholars, it is important for developing 
countries like China to consider its investment environment in the sense of economy, politics and 
law. Private equity investors concern the highly regulated infrastructure in developing countries, 
and their stabilization of the regulatory changes and currency.435 Nahata and other scholars have 
built the empirical evidence that “investment opportunities available to investors affect their 
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investment decisions and performance.”436 Meanwhile, Lerner and Schoar remind that it is 
important to enforce contracts for the efficiency of court systems, or no matter how the contracts 
are designed cannot protect investors.437 Besides the enforcement of contracts, the design of 
contracts would be affected by different legal systems, so Kaplan, Martel and Stromberg suggest 
designing new protective mechanisms for investors in various legal origins where portfolio 
companies reside.438  
 
1.2. IPO and Public Equity Market 
 
The Initial public offering (IPO) market is an exit mechanism on VC investments, and its 
high returns provide the incentives for venture capitalists to invest in SMEs.439 Thus, Black and 
Gilson state that the potential mechanism for exit through IPO is important for developing an 
active VC market.440 Simultaneously, venture capitalists are important to the efficiency of an 
IPO market because they monitor portfolio firms and certify the quality of the firms so as to 
reduce information asymmetries between corporate insiders and prospective investors and help 
the firms enter public equity market.441  
Gompers et al. present the empirical evidence of that IPOs and investment activities are 
highly correlated in particular industries, such as Internet and Computers, so they imply that 
IPOs may make investments in these industries more attractive, which also may attract more 
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entrepreneurs into these industries.442 A similar correlation result is also shown in the empirical 
study conducted by Jeng and Wells. They conclude that IPOs are the strongest driver of VC 
investing across countries, especially at the later stage of investment.443  
Because large profits on IPOs attract venture capitalists, Gulinello suggest structuring a 
strong and active securities market for realizing private capital in the investments.444 Taking the 
U.S. financial market as an example, Sibbitt claims that its characteristics of the quick returns 
with the easy liquidity attract both foreign high-tech firms and venture capitalists.445 Precisely, 
Lin reminds that the NASDAQ resulted in the success of American VC market and is still 
supporting this success by providing an efficient exit channel for VC investors.446 
While in both the U.S. and the Europe, PE funds can raise more capital based on their 
healthy IPO markets, Lerner, Hardymon and Leamon doubt if the PE investors can rely on the 
public markets which cause the difficulty of their exit of the investments.447 They see a higher 
cost of IPO to both the PE investors and portfolio firms than the cost of acquisition.448 The high 
cost of going public to the issuers specifically includes the legal, accounting, underwriter and 
broker fee, the degree of disclosure in their prospectuses, potential loss of control of the firm 
permanently, underpriced value of the shares as the concession of the success to IPO, and other 
potential risks in the management and equity transactions of the firm in the future.449  
In the case of China, the Chinese Growth Enterprise Market (GEM) can stimulate raising 
capital into the VC market and be an ideal way to exit for Chinese domestic VC investors, but 	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Lin observes that the GEM has not been fully utilized yet.450 Also, because of the policy of 
equity division in China, the exit of Chinese domestic VC through the Small and Medium-Sized 
Enterprises (SME) Board cannot be achieved successfully even after the portfolio firms listed on 
it.451  
Comparatively, for filling the gaps of the deficiencies of domestic VC markets, without 
various structures of mature IPO markets, Lu, Tan and Chen suggest pursuing overseas IPOs or 
learning from the model of Israel, where the firms are able to access foreign inputs and the 
financial market bridges the international VC industries.452 This could only be a temporary 
solution because there are many other scholars who suggest strengthening the local IPO 
markets.453  
Regardless of the function of exit for VC or PE investors, Lerner, Hardymon and Leamon 
argue that the invested companies demand a robust public equity market.454 On the one side, 
they explain that only in such a public market, PE investors can credibly commit entrepreneurs to 
ultimately relinquish the control of the portfolio firm.455 On the other side, public equity market 
is a crucial channel to raise capital for a firm after VC or PE provided it initial fund that may not 
continue keeping its positive cash flow.456 Moreover, going public can send signals of the 
stability and dependability of the firm to the existing and the potential customers or suppliers.457 
The empirical study conducted by Gompers et al. shows that VC funds are sensitive to the 
public equity market signals of investment opportunities.458 However, although institutional 
investors who make transactions in a much higher frequency than individual investors prefer 
securities with active trading markets, Rousseau reminds that they are reluctant to invest in 	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public SMEs due to the high risk and high transaction costs of illiquidity.459 In order to look for 
issuers in a low degree of information asymmetry and to decrease transaction costs, they would 
invest in the securities of SMEs that were brought to the public equity market by venture 
capitalists or high quality auditors and underwriters.460 
This could be a high standard to meet for many firms,461 not only for SMEs. The statistics 
compelled by Barry et al. reveal that only ten percent of IPOs were VC-backed between 1986 
and 1987, and on average 28 percent of all IPOs were VC-backed during the period 1978-1987 
in the U.S.462 However, the statistics also show that the aggregated equity held by VC investors 
among the firms become larger after their IPOs.463  
 
1.3. International Financial Flows 
 
International financial flows basically have two separate types. One type is foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which means direct investment in factories, machines and business; the other 
type is portfolio investment, which is passive investment in bonds or shares without control.464  
The importance of international financial flows has been realized by many countries, 
especially in this time of globalization. This phenomenon has been presented in an empirical 
study conducted by Heffernan and Wachtel, and they also conclude that foreign-owned banks, 
the lending decisions of which should require hard verifiable information and real estate as 
collateral in theory, do not lend less to SMEs than private domestic banks do in practice.465 
Comparatively, FDI is more important with a common consensus of scholars. For example, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  459	   Rousseau,	  “The	  Future	  of	  Capital	  Formation	  for	  Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises:	  Rethinking	  Initial	  Public	  Offering	  Regulation	  after	  the	  Restructuring	  of	  Canadian,”	  712-­‐713.	   	  460	   Ibid.	  713.	   	  461	   Himmelberg	  and	  Petersen,	  “R&D	  and	  Internai	  Finance:	  A	  Panel	  Study	  of	  Small	  Firms	  in	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries.”	  40.	   	  462	   Christopher	  B.	  Barry	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Role	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  in	  the	  Creation	  of	  Public	  Companies,”	  Journal	  of	  Financial	  
Economics	  27	  (1990):	  451-­‐454.	  (“433	  IPOs	  with	  venture-­‐capital	  backing	  and	  1,123	  IPOs	  without	  such	  backing.”)	  463	   Ibid.	  460.	   	  464	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  244.	   	   	  465	   Beck,	  D.	  Kunt,	  and	  Peria,	  Bank	  Financing	  for	  SMEs	  around	  the	  World:	  Drivers,	  Obstacles,	  Business	  Models,	  and	  Lending	  
Practices,	  16.	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Greenhalgh and Rogers explain that FDI creates new productive capacity, so it is important to 
economic growth in a country, and it also brings knowledge and technology.466  
From the study of the VC investors from San Francisco, New York and Boston, Chen, 
Gompers, Kovner and Lerner learn that the VC investors from VC center cities can firstly 
outperform on their non-local investments because of their successful investment models at 
home cities and their high cost of remote monitoring, even though the success rate of their 
investments would be reduced after the marginal cost of monitoring decreases.467 In the case of 
Australia, Barkoczy and Edmundson believe that foreign VC investment would be a catalyst for 
developing the VC market.468  
When discussing the financial market in China, Lu, Tan and Chen believe that foreign VC 
funds are more flexible than domestic in exiting their investment to avoid risks, which causes the 
gap between the performance of foreign and domestic VC funds.469 They believe the success of 
Israeli VC market results from accessing FDI and its technological contribution.470 Moreover, 
their statistics of the source of VC in China also show an increasing importance of FDI, which 
took 5 percent in 2004 and 43.7 percent in 2006 to become the largest source of VC.471  
During this process, FDI broadens the size and independence of domestic VC markets and 
instructs the market to be more mature.472 However, currently, under the Chinese dual-track 
system in financial regulations, domestic VC funds are less protected by law than foreign VC 
funds, which hurts the success of domestic VC funds.473 Also, even if foreign VC funds hold 
beneficial financial laws in China, they still prefer overseas operation for better legal protection 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  466	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  244.	   	  467	   Henry	  Chen	  et	  al.,	  “Buy	  Local?	  The	  Geography	  of	  Successful	  and	  Unsuccessful	  Venture	  Capital	  Expansion,”	  Journal	  of	  
Urban	  Economics	  67	  (2010):	  90–110.	  468	   Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  62.	   	  469	   Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China,”	  253.	   	  470	   Ibid.234.	  The	  authors	  rank	  Israel	  as	  the	  second	  best	  VC	  market	  outside	  that	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  based	  on	  its	  performance	  on	  R&D,	  GDP,	  VC	  availability	  and	  technological	  readiness	  reported	  by	  IMD	  World	  Competitiveness	  Yearbook	  2004	  and	  the	  WEF	  Global	  Competitiveness	  Report	  2004.	  471	   Ibid.	  242.	  472	   Ibid.	  250.	  Foreign	  VC	  funds	  provide	  more	  exit	  channels	  for	  early-­‐stage	  VC	  investments.	  473	   Ibid.	  262.	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there.474 Therefore, comparing foreign capital investing Chinese firms through foreign venture 
capitalists, Lu, Tan, and Chen suggest that China should take care of the investment through 
domestic venture capitalists more, and then the new corporations would create more investment 
opportunities for other foreign VC funds.475  
 
1.4. Debt 
 
    In this section, I will firstly compare two types of financing strategies in their pros and cons 
to help SMEs find an appropriate path to acquire capital. To explain why the firms prefer debt 
financing to equity financing, the literature in Section 1.4.2 presents some environmental factors, 
such as policy and the structure of financial market, which help SMEs easily acquire debt. 
Furthermore, the literature in Section 1.4.3 explores more effective factors from legal 
environments and compares the availability of debt for SMEs in civil law countries with that in 
common law countries. 
 
1.4.1. Debt Financing v. Equity Financing  
 
Although the cost of debt financing is lower than that of equity financing, Levin and Rocap 
argue that PE/VC investors bring to the portfolio companies more than capital, also the firms are 
more easily acquire loans after invested by PE/VC investors.476 Heffernan argues that SMEs are 
difficult to get any banking services, including getting loans and negotiating the loan rates, in the 
local markets, and they are treated discriminately in these processes.477 The statistics conducted 
by Himmelberg and Petersen show a low degree of using debt among the 3035 U.S. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  474	   Ibid.	  262.	   	  475	   Ibid.	  257.	   	  476	   Levin	  and	  Rocap,	  Structuring	  Venture	  Capital,	  Private	  Equity,	  and	  Entrepreneurial	  Transactions,	  1-­‐7.	   	  477	   S	  Heffernan,	  “UK	  Bank	  Services	  for	  SMEs:	  Are	  They	  Competitively	  Priced?,”	  Faculty	  of	  Finance	  Working	  Paper	  44,	  2,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  no.	  0	  (2003),	  http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=903342.	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manufacturing firms from 1983 to 1987.478 Precisely, the sum of both short-term loans and 
long-term loans of these firms on average reaches only ten percent of their average internal 
finance.479  
For innovative firms, Mueller and Reize conclude that bank loans are not an optimal 
method of financing for them because of the lack of collateral, as their R&D expenditures are 
less likely to transform to tangible assets.480 In practice, the empirical study conducted by Hall 
about U.S. manufacturing firms over the period 1973 to 1989 tells that the firms with high 
leverage usually were not R&D-intensive firms, so Hall implies that debt may not be an 
appropriate source of financing R&D for firms, or be necessarily considered in R&D policies.481 
By contrast, Spulber makes a completely opposite standpoint that debt is an optimal 
structure of financing for improving R&D because moral hazard and limited liability of debt 
contract can provide firms more incentives to make efficient performance for payoff of the loans, 
even though firms may also avoid some projects that probably make positive expected value in 
their business.482   
When solely discussing the effectiveness of equity financing by banks, however, Jeng and 
Wells learn that only the firms having close relationships with banks in Japan and Germany can 
get equity financing from the banks, and the function of management by the banks is limited.483 
Besides the limitation of the function of banks on equity financing, private equity financing itself 
is not perfect on the effectiveness of financing by SMEs. A survey by Mason and Kwok among 
884 SMEs in the U.K. shows that many SMEs are not ready to accept VC investment, so they 
make limited amount of early stage equity financing.484  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  478	   Himmelberg	  and	  Petersen,	  “R&D	  and	  Internai	  Finance:	  A	  Panel	  Study	  of	  Small	  Firms	  in	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries,”	  44.	   	  479	   Ibid.	  44.	   	  480	   Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  Can	  Innovative	  Companies	  Better	  Cope	  with	  Loan	  Denials?	  2-­‐4.	   	  481	   Hall,	  Investment	  and	  Research	  and	  Development	  at	  the	  Firm	  Level:	  Does	  the	  Source	  of	  Financing	  Matter,	  19-­‐20.	  482	   Daniel	  F	  Spulber,	  Patents	  Are	  the	  Foundation	  of	  the	  Market	  for	  Inventions,	  2014,	  40,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.law.northwestern.edu/research-­‐faculty/searlecenter/events/roundtable/documents/Spulber_Patents_and_the_Market_for_Inventions.pdf.	   	  483	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  247.	   	  484	   Colin	  Mason	  and	  Jennifer	  Kwok,	  Investment	  Readiness	  Programmes	  and	  Access	  to	  Finance:	  A	  Critical	  Review	  of	  Design	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If we turn our eyes on the lending function of banks, on the side of lenders, Barkoczy and 
Edmundson claim that the risk of debt is smaller than the risk of making VC investment because 
the return is fixed and the only concern of lenders is the ability of debtors to repay the 
principles.485 As every type of financiers has their own solution for information asymmetry 
problems, Mueller and Reize appreciate that banks use screening techniques and collateral to 
control their risks on loans.486 On the side of debtors, because of the lack of access to public 
equity markets, they find that bank loans are a more important channel of capital than equity 
financing to most German SMEs.487  
 
1.4.2. Economic Environments of Using Debt 
 
    In Germany, banks and SMEs have close, long-term relationships, and Mueller and Reize 
conclude that this is a result of the bank-based system, in which firms prefer bank loans to equity 
financing.488 Reize finds that bank loans take 31 percent of total external financing sources.489 
Moreover, Jacobson, Linde and Roszbach recognize that the Interpreting Basel II Accord (Basel 
Committee, 2004) is particularly designed to encourage small business loans by setting low 
systematic risk on them.490  
Outside Germany, the empirical study across several countries, conducted by Giannetti. 
confirms that unlisted firms were more likely indebted.491 Jacobson, Linde and Roszbach also 
recognize that in a relatively long period of the past years bank loans have been the prime source 	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  Journal	  of	  Financial	  Services	  Research,	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  Choices,”	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of business finance, especially for SMEs.492 Similarly, Berger and Udell find that 86.95 percent 
of SBA (Small Business Administration) firms in 1994 considered bank loans as their primary 
financing method.493 On the lenders’ side, the statistics of 20 countries by Haselmann and 
Wachtel shows that smaller banks lend to SMEs more than larger banks and larger banks prefer 
to lend to larger firms.494 
Comparatively, Beck, Kunt and Peria observe that banks in developing countries tend to 
treat SMEs strictly, and they believe that a significant difference between banks in developed 
and developing countries on the issue of the discriminated availability, interest rates and fees of 
bank loans to SMEs is caused by the different degree of economic development.495 Thus, they 
suggest adjusting an appropriate lending environment.496 Similarly, another empirical study 
conducted by Kunt and Maksimovic shows that firms in developed countries and large firms 
have more long-term debts.497  
Besides to consider the lending environment itself, Giannetti reminds us to count the 
development of security market into the issue of the availability of both bank loans and market 
debts because their statistics show that firms are highly indebted in the local market with an 
underdeveloped stock market.498 Precisely, statistical results show that the debt maturity of 
smaller firms was shorter.499 In contrast, public firms, which may be considered good borrowers, 
are more easily able to access debt and generally access long-term debt in high leverage because 
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  II:	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  Loans	  and	  Retail	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  43.	   	  493	   Allen	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  Berger	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Economics	  of	  Small	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  The	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  of	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  in	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  Journal	  of	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  22	  (1998):	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of their high level of transparency of information reducing the risk of lenders.500 
Alternatively, Giannetti suggests both developing and developed countries adjusting their 
creditor protection laws to open this cheap source of external finance.501 His empirical study 
finds that the firms in the countries with above average creditor protection are more easily able to 
have debt financing to invest in their R&D and other intangible assets, or the lenders only prefer 
short-term debt.502 
 
1.4.3. Legal Environment of Using Debt 
 
After learning from Milhaupt that developing or late development economies often 
generally favor to use bank-oriented financial policies,503 the empirical study conducted by Kunt 
and Maksimovic does prove that small firms in bank concentrated countries have more long-term 
debt than short-term debt.504 Actually, they find that small firms in civil law countries are more 
likely to use it than small firms in common law countries, although large firms do not show such 
obvious difference.505  
This result shows that legal system of a country may influence firms choosing the optimal 
pattern of financing in that country.506 Thus, they suggest improving legal effectiveness to 
benefit all firms in the financial market, and suggest that any sizes of firms in effective legal 
systems consider long-term debt to be a substitute for short-term debt, even if the liabilities of 
the latter type of debt is lower.507 However, neither can their study prove a correlation between 
the size of the stock market and financing patterns like debt with samples across both developed 	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  185.	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and developing countries, nor can it use legal and institutional differences to explain the 
variation of using long-term debt by firms in their study.508  
Comparatively, through an empirical study with the samples from 26 European countries 
from 1993 to 1997 at a firm level, Giannetti finds that in the countries with good creditor 
protection laws, obtaining loans is easier for the small firms investing in intangible assets.509 
Also, he proves that the maturity of debt is shorter in the countries where the banking system is 
concentrated, and the maturity is longer only when the enforcement of laws and creditor 
protections are better.510  
Moreover, when learning bank behaviors in 20 countries, Haselmann and Wachtel find that 
banks would prefer SMEs that have information opaque to large enterprises and governments as 
their debtors in well-functioning legal environments, and, otherwise, banks prefer the latter 
groups of borrowers.511 Therefore, they conclude that the improvement of legal environment can 
promote an active capital market for SMEs.512 Also, the economic model designed by Bottazzi, 
Rin and Hellmann considers that in developing countries firms using debt by equity investors is 
associated with the quality of their legal systems.513 After they tested with the data of 
developing countries, they conclude a positive relationship between legal systems and the use of 
pure debt by VC investors.514 
Comparatively, Lerner and Schoar find that straight debt is relatively less used by PE 
investors in common law countries, which have better legal enforcement, and the civil law or 
socialist legal background countries with weaker legal enforcement on control rights of firms are 
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  “Do	  Better	  Institutions	  Mitigate	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  Finance	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   Ibid.	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  2,	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more likely to use debt.515 However, with the economic analysis of contracts of debt, Gale and 
Hellwig would argue that debt is an optimal instrument of financing in poor legal systems for 
information asymmetry problems.516  
 
2. Interaction of IP and Finance 
 
The literature in this section discusses the interaction of IP and various financial tools that 
are important to both the economy of a country and the demands of R&D-intensive firms, 
especially the small and medium-sized ones. After presenting the literature broadly talking about 
how FDI investors have preferences on strong IP protection first, I then cite some literature to 
discuss why equity investors need IP regimes to decrease their risks on investments and the 
relevant transaction costs on information asymmetry and how firms use IPRs to signal and attract 
these investors. At last, I introduce some studies that argue how IP regimes and creditor 
protection regimes coordinately affect R&D-intensive firms and their innovation.  
While understanding the importance of FDI both in theory of economics and in practice, 
many countries still have difficulties attracting more FDI because of their immature capital 
market and limited financial environment, like in China.517 The traditional view in developing 
countries is that IP is a significant economic policy, so Olwan implies that providing IP 
protection should also be important to encourage FDI from developed countries.518  
Moreover, the theoretical models designed by Helpman and Lai argue that strengthening 
IPR in developing countries can encourage more FDI.519 Hu and Jaffe agree that fuller IPR 	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  The	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  Channel	  in	  Private	  Equity,”	  224-­‐225.	   	  516	   Douglas	  Gale	  and	  Martin	  Hellwig,	  “Incentive-­‐Compatible	  Debt	  Contracts:	  The	  One-­‐Period	  Problem,”	  The	  Review	  of	  
Economic	  Studies	  52,	  no.	  4	  (1985):	  650-­‐651.	   	  517	   Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	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  and	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  in	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  250.	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  and	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  Theory	  and	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  348.	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   Hu	  and	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  “Lessons	  from	  the	  Economics	  Literature	  on	  the	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  of	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  Also	  see	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  “International	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  Product	  Innovation,”	  Journal	  of	  Development	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  55	  (1998):	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  E.	  Helpman,	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  Econometrica	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  (1993):	  1247–80.	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protection will foster FDI.520 This is reasonable because foreign investors generally invest 
knowledge and technology beyond capital in their FDI as explained by Greenhalgh and 
Rogers.521  
Other scholars also find that investors, mostly the investors of FDI, care about IPRs and 
make decisions of investment relating to IPRs of the firms and the IPR protection environment 
where the firms have their business.522 At least, Park and Lippoldt find that “stronger IPRs tend 
to be associated with higher FDI.”523 However, while Maskus also admits that FDI is sensitive 
to international variations in patent rights based on his statistics across both the U.S. and 
developing countries, he reminds that strong IPRs alone are not enough to attract FDI.524  
Similarly, a firm-level survey conducted by Javorcik across both developed and developing 
countries in 1999 shows that Eastern Europe with strong IPR protection has weaker ability to 
attract FDI than other developing countries, such as China and Brazil.525 Moreover, she can only 
confirm the existence of a connection between the strength of IPRs and the incentives of 
attracting FDI in few industries, such as production facilities.526 Thus, while she implies that the 
quality and value of the transferred technologies through FDI could be influenced by the strength 
of IPR protection in host countries, she still argues that both a weak and strong IPR system may 
deter FDI.527  
Chatterrjee et al. also make a same conclusion after they combine the arguments in both 	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  International	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  of	  IPR	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  107.	   	  521	   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	  Innovation,	  Intellectual	  Property,	  and	  Economic	  Growth,	  244.	   	  522	   Hu	  and	  Jaffe,	  “Lessons	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  International	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  100.	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  least	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  E.	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  Smarzynska	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  McCalman	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  of	  20	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  the	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  the	  U.S.	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   Greenhalgh	  and	  Rogers,	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  Intellectual	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  Economic	  Growth,	  337.	  Also	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  W.	  Park	  and	  D.	  Lippoldt,	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  Transfer	  and	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  Implications	  of	  the	  Strengthening	  of	  Intellectual	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  Evidence	  from	  Transition	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  in	  Intellectual	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  and	  Development:	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Research,	  ed.	  Carsten	  Fink	  and	  Keith	  E.	  Maskus	  (The	  World	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  Oxford	  University	  Press,	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relative theoretical and empirical literature.528 Interestingly, even though Reichman believes that 
the relationship between FDI and IPRs is still ambiguous as opinions in the prior literature, he 
suggests that OECD technology exporters should take this opportunity to enter emerging 
economies as much as they demand FDI with the unilateral strong IP protection terms for 
exporters under TRIPs Agreement.529 However, for the benefits of developing countries, Coriat 
and Orsenigo think that providing strong IPR protection could be effective in attracting FDI 
relating to R&D despite its high cost, but they also reserve this suggestion because technology 
developers may use different global business strategies besides FDI.530  
Viewing U.S. investors, a survey conducted by Mansfield about 100 U.S. firms from six 
different manufacturing industries in 1991 shows that stronger IPRs attract their investments in 
developing countries, especially in R&D activities.531 Fuller explains the predicament that 
foreign VCs, excluding ethnic Chinese foreign venture capitalists, avoid investing in China with 
its weak IP protection as they prefer to centralize their investment in the countries where formal 
property rights, such as IPRs, are well protected.532 
“There is an important complementarity between IPRs and financing for innovation,” and 
Maskus et al. explain this interaction: a significant type of incentives to do risky innovations is to 
attract bank loans and venture capitalists with their IPRs or trade secrets.533 On the one side, 
Maskus believes that IPRs can also indirectly encourage investment, such as FDI, through 	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  Nations,”	  NERA	  Economic	  Consulting,	  2008,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.mondaq.com/unitedstates/article.asp?articleid=57856.	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   Jerome	  H.	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  the	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  Will	  the	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  Lead	  or	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  in	  Intellectual	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  Rights:	  Legal	  and	  Economic	  Challenges	  for	  Development,	  ed.	  Mario	  Cimoli	  et	  al.	  (Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2014),	  114.	   	   	  530	   Coriat	  and	  Orsenigo,	  “IPRs,	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  the	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  countries	  with	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  export	  to	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  In	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  “the	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  of	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  may	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  531	   Edwin	  Mansfield,	  Intellectual	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  Protection,	  Foreign	  Direct	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  Discussion	  Paper	  19,	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  Journal	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  (2010):	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  firms	  founded	  by	  ethnic	  Chinese	  and	  embedded	  in	  ethnic	  Chinese	  communities	  are	  called	  ethnic	  Chinese	  foreign	  venture	  capital	  firms.	  Because	  of	  difference	  of	  culture,	  they	  are	  distinguished	  by	  Fuller	  from	  other	  foreign	  VCs.	   	  533	   Maskus,	  Dougherty,	  and	  Mertha,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  and	  Economic	  Development	  in	  China.”	  
	   167	  
constructing a pro-competitive environment.534 On the other side, Maskus argues that stronger 
IPRs improve confidentiality, contract maintenance, and monitoring capabilities, so he suggests 
Lebanon setting a stronger IPR environment to foster both FDI and local investments.535 
Heald, however, challenges the empirical results by Mansfield and other conclusions on the 
positive relationship between strong IP protection and FDI in an under-developed economy.536 
The above conclusions could be incomplete if these studies do not separate FDI as the targets in 
manufacture or research, because foreign investors care less about IP environment when they 
make decisions on investing in manufacture and facilities.537 
Actually, there is a trend for both law scholars and business scholars to discuss that firms 
are more likely to design various IP strategies relating to finance other than solely rely on the 
benefits of their patents from the market. For instance, scholars, such as Graham, Sichelman, 
Kesan, Hsu, and Ziedonis, find that patents are used to send signals of the quality of the technical 
capabilities of a firm to investors or analysts and attract investors in the capital market.538 In this 
scenario, regardless of the qualify of their patents, empirical evidence by Hsu and Ziedonis 
shows that the firms in the U.S. semiconductor industry can effectively gain credits from 
potential and existing investors, especially in their early stage of financing.539  
The theoretical rationale of this course of signaling investors is concluded by Long as that 
patents decrease the cost of information asymmetry between firms and investors in the market, 
which should be a resource of positive returns of the patents for firms.540 Because of the risk of 
getting undervalued and the aspiration of capital to do innovation, Long believes that signals of 	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  54.	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  a	  Canonical	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  314.	  537	   Ibid.	  314.	  538	   Ted	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  and	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  Graham,	  “Patenting	  by	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  An	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  Michigan	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Technology	  Law	  Review	  17,	  no.	  1	  (2010):	  130-­‐132.	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  911-­‐913.	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  of	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  777.	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  2005.	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patents to investors are significant for SMEs; otherwise, they burden higher opportunity costs.541 
On the side of firms, the 2008 Berkeley Survey with 1,332 firms finds that some of the 
important incentives of technology startups to file patent applications are to increase 
opportunities of securing investment and successful liquidity event, rather than to improve 
innovate activities.542  
On the side of investors, an empirical study conducted by Kortum and Lerner with the 
samples from twenty U.S. manufacturing industries over a period from the late 1970s to the late 
1990s suggests that VC does not only have a strong positive effects on innovations, but also is 
obviously associated with patent activities.543  
Moreover, a survey about 190 VC backed German and British biotech companies, 
conducted by Haussler et al., shows that patent applications solely reduce the time of 
successfully acquiring VC investment.544 Based on this result, they imply that patent systems 
can provide effective information for VC investors when they are making investment decisions. 
Therefore, more scholars, like Reichman et al., infer that small firms may use patents to attract 
venture capital, and delays in patent examination may cause severe implications for them.545  
By contrast, the empirical result of a survey conducted by Audretsch et al. around 900 
nascent entrepreneurs in the U.S. suggests that the signal effects of patents may only be 
significant for angel investors and venture capitalists when the entrepreneurs provide or plan to 
develop a prototype combining with the patent.546  
Alternatively, Cockburn and MacGarvie predict that the software industry is a totally 
different story: investors may require early stage firms to file patents as the condition of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  541	   Ibid.	  674.	  In	  security	  market,	  when	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  value	  a	  firm	  and	  its	  projects,	  it	  is	  more	  likely	  that	  they	  are	  to	  be	  undervalued.	  It	  is	  usually	  hard	  to	  value	  the	  quality	  and	  qualify	  of	  the	  R&D	  in	  a	  firm,	  specially	  a	  small	  firm.	   	  542	   Graham	  and	  Merges,	  “High	  Technology	  Entrepreneurs	  and	  the	  Patent	  System:	  Results	  of	  the	  2008	  Berkeley	  Patent	  Survey,”	  1297-­‐1298.	  543	   Kortum	  and	  Lerner,	  “Assessing	  the	  Contribution	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  to	  Innovation,”	  674.	   	  544	   Carolin	  Häussler,	  Dietmar	  Harhoff,	  and	  Elisabeth	  Müller,	  To	  Be	  Financed	  or	  Not	  -­‐	  The	  Role	  of	  Patents	  for	  Venture	  
Capital-­‐Financing,	  Business	  Administration	  8970,	  2009,	  35.	   	  545	   Reichman	  et	  al.,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Alternatives:	  Strategies	  for	  Green	  Innovation,”	  361.	   	  546	   David	  B	  Audretsch,	  Werner	  Bönte,	  and	  Prashanth	  Mahagaonkar,	  “Financial	  Signaling	  by	  Innovative	  Nascent	  Entrepreneurs,”	  Schumpeter	  Discussion	  Papers	  2009-­‐001,	  no.	  7165	  (2009):	  31.	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investing.547 Their empirical study around 19,717 public and private software firms between 
1990 and 2004 shows that venture capitalists value pending patents more than patents granted in 
the software industry, which proves the anecdotal evidence that investors are forward-looking.548 
Under this rationale of investors, if “patent thickets” as the result of a strong IP regime inhibit 
early-stage software firms to entry the market, these firms are less attractive to investors due to 
the concern about the transaction costs of anti-commons in this market with larger patent 
thickets.549  
The financial cooperation between firms and VC funds is not limited to equity financing but 
also includes venture lending. After interviewing venture lenders, Ibrahim acknowledges that 
they value IPRs, such as patents and copyrights, as a substitute for tangible collateral when they 
lend to start-ups and they have concerns about the protection of downside value of the IPRs.550 
He finds that in practice, some venture lenders negotiate for the entitlement of the first priority 
from the IPRs’ sale in their lending contracts with start-ups.551  
Also, Hochberg et al. designed an empirical study about 1,519 U.S. startups and their 
venture debts from VCs.552 They indicate that patents as intangible assets and their exchange can 
effectively eliminate the impediments in the financial market.553 Precisely, they appreciate that 
VCs can effectively foster commercialization of patents and increase the liquidity of patent 
trading in the market. In a process like this, both the market of patent trading and the market of 
risky debt financing for startups are improved.554  
For ordinary lenders, IPRs can be important collateral. In the case of the U.S., Article 9 
allows them to attach particular collateral or the power to transfer rights in the collateral that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  547	   Cockburn	  and	  MacGarvie,	  Patents,	  Thickets	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Early	  Stage	  Firms:	  Evidence	  from	  the	  Software	  Industry,	  43.	   	  548	   Ibid.	  37.	  549	   Ibid.	  26-­‐27.	  550	   Darian	  M.	  Ibrahim,	  “Debt	  as	  Venture	  Capital,”	  University	  of	  Illinois	  Law	  Review	  4	  (2010):	  1187.	   	  551	   Ibid.	  1188.	   	  552	   Hochberg,	  Serrano,	  and	  Ziedonis,	  Patent	  Collateral,	  Investor	  Commitment,	  and	  the	  Market	  for	  Venture	  Lending.	  553	   Ibid.	  8-­‐9.	   	  554	   Ibid.	  2.	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debtors have rights in.555 Meanwhile, when an owner of an IPR files for bankruptcy, Chapter 11 
permits licensing incomes from the executory contract of IPRs held by trustees, regardless of 
whether trusts assume or reject the contract.556 Hence, there are scholars, like Menell, to explore 
measures to protect lenders from bankruptcy law, contract law, IP laws and relevant policies 
because he believes that lenders do consider how their attachment of security interests from the 
IPRs and their relevant interests held by the debtors.557  
Because the creditor protection laws vary among different states in the U.S., Mann provides 
empirical evidence showing that stronger creditor rights result in greater flexibility on, and an 
increased amount of, using patent collateral, especially in the pharmaceutical industry and the 
software industry.558 Ultimately, his statistics show that firms invest more in R&D expenditures, 
so he concludes that a strengthening of creditor rights to patent collateral fosters innovation by 
firms through both the patent regime and the creditor protection regime.559  
 
3. Government Intervention in the Financial Market 
 
Chapter 1 discusses direct investments by the government in the form of grants and funding. 
Indirectly, the government also subsidizes firms and their R&D activities through financial 
markets, so Section 3.1 introduces how the government acts in a venture capital market as an 
investor coordinating with professional fund managers or through subsidies for this market. 
Moreover, Section 3.2 discusses how the government subsidies in debt markets are effective in 
some studies with the experience of different countries.  
Other than the direct subsidies in the form of capital, regarding the indirectly supporting 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  555	   A	  security	  interest	  is	  enforceable	  against	  the	  debtor	  and	  third	  parties	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  collateral	  only	  if:	  the	  debtor	  has	  rights	  in	  the	  collateral	  or	  the	  power	  to	  transfer	  rights	  in	  the	  collateral	  to	  a	  secured	  party.	  U.C.C.	  section	  9-­‐203.	  (b)(2).	   	  556	   11	  U.S.C.	  section	  365	  (a)&(n).	   	  557	   Peter	  S.	  Menell,	  “Bankruptcy	  Treatment	  of	  Intellectual	  Property	  Assets:	  An	  Economic	  Analysis,”	  Berkeley	  Techn.	  Law	  J.	  22	  (2007):	  814.	   	   	  558	   William	  Mann,	  Creditor	  Rights	  and	  Innovation:	  Evidence	  from	  Patent	  Collateral,	  2014,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://fnce.wharton.upenn.edu/profile/1033/.	  22.	   	  559	   Ibid.	  2-­‐3.	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rules, the government also regulates the financial market. Section 3.3 presents the literature in 
which the scholars discuss the successes and failures of various policies or regulations on 
structuring a financial market, which should be efficient to facilitate SMEs to acquire capital to 
innovate.  
 
3.1. Subsidies and Funding in the VC Market 
 
An important characteristic of the VC market from the experience of the U.S., concluded by 
Gulinello and Gilson, is that the VC market is emerged and developed as a result of market 
forces, rather than any policies by the governments.560 While the U.S. VC market did not have 
government assistance or government design in its early stage of development, however, Gilson 
also admits that other countries could follow a distinguished path from the U.S. Governments to 
cure the limitation of the market power to solving the simultaneity problem by providing capital 
and acting as the financial intermediary.561  
On one side, White agrees with this conclusion because financial market has limitations, so 
it needs government interventions in the form of regulations or subsidies.562 For example, the 
Norwegian government funded PE investments to rebuild its PE market after the banking crisis 
after the late 1980s.563 Also, Sibbitt recognizes that governments can be both lawmakers and the 
largest single financial intermediaries to impact on the VC market.564  
On the other side, extremely, in the perspective of Dent, governments may completely be 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  560	   Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience.”	  846.	  Also	  see,	  Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience,”	  1070.	  561	   Ibid.	  1070.	  Gilson	  believes	  that	  every	  country	  faces	  the	  simultaneity	  problem	  when	  it	  engineers	  a	  venture	  capital	  market.	  The	  core	  elements	  of	  a	  VC	  market	  are	  capital,	  specialized	  financial	  intermediaries	  and	  entrepreneurs,	  but	  “each	  of	  these	  inputs	  will	  emerge	  if	  the	  other	  two	  are	  present,	  but	  none	  will	  emerge	  in	  isolation	  of	  the	  others.”	  This	  is	  the	  simultaneity	  problem.	   	  562	   Lawrence	  J.	  White,	  “Market	  Failures	  and	  Government	  Failures:	  Some	  Cautionary	  Implications	  for	  Financial	  Reform,”	  in	  
Sequencing?	  Financial	  Strategies	  for	  Developing	  Countries,	  ed.	  Alison	  Harwood	  and	  Bruce	  L.R.	  Smith	  (Brookings	  Institution	  Press,	  1997),	  71-­‐74.	  563	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  278.	  564	   Sibbitt,	  “Law,	  Venture	  Capital,	  and	  Entrepreneurism	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	  Generation	  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses,”	  85.	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not necessary to be involved into the VC market because well-designed and negotiated contracts 
can solve the moral hazard issues.565 Gilson mentions that governments could effectively 
engineer a VC market only if they are passive investors to provide funds to the new market but 
not to participate in the capital allocation process, or they behaving as financial intermediaries 
can discourage the development of the VC market because their “implicit promise of future 
funding” could impede the access of private investors to the future funding due to its lack of a 
mechanism of reputational sanction.566 With the failure of the German WFG program, a 
financial intermediary funded by banks under German government guarantees, Gilson explains 
the reasons why too many government direct interventions are harmful to the VC market. WFG 
under the management of government officers has less incentives to make successful investments, 
does not provide technological or management assistance to the portfolio companies, and has 
less incentives and ability to monitor the portfolio companies.567 Alternatively, he supports 
governments building a VC environment where funds and specialized intermediaries are 
available to entrepreneurs.568  
Unfortunately, furthermore, responding to Gilson’s suggestion of a passive role played by a 
government on facilitating the development of a local capital market, Zhao and Ziedonis believe 
that the immature experience of the state of Michigan, the government of which invests in VC 
funds to support their local firms, provides us an answer of paradox.569  
Moreover, Milhaupt would argue that direct government interventions, such as subsidies or 
loan guarantees, are inefficient. Instead, he suggests that governments should only invest in 
information-related public goods and remove the obstacles of private intermediaries investing to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  565	   George	  W	  Dent	  Jr,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Future	  of	  Corporate	  Finance,”	  Wash.	  U.	  L.	  Q.	  70,	  no.	  4	  (1992):	  1044.	   	  566	   Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience,”	  1115-­‐6.	   	  567	   Ibid.	  1104-­‐1107.	   	  568	   Ibid.	  1116.	   	  569	   They	  introduces	  that	  the	  state	  of	  Michigan	  has	  sponsored	  two	  such	  funds	  as	  “fund-­‐of	  funds.”	  One	  is	  in	  2006	  with	  $95	  million	  and	  the	  other	  is	  in	  2011	  with	  $120	  million.	  Zhao	  and	  Ziedonis,	  State	  Governments	  as	  Financiers	  of	  Technology	  
Startups:	  Implications	  for	  Firm	  Performance,	  9.	  Also	  see,	  “Venture	  Michigan	  Fund,”	  Merrill	  Corporation,	  accessed	  May	  2,	  2015,	  http://www.venturemichigan.com/index2.htm.	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bridge private VCs and firms.570 He believes that a private equity market creates contractual 
incentive to monitor their investments.571 Lerner explains that government officials cannot have 
effective expertise or resources to monitor portfolio companies because of the lack of 
experience.572  
As a solution, learning from the experience of Japan, Milhaupt suggests that governments 
can behave as a network builder and a participant in VC market and they can subsidize the 
information problems of the market by supplying and cooperating with private institutions.573 
Alternatively, Lu, Tan and Chen support governments directly funding VC funds rather than 
controling them, which can lower the risks and costs of the governments’ funding and create 
incentives of private capital by leveraging them, and they believe that it is particular significant 
to design a proper government funded scheme.574 
A qualitative study about government programs conducted by Jeng and Wells concludes 
that government funds can play as a catalyst for private sector funding.575 Moreover, in the 
empirical study of the U.S. SBIR program, while Gompers and Lerner did not find a significant 
difference between government funding and venture capital funding to the awardees, they found 
that the awardees indeed are more likely to receive investments from VC funds in subsequent 
years after they acquire government funding.576 Actually, besides to induce the development of 
these specialized intermediaries, for the situation of development countries, Gilson suggests that 
these governments can be financial intermediaries to invest seed capital to the new market.577 
Responding to the considerations and the worries of Gilson, that government interventions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  570	   Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy,”	  180.	  571	   Curtis	  J.	  Milhaupt,	  “The	  Market	  for	  Innovation	  in	  the	  United	  States	  and	  Japan:	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Comparative	  Corporate	  Governance	  Debate,”	  Nw.	  U.	  L.	  Rev.	  91	  (n.d.):	  886-­‐887.	   	  572	   Josh	  Lerner,	  “The	  Government	  as	  Venture	  Capitalist:	  The	  Long‐Run	  Impact	  of	  the	  SBIR	  Program,”	   The	  Journal	  of	  
Business	  72,	  no.	  3	  (1999):	  289.	  573	   Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy,”	  195.	   	  574	   Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China,”	  246-­‐7.	   	  575	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  243.	  576	   Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  Cycle,	  341.	   	  577	   Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience,”	  1104.	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may reduce the incentives of investors, Gulinello argues that alternatively they may do not only 
keep the incentives undamaged but also encourage private transactions on capital by increasing 
its efficiency. 578  However, in order to realize the political goals of governments when 
engineering a VC market, Gulinello reminds them to reconsider the transaction costs created by 
their subsidies in tax or direct investment, even though their political goals should be more 
important to be realized than to decrease the transaction costs in the VC market.579  
In 1986, the Portuguese government created a type of the venture capital corporation in a 
new structure providing tax benefits, and PE investment in Portugal had a dramatic increase in 
the following year. 580  Similarly, the Australian government established Management and 
Investment Companies (MIC) program in 1983 and Pooled Development Funds (PDF) program 
in 1992 providing tax incentives to attract investors investing in small firms and medium 
firms.581 The Singaporean government uses tax deductions to compensate the losses of VC 
funds that invest in SMEs to create their investment incentives.582 So does the Malaysian 
government to provide income exemptions for investors who join venture capital funds by 
special vehicles known as VCCs, regardless of whether the investments are made successful or 
not.583 With an understanding of these regimes and analyzing the cases of Australia and 
Singapore, Barkoczy and Edmundson conclude that various forms of subsidies are effective in 
providing tax incentives to different parties on the VC market, such as the investors or the 
particular VC funds investing in SMEs, which will ultimately affect the development formal VC 
markets significantly.584  
Lu, Tan and Chen agree that tax incentives can influence on both the supply and the 
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   Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience,”	  847.	  579	   Ibid.	  869.	   	  580	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	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  across	  Countries,”	  277.	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  Expenditure	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  61-­‐62,	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   Ibid.	  69.	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  97V.	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   Ibid.	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demand side of venture capital in the U.S., and stroke incentives of VC investment and the 
success of portfolio firms, so they suggest the Chinese government providing tax credits for 
domestic VC funds to reduce the gap of tax policies between domestic and foreign VC funds.585 
Also, Lerner, Hardymon and Leamon present empirical evidence supporting that lower tax rates 
of capital gains attract particular types of investors so as to positively impact on VC 
fund-raising.586 However, considering the probable failure of tax incentives, Rousseau reminds 
governments to put some weights on the availability of liquidity for the funds.587  
Alternatively, based on an empirical study of VC investments distributed by geography, in 
order to take the benefits from established and mature VC markets, Chen et al. suggest that 
policymakers outside these markets should consider to attract experienced VC investors from 
these markets instead of to subsidize the existing local investors from their markets.588  
 
3.2. Subsidize Debt Financing  
 
In the U.S., the Small Business Innovation Research (SBIC) program was established in 
1958 and is administered by the SBA. In an empirical study about 280 SBICs, Brewer et al. show 
that this program was designed to encourage banks that lend long-term debts to small firms by 
government guarantees, which resulted in poor performances.589 Conversely, the regular interest 
payment requirements for these equity-oriented SBICs made the SBA burdensome.590  
Japan also has a similar program, the Venture Enterprise Center, established by the Ministry 
of International Trade and Industry (MITI) to provide guarantees of the loans for the small firms 
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   Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China,	  ”	  262,	  266-­‐267.	  586	   Lerner,	  Leamon,	  and	  Hardymon,	  Venture	  Capital,	  Private	  Equity,	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Entrepreneurship :	  The	  Power	  of	  
Ictive	  Investing,	  103.	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   Rousseau,	  “The	  Future	  of	  Capital	  Formation	  for	  Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises:	  Rethinking	  Initial	  Public	  Offering	  Regulation	  after	  the	  Restructuring	  of	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  713-­‐714.	   	  588	   Chen	  et	  al.,	  “Buy	  Local?	  The	  Geography	  of	  Successful	  and	  Unsuccessful	  Venture	  Capital	  Expansion,”	  27.	   	  589	   Elijah	  Brewer	  III	  et	  al.,	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  and	  Access	  to	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  Guarantees :	  The	  Case	  of	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  Business	  Investment	  Companies,”	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  1996,	  29.	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   Ibid.	  29.	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with an original project. Learning from the experiences of this program and the SBICs, although 
Sibbitt admits that the government subsidies on debts could reduce the risk and cost of debt 
financing of venture businesses, he worries that an excessive government involvement and the 
inefficient management by governments would finally hamper the available investments or loans 
to venture businesses.591  
The empirical study conducted by Kunt and Maksimovic proves that the level of 
government subsidies is positively related to the amount of long-term debts lent to both large and 
small firms, and they infer that one probable reason could be that the subsidies are considered by 
lenders as implicit guarantees.592 
 
3.3. Regulations or Policies on Financial Markets   
 
Gilson criticizes the political influences of governments on investors selecting portfolio 
companies because it would probably make negative effects on the likelihood of the success of 
the VC funds.593 Milhaupt recognizes this conflict of interest when they prove that governments 
can acquire profits from the investments of information-related public goods.594  
To the situation of developing countries, Harwood concludes that they need economic and 
prudential regulations in the transition from a regulated environment to a deregulated one, even 
though they plan to build market-oriented financial systems rather than government-controlled 
ones.595 
In practice, however, government interventions are inevitable. Whenever we consider a 
legal and tax environment, government direct investment, or any other governments’ indirect 
encouragements on investment, Jeng and Wells remind that governments play a strong role in 	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  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	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  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses,”	  103-­‐104.	   	  592	   Demirguc-­‐Kunt	  and	  Maksimovic,	  Institutions,	  Financial	  Markets,	  and	  Firms’	  Choice	  of	  Debt	  Maturity,	  26-­‐27.	   	  593	   Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience,”	  1114-­‐1115.	   	  594	   Milhaupt,	  “The	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  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	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  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy,”	  180.	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influencing the growth of private sources of PE or VC funds because of the experiences of 
explosion of new VC or PE funds in the U.S., Canada, Ireland, Italy and Finland, where the 
governments unleashed the obstacles of pension funds or banks’ investments in their VC 
markets.596 
Taking the example of Taiwan, Gulinello explains that one possibility of the importance of 
government interventions to an early VC market could be that it trains labors to become the next 
generation of entrepreneurs.597 Moreover, the regulations governing the VC investment in 
Taiwan of 1983 constructed a framework of venture capitalists.598 While these regulations were 
designed to control the investment decisions of the VC investors, Gulinllo observes that the 
enaction of these regulations did not reduce the incentives of the investors and fund managers 
because of the strong power of the market, even though the regulations limited some choices of 
theirs.599  
Due to financial systems are designed differently as bank-oriented or stock 
market-oriented,600 financial regulations vary among different countries. White points out that 
some bank-oriented countries, such as Japan, would not develop the information infrastructure to 
support equity markets as well as the countries with the latter form in their financial systems.601 
Even more seriously, Milhaupt realizes that the policies of “financial repression” in Japan and 
South Korea against equity-based finance impeded their development of the VC markets.602 In 
contrast, the policymakers in the U.S., a stock market-oriented market, pursue to eliminate 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  596	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries.”	  278-­‐280.	  Around	  1980,	  the	  U.S.	  had	  a	  large	  flow	  of	  new	  VC	  funds	  after	  the	  Employment	  Retirement	  Income	  Securities	  Act	  (ERISA)	  permitted	  VC	  investing	  for	  pension	  funds.	  Many	  new	  funds	  came	  out	  in	  Ireland	  after	  its	  governments	  encouraged	  pension	  funds	  investing	  in	  PE.	  In	  1985,	  the	  Research	  Bank	  changed	  its	  rules	  to	  allow	  Australian	  banks	  to	  make	  equity	  investments	  in	  SMEs.	  In	  the	  later	  1990s,	  Italian	  government	  permitted	  pension	  funds	  to	  invest	  in	  SMEs.	  In	  1995,	  Finnish	  governments	  encouraged	  banks	  and	  pensions	  to	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  in	  VC	  so	  as	  to	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  a	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  in	  VC	  comparing	  to	  that	  in	  1994.	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   Ibid.	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regulatory obstacles to facilitate private intermediaries.603  
Milhaupt thinks that the success of the U.S. policy is due to its function of “gradual 
accumulation of incentive compatible regulation”, which provides limited liability, favorable tax 
policies and a flexible governance structure, allowance of pension investment and disclosure 
requirements to promote an active VC and security market. 604  Based on this successful 
experience of the U.S., he suggests governments facilitating the development of relevant contract 
structures on the financial markets.605  
More objectively, however, Gilson realizes that the U.S. experience may not be completely 
appropriate to apply to everywhere, especially the developing countries seeking to construct a 
VC market quickly.606 Tracking the pattern of the U.S. but not exactly copying its experience, 
the success of the Chilean Corporation for the Incentive of Production (CORFU) program 
provides the evidence that governments should solve the simultaneity problem of engineering a 
VC market by providing seed capital and facilitating financial intermediaries. In this process, 
Gilson also reminds that the most valuable piece of the U.S. VC contracting system is its 
characteristics of providing intense incentives with intense monitoring, not limited to the side of 
portfolio companies, but also in the side of fund managers for their reputation in the market.607  
In the branch of securities regulation, Rousseau suggests public policies aiming at 
enhancing the marketability of the equity of SMEs because he believes that security regulations 
impact on SME’s ability to raise public equity capital and public policies that enhance the 
efficiency of an IPO market can encourage the development of a VC market.608 Looking into 
this process, on the one hand, he reminds that the high cost of IPO can inhibit the abilities of 
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SMEs from raising capital in this market.609 Meanwhile, on the other hand, he saw a high cost 
on information acquisition for investors in an IPO market, especially small firm IPO market.610 
The two main sources of high cost of a public equity market are market imperfections and the 
regulations impairing market efficiency, so he strongly suggests that regulators should decrease 
this high cost, increase the efficiency of the market and modify the market to be more suitable 
for the demands and characteristics of SMEs.611  
In the case of Japan, the regulatory restrictions for stability of the financial market causes 
lack of dynamic public market, so Sibbitt pushes Japanese governments to deregulate the equity 
market and improve its diversity, such as facilitating the emergence of a dynamic OTC 
market.612 In the case of China, in 2005, the SME Board is established by the State Council to 
provide a convenient capital-raising environment for SMEs and exit channel for VC investors.613 
However, Lin criticizes the high requirements of IPOs on the SME Board as it betrays these two 
goals.614  
Moreover, because the policies improving stock markets in their functioning and liquidity 
would particularly benefit large firms, Kunt and Maksimovic suggest that policies should 
improve the development of banking systems to expand the availability of long-term debt to 
small firms.615 For the countries like the U.K., where the stock market is not the main stream of 
financing, Giannetti suggests legislations or governments should make creditor protection laws 
or policies to improve market development, which affects the power of banks and costs of 
lending, so as to ultimately affects the maturity of firm debt and its leverage.616 Furthermore, 
besides to improve enacted laws, Haselmann and Wachtel suggest that policies should develop 	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  67-­‐70.	   	  613	   Lin,	  “Legal	  Ecology	  of	  China’s	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Reflection	  in	  the	  American	  Mirror,”	  105.	   	  614	   Ibid.	  105.	   	  615	   Demirguc-­‐Kunt	  and	  Maksimovic,	  Institutions,	  Financial	  Markets,	  and	  Firms’	  Choice	  of	  Debt	  Maturity,	  28.	   	  616	   Giannetti,	  “Do	  Better	  Institutions	  Mitigate	  Agency	  Problems?	  Evidence	  from	  Corporate	  Finance	  Choices,”	  195-­‐196.	   	  
	   180	  
confidence of lenders in the operation of a legal environment.617  
 
II. Problems that Remain in the Literature 
 
This part regards three problems that are about the financial market and still remain in the 
literature. Problem 1 and Problem 2 review the arguments regarding the effects of the other two 
types of economic instruments of venture capital investment and lending on stimulating 
innovation by SMEs. In addition to the issues of the voluntary effects from the lending regime 
itself and its efficiency, Problem 2 also concerns the positive effects of an IP regime on them. 
Problem 3 is a follow-on question of Problem 1 and Problem 2. It uses China as an example to 
present the remaining issues in structuring a proper VC market in countries in which this market 
is immature, especially in developing countries. Problem 4 appreciates other characteristics of 
these immature markets where the civil law environment creates many criticisms but no effective 
solutions. This could be avoided after having a better understanding of the previous three 
problems and the problems discussed in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3.  
 
1. Does VC Stimulate Technical Innovation in SMEs? 
 
Basically, most scholars in finance support that venture capital (VC) provides significant 
positive effects on innovation, because VC investment can become a crucial resource of capital 
for the firms in high-tech industries.618 However, if we look into their studies, their conclusions 
are still too imprudent as two problems remain. One is the lack of sufficient empirical evidence, 
especially the empirical evidence from the innovation by SMEs in developing countries, and the 
other is the ambiguous definition of innovation.  	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  and	  Edmundson,	  Jeng	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  and	  Lerner	  present	  that	  VC	  can	  spur	  innovation,	  especially	  through	  high-­‐tech	  industries.	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First, if we look into the pioneer empirical study of some U.S. traditional manufacturing 
industries by Gompers and Lerner,619 there are some limitations to prove the theory that VC 
investments can spur technical innovation, although their data were collected both at 
country-level and at firm-level. When they tried to explore a connection between innovation by 
the firms and investments in growing firms in the U.S. manufacturing industries, they found a 
positive correlation between the number of issued patents and the amount of VC investments 
which were substituted for R&D.  
The exact relationship between R&D and VC investment or patent applications and VC 
investment in this study, however, is still vague because Gompers and Lerner did not control for 
the number of patent applications and only controlled for the amount of VC investment and the 
factors relating to R&D620 as independent variables to predict the number of issued patents. 
Besides that, they did not control for the size of portfolio firms. Hence, it is difficult to apply this 
result to suggest that other countries should construct or improve their VC market to encourage 
the innovation by SMEs.  
The empirical study by Audretsch et al. controls for the size of portfolio firms to test 
signaling effects for investors or lenders.621 Their study controls for patents granted and 
prototype rather than R&D expenditure or the number of patent applications in processing as a 
measure of innovation. Even though this literature indicates that investors make predictions on 
the profits of the invested startups because of the significant effects of the achieved technical 
outcomes on financing decisions by lenders or investors, it cannot show how the various external 
financing resources affect the current innovation or innovation in the future by the firms. 
Therefore, the relationship between innovation and financing resources shown in this literature 
could be lagged.  
Alternatively, the results of the Poisson regressions for U.S. startup software firms, in the 
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study by Cockburn and MacGarvie, show a positive relationship between the numbers of 
pending patent applications and the fund that the firms acquired from venture capitalists, and 
they imply that investors set patent applications as a condition of funding.622 However, the 
literature does not mention if this phenomenon also signifies that the conditional investment can 
stimulate further innovation by the firms and innovation by other firms in the industry.  
Except the above two important empirical studies, other scholars either theoretically imply, 
based on some superficial experiences from some mostly developed countries, that venture 
capital markets can spur technical innovation in a country,623 or merely show some statistical 
results, the data of which are also mostly from developed countries.624 A possible reason could 
be that developing countries have less evidence to study the variance of VC markets and 
innovation since both the development of their VC markets625 and innovation are at a relatively 
low level, so I conducted this study to suggest how developing countries should develop their 
VC/PE markets so as to potentially spur innovation. 
This lack of evidence, however, should not be an excuse to ignore the practical stories of 
VC markets and innovation in developing countries. From the successful experience of certain 
developed countries, we learn the importance of encouraging them to structure a VC market. 
Moreover, we still need to learn from the experience of the developing countries which have 
developed a relatively successful VC market, such as the VC market in Israel.626  
Hence, it is meaningful to expand the study in how VC markets affect innovation in the case 
of China with both theoretical analysis and empirical evidence, not being limited to its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  622	   Cockburn	  and	  MacGarvie,	  Patents,	  Thickets	  and	  the	  Financing	  of	  Early	  Stage	  Firms:	  Evidence	  from	  the	  Software	  
Industry.	  623	   This	  type	  of	  scholars	  mentioned	  by	  our	  literature	  review	  at	  least	  includes	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  Gilson,	  and	  Gulinello.	   	  624	   The	  studies	  presenting	  statistical	  evidence	  are	  still	  comparatively	  less	  than	  the	  former	  type	  of	  theoretical	  studies.	  The	  only	  one	  developing	  country	  that	  we	  know	  its	  VC	  market	  development	  and	  its	  effects	  on	  innovation	  is	  Israel.	   	  625	   Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson	  state	  that	  many	  countries	  other	  than	  the	  U.S.,	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  developing	  countries	  but	  also	  including	  many	  developed	  countries,	  do	  not	  have	  a	  mature	  VC	  market.	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  56.	   	  626	   Actually,	  Lu,	  Tan,	  Chen,	  Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  have	  realized	  the	  success	  of	  Israeli	  VC	  market.	  However,	  they	  did	  not	  analyze	  its	  success	  in	  detail,	  but	  only	  superficially	  introduce	  the	  process	  of	  its	  growth	  and	  mentioned	  some	  important	  factors	  of	  recourses	  acquired	  from	  foreign	  investors,	  without	  empirical	  evidence.	  See,	  Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China.”	  See	  also,	  Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  Cycle.	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manufacturing industries, but rather directly applying the rationale of VC and innovation from 
the experience of developed countries to China and other developing countries.627 If not, the 
correctness of the advice of the scholars who suggest that developing countries should follow the 
experience of the U.S. to structure their VC markets with an “extremely efficient contracting 
structure” could be doubted.628  
In the process of this study, I also deal with another remaining question of the previous 
literature: the definition of innovation that the literature presents is not clear. The defects of the 
empirical study by Gompers and Lerner provide direct evidence to support the existence of this 
issue.629 Based on their regressions that merely held the number of issued patents as an 
explained variable, Gompers and Lerner conclude that VC investments can spur innovation. 
Obviously, the number of issued patents solely cannot be equal to innovation.630 For example, 
some firms in the industry of information technology usually do not use patents to protect their 
results of innovation, but use copyrights or trade secrets.631  
If instead I use R&D expenditure to present the innovative activities, unfortunately, the 
definition of innovation is still vague. Gompers and Lerner remind us that if patents are only for 
attracting investors, VC investments may deter R&D amount at some level.632 Comparatively, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  627	   The	  literature,	  mentioned	  by	  literature	  review,	  discussing	  the	  VC	  market	  of	  China	  by	  the	  scholars,	  Lu,	  Tan,	  Chen,	  and	  Zhang,	  directly	  applies	  the	  theory	  that	  VC	  can	  spur	  innovation	  so	  as	  to	  suggest	  that	  Chinese	  government	  should	  apply	  the	  experience	  of	  the	  U.S.,	  its	  structure	  of	  the	  market	  and	  law,	  without	  testifying	  the	  practical	  situation	  in	  China.	  See	  Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China.”	  See	  also,	  Lin,	  “Legal	  Ecology	  of	  China’s	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Reflection	  in	  the	  American	  Mirror.”	  628	   In	  the	  literature	  review	  exploring	  how	  developing	  countries	  develop	  a	  VC/PE	  market,	  it	  shows	  that	  some	  scholars,	  such	  as	  Gilson,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  Kaplan,	  Martel	  and	  Stromberg,	  have	  realized	  that	  it	  should	  not	  be	  practical	  or	  appropriate	  to	  apply	  a	  strict	  contracting	  system	  of	  the	  VC	  markets	  in	  developing	  countries.	  See	  Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience.”	  See	  also,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries.”	  See	  also,	  Kaplan,	  Martel,	  and	  Strömberg,	  “How	  Do	  Legal	  Differences	  and	  Experience	  Affect	  Financial	  Contracts?”	  629	   Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  Cycle.	  630	   Literatur	  usually	  uses	  R&D	  expenditure,	  R&D/sales	  ratio,	  the	  number	  of	  patent	  applications,	  and	  forward-­‐looking	  citations	  to	  value	  the	  degree	  of	  innovation	  and	  the	  value	  of	  innovation	  of	  technology	  developers.	   	  631	   Li	  mentioned	  that	  the	  importance	  of	  patents	  varies	  among	  different	  industries.	  They	  could	  be	  significant	  for	  hardware	  industries,	  whereas	  they	  may	  be	  not	  that	  important	  for	  software	  industries.	  See	  Li,	  “Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation:	  A	  Case	  Study	  of	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries	  in	  China,”	  262.	  Denicolo	  and	  Franzoni	  explain	  that	  technology	  developers	  pursue	  protection	  of	  their	  innovation	  from	  trade	  secrecy	  or	  copyrights	  when	  their	  innovation	  cannot	  by	  protected	  by	  patents.	  See	  also,	  Denicolò	  and	  Franzoni,	  “Weak	  Intellectual	  Property	  Rights	  ,	  Research	  Spill-­‐Overs	  and	  the	  Incentive	  to	  Innovate,”	  129.	   	  632	   Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  Cycle,	  275.	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when other scholars theoretically conclude that VC investments are important to innovation, 
although Gompers and Lerner present that R&D activities demand capital from VC investors and 
VC investors prefer risky businesses that do R&D, they roughly make innovation be equal to 
R&D expenditures.633 Not only can their studies not clearly define the ambiguous relationship 
between R&D activities and VC investments, but their conclusions also conflict with the 
conclusions of their empirical study, which also adopt a rough definition of innovation.  
Hence, there are still no clear answers for the question how VC investments spur innovation 
in the previous studies. In my empirical study, I try to both independently and jointly explore the 
effects of VC investments on various activities or incentives of innovation, including R&D 
activities, R&D incentives, patent activities and copyright activities by SMEs. This result will fill 
the gap of the relationship between VC investments and R&D activities brought out in the 
previous literature. Only if we understand the exact relationship between a VC market and 
innovative activities by SMEs and how the incentives for innovation in SMEs relate to VC 
investments634, can we reasonably suggest how the Chinese government should improve its VC 
markets to realize its political goal to encourage technical innovation, especially by SMEs.635  
 
2. What Is a Suitable Lending Regime for R&D-Intensive SMEs with the Aid of an IP Regime? 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  633	   For	  example,	  the	  studies	  by	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  Gulinello,	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Zhang,	  and	  the	  Chinese	  scholars	  from	  CASTED	  have	  this	  issue.	  See	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries.”	  See	  also,	  Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience.”	  See	  also,	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs.”	  See	  also,	  Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  Can	  
Innovative	  Companies	  Better	  Cope	  with	  Loan	  Denials?	  See	  also,	  Lin,	  “Legal	  Ecology	  of	  China’s	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Reflection	  in	  the	  American	  Mirror.”	  634	   Gompers	  and	  Lerner	  imply	  that	  firms	  use	  patents	  to	  attract	  VC	  investment.	  However,	  can	  firms	  be	  encouraged	  to	  do	  more	  R&D	  because	  they	  have	  enough	  capital	  to	  support	  their	  R&D	  spending	  from	  VC	  investors,	  as	  the	  other	  theoretical	  scholars	  claim	  that	  VC	  investments	  are	  important	  to	  high-­‐tech	  industries?	  See	  Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  
Cycle,	  304.	   	  635	   In	  order	  to	  realize	  the	  continuous	  growth	  of	  economy,	  Premier	  Li	  Keqiang	  presented	  that	  China	  should	  realize	  the	  importance	  of	  technical	  innovation	  and	  should	  reform	  to	  provide	  suitable	  environment	  for	  supporting	  this	  political	  goal.
“Li	  Keqiang:	  Zai	  Guojia	  Kexue	  Jishu	  Jiangli	  Dahui	  Shang	  De	  Jianghua(李克强：在国家科学技术奖励大会上的讲话)[Li	  Keqiang:	  Speech	  at	  the	  Conference	  of	  Awarding	  State	  Science	  and	  Technology],”	   2015,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.gov.cn/guowuyuan/2015-­‐01/09/content_2802721.htm.	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In the time when the VC markets in many countries are immature,636 bank loans and 
venture lending are the important alternative capital resources for firms to obtain capital from 
financial markets.637 How are these capital resources efficiently used by SMEs to do innovation? 
How do IPRs play a role in a lending market? 
Unfortunately, although in the previous literature many scholars show the importance of 
lending to SMEs,638 at least two critical issues remain, because of which the problems still have 
no clear and definite answers. The first issue is the gap between bank loans and the R&D 
spending by SMEs, and the second issue is the conflicts between the lending regime, especially 
the financial structures of banks, which fit large firms, and the demand of loans by SMEs. 
After reviewing the literature, I recognize a gap in the relationship between bank loans and 
R&D activities by SMEs. On the one hand, bank loans are significant for firms in their R&D 
activities, which demand high level of cash flows.639 The firms therefore may prefer loans to 
other types of financing for several reasons. For example, they may believe that loans are 
relatively cheaper.640 Another reason could be that they may be not ready to accept641 or able to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  636	   I	  repetitively	  cite	  this	  claim	  by	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson	  because	  it	  is	  an	  important	  financial	  issue	  faced	  by	  many	  countries	  so	  that	  many	  scholars	  study	  to	  improve	  VC	  market	  in	  various	  countries,	  not	  just	  in	  developing	  countries.	  This	  financial	  issue	  could	  be	  relative	  to	  the	  other	  parts	  of	  the	  whole	  financial	  market,	  and	  bank	  loan	  is	  an	  important	  part	  in	  the	  financial	  market.	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  56.	   	   	   	  637	   Jacobson	  et	  al.	  claim	  that	  bank	  loans	  are	  the	  primary	  source	  of	  business	  finance,	  especially	  for	  SMEs.	  See,	  Jacobson,	  Lindé,	  and	  Roszbach,	  “Credit	  Risk	  versus	  Capital	  Requirements	  under	  Basel	  II:	  Are	  SME	  Loans	  and	  Retail	  Credit	  Really	  Different?”	  43.	   	  638	   In	  the	  literature	  review,	  the	  scholars	  who	  agree	  on	  the	  view	  point	  include	  Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Mason	  and	  Kwok,	  Jacobson	  et	  al.,	  Giannetti,	  Berger	  et	  al.,	  Haselmann	  and	  Pwachtel.	  See	  Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  
Can	  Innovative	  Companies	  Better	  Cope	  with	  Loan	  Denials?	  See	  also,	  Mason	  and	  Kwok,	  Investment	  Readiness	  Programmes	  
and	  Access	  to	  Finance:	  A	  Critical	  Review	  of	  Design	  Issues.	  See	  also,	  Jacobson,	  Lindé,	  and	  Roszbach,	  “Credit	  Risk	  versus	  Capital	  Requirements	  under	  Basel	  II:	  Are	  SME	  Loans	  and	  Retail	  Credit	  Really	  Different?”	  See	  also,	  Giannetti,	  “Do	  Better	  Institutions	  Mitigate	  Agency	  Problems?	  Evidence	  from	  Corporate	  Finance	  Choices.”	  See	  also,	  Berger	  et	  al.,	  “The	  Economics	  of	  Small	  Business	  Finance:	  The	  Roles	  of	  Private	  Equity	  and	  Debt	  Markets	  in	  the	  Financial	  Growth	  Cycle.”	  See	  also,	  Haselmann	  and	  Wachtel,	  “Institutions	  and	  Bank	  Behavior.”	  639	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  246.	  640	   Scholars	  generally	  believe	  that	  debt	  financing	  is	  cheaper	  than	  equity	  financing,	  whereas	  this	  does	  mean	  debt	  financing	  is	  cheap	  as	  Hall	  reminds.	  See	  Levin	  and	  Rocap,	  Structuring	  Venture	  Capital,	  Private	  Equity,	  and	  Entrepreneurial	  
Transactions.	  See	  also,	  Giannetti,	  “Do	  Better	  Institutions	  Mitigate	  Agency	  Problems?	  Evidence	  from	  Corporate	  Finance	  Choices.”	  See	  also,	  Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  Can	  Innovative	  Companies	  Better	  Cope	  with	  Loan	  
Denials?	  Hall,	  Investment	  and	  Research	  and	  Development	  at	  the	  Firm	  Level:	  Does	  the	  Source	  of	  Financing	  Matter,	  10.	   	   	   	  641	   In	  the	  literature	  review,	  I	  have	  mentioned	  that	  Mason	  and	  Kwok	  raise	  this	  point	  of	  view	  based	  on	  their	  survey	  with	  884	  SMEs	  in	  the	  UK.	  Mason	  and	  Kwok,	  Investment	  Readiness	  Programmes	  and	  Access	  to	  Finance:	  A	  Critical	  Review	  of	  Design	  
Issues.	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obtain equity financing.642 
On the other hand, R&D-intensive SMEs are less likely to obtain or use loans, especially 
long-term bank loans.643 For SMEs to acquire loans from banks for R&D activities, R&D 
expenditures are accounted as expenses rather than costs, so they do not increase the value of 
tangible assets that can be used as collateral for bank loans.644 Banks necessarily ask for 
collateral to control their risks.645 As the result of the gap between loans and R&D expenditures, 
the R&D-intensive SMEs desire loans, but instead they become a group of debtors who are less 
likely to obtain loans.  
Recall the suggestions that scholars provide to governments about how they should 
construct a better financial structure for raising the possibility that banks or venture lenders lend 
long-term loans to SMEs. 646 They usually suggest that governments should construct a better 
legal environment, with better creditor protections.647 However, the obstinate difficulty that 
impedes R&D-intensive SMEs to obtain loans is that these SMEs are less likely able to provide 
collateral.648 Thus, trying to unilaterally eliminate the bias of lending R&D-intensive SMEs by 
improving the legal system of finance would not be the most effective solution for this issue.649  
The solutions by the previous scholars could also be less valuable because they are similar 
to the structure of the benzene molecule, dragging us back to the origin of my question.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  642	   In	  the	  literature	  review,	  some	  scholars,	  such	  as	  Himmelberg	  and	  Petersen,	  remind	  that	  IPO	  to	  acquire	  public	  equity	  investment	  has	  a	  high	  threshold	  so	  as	  to	  be	  hard	  to	  meet	  by	  many	  firms.	  Himmelberg	  and	  Petersen,	  “R&D	  and	  Internai	  Finance:	  A	  Panel	  Study	  of	  Small	  Firms	  in	  High-­‐Tech	  Industries.”	  643	   For	  example,	  the	  statistic	  by	  Himmelberg	  and	  Petersen	  shows	  manufacturing	  firms	  in	  the	  U.S.	  use	  loans	  as	  10	  percent	  of	  their	  average	  internal	  finance.	  Also,	  Mueller	  and	  Reize	  present	  that	  high	  leverage	  firms	  include	  few	  R&D-­‐intensive	  firms.	  
See	  Ibid.	  See	  also,	  Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  Can	  Innovative	  Companies	  Better	  Cope	  with	  Loan	  
Denials?	   	  644	   Ibid.	  4.	   	  645	   Ibid.5.	   	  646	   In	  the	  literature	  review,	  the	  suggestions	  from	  most	  of	  the	  scholars	  are	  no	  surprisingly	  are	  about	  this.	  See	  Giannetti,	  “Do	  Better	  Institutions	  Mitigate	  Agency	  Problems?	  Evidence	  from	  Corporate	  Finance	  Choices.”	  See	  also,	  Haselmann	  and	  Wachtel,	  “Institutions	  and	  Bank	  Behavior.”	  See	  also,	  Bottazzi,	  Da	  Rin,	  and	  Hellmann,	  “What	  Is	  the	  Role	  of	  Legal	  Systems	  in	  Financial	  Intermediation?	  Theory	  and	  Evidence.”	  647	   I	  have	  mentioned	  these	  scholars,	  including	  Giannetti,	  Bottazzi	  et	  al.,	  Haselmann	  and	  Wachtel.	   	  648	   Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  Can	  Innovative	  Companies	  Better	  Cope	  with	  Loan	  Denials?	  4.	  649	   For	  example,	  the	  empirical	  study	  by	  Kunt	  and	  Maksimovic	  cannot	  prove	  a	  correlation	  between	  the	  degree	  of	  creditor	  protection	  in	  financial	  laws	  and	  the	  use	  of	  long-­‐term	  debt.	  Demirguc-­‐Kunt	  and	  Maksimovic,	  Institutions,	  Financial	  Markets,	  
and	  Firms’	  Choice	  of	  Debt	  Maturity.	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Besides that, a valuable study conducted by Giannetti implies that intangible assets invested 
in by SMEs are helpful to attracting loans, which provides hope to R&D-intensive SMEs.650 
Actually, beyond a signaling effect to attract lenders, the literature shows, with the evidence of 
statistics and interviews, that venture lenders in the U.S. value IPRs as a substitute for tangible 
collateral.651  
In the case of the U.S., Hochberg et al. show with empirical evidence that a lending regime 
allowing intangible collateral can eliminate the impediments in the lending market and foster 
patent commercialization, which could be a happy ending for the first issue, the gap between 
bank loans and innovation by SMEs.652 Moreover, Mann also finds empirical evidence to 
support a positive effect of stronger creditor rights on innovation by firms that use intangible 
assets as loan collateral for creditors, and to support the effectiveness of state laws strengthening 
creditor protection in encouraging lenders using patent collateral.653 However, the second issue 
that the the lending regime is not designed for SMEs as conveniently as for large firms still 
remains because SMEs hold fewer patents than large firms.  
Alternatively, other scholars suggest that government can provide guarantees for SMEs so 
they could more easily obtain long-term loans from banks.654 This process of subsidizing loans 
for SMEs should be effective in increasing the level of long-term loans for them because it 
removes the risks on the burden of creditors when SMEs are incapable of providing enough 
collateral.655 Simultaneously, however, the risks are shifted to governments and social welfare. 
Hence, this unfortunately could not become an optimal solution as so many scholars criticize 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  650	   Giannetti,	  “Do	  Better	  Institutions	  Mitigate	  Agency	  Problems?	  Evidence	  from	  Corporate	  Finance	  Choices.”	  186.	   	  651	   Ibrahim,	  “Debt	  as	  Venture	  Capital.”	  See	  also,	  Mann,	  Creditor	  Rights	  and	  Innovation:	  Evidence	  from	  Patent	  Collateral.	  See	  also,	  Hochberg,	  Serrano,	  and	  Ziedonis,	  Patent	  Collateral,	  Investor	  Commitment,	  and	  the	  Market	  for	  Venture	  Lending.	  652	   Ibid.	  653	   Mann,	  Creditor	  Rights	  and	  Innovation:	  Evidence	  from	  Patent	  Collateral.	  654	   The	  U.S.	  SBIC	  program	  and	  Japanese	  Venture	  Enterprise	  Center	  provide	  government	  guarantees	  for	  SMEs	  to	  support	  their	  applications	  for	  long-­‐term	  loans.	  See	  Brewer	  III	  et	  al.,	  “Performance	  and	  Access	  to	  Government	  Guarantees :	  The	  Case	  of	  Small	  Business	  Investment	  Companies.”	  See	  also,	  Sibbitt,	  “Law,	  Venture	  Capital,	  and	  Entrepreneurism	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	  Generation	  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses.”	  655	   Demirguc-­‐Kunt	  and	  Maksimovic,	  Institutions,	  Financial	  Markets,	  and	  Firms’	  Choice	  of	  Debt	  Maturity.	  
	   188	  
how inefficient it is.656  
In my research, I concern the interaction of IP and finance in the previous literature, which 
is unfortunately only in a small amount. For a further research, I explore innovative solutions for 
effectively financing R&D-intensive SMEs through an IP regime, not limited to the financial 
regulations and policies. Instead of relying on the empirical evidence by Giannetti’s study about 
European firms or by the study of Mann and Hochberg et al. about U.S. firms, I use the data 
from the Chinese market to fill the gap in China and other developing countries where the 
financial markets and relative laws are immature.657  
Although a gap between loans and SMEs exists,658either in a mature or an immature 
financial market, my second issue is more serious in developing countries.659 Hence, after 
understanding the specific gap between bank loans and the R&D expenditure by SMEs, it is 
essential to broaden the view to the whole picture of the financial market: lending regimes are 
usually designed for large firms, and governments, investors and lenders usually neglect SMEs, 
which have difficulties obtaining capital under these financial structures.660  
In sum, for my second issue about the lending regime with SMEs, any solutions directly 
targeting it may be not effective or not efficient. In contrast, in my research, when studying how 
the financial structure of banks in China disfavors SMEs, I also study how the financial 
structures of private and public equity markets help SMEs obtain capital to do innovation.  
If VC/PE investments, venture lending or IPO can be proven to be more suitable for SMEs, 
especially R&D-intensive SMEs, than debt financing from banks, it should be not necessary to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  656	   For	  example,	  Brewer	  et	  al.	  criticize	  the	  bad	  performance	  of	  the	  small	  firms	  with	  long-­‐tern	  debts	  by	  government	  guarantees.	  Also,	  because	  of	  the	  inefficiency	  of	  loan	  guarantees,	  Milhaupt	  suggests	  that	  governments	  should	  facilitate	  the	  development	  of	  VC	  market.	  See	  Brewer	  III	  et	  al.,	  “Performance	  and	  Access	  to	  Government	  Guarantees :	  The	  Case	  of	  Small	  Business	  Investment	  Companies.”	  See	  also,	  Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy.”	  657	   Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China,”	  250.	   	  658	   Milhaupt	  recognized	  this	  financial	  structure	  issue	  when	  he	  studied	  with	  the	  U.S.	  firms	  in	  the	  U.S.	  financial	  market.	  Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy.”	  659	   As	  the	  literature	  review	  presents,	  banks	  in	  developing	  countries	  are	  less	  likely	  provide	  SMEs	  long-­‐term	  debt	  under	  the	  studies	  by	  several	  scholars.	  See	  Beck,	  D.	  Kunt,	  and	  Peria,	  Bank	  Financing	  for	  SMEs	  around	  the	  World:	  Drivers,	  Obstacles,	  
Business	  Models,	  and	  Lending	  Practices.	  See	  also,	  Demirguc-­‐Kunt	  and	  Maksimovic,	  Institutions,	  Financial	  Markets,	  and	  Firms’	  
Choice	  of	  Debt	  Maturity.	  660	   Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy,”	  184.	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construct the financial structure of banks for their accessibility of long-term loans or to 
encourage the inefficient government guarantees. If this cannot be proven, besides all the 
above-mentioned exterior and interior factors of the firms relating to the financial system 
itself,661 I also try to explore other potentials of the SMEs under the IP regime so that they could 
solve the puzzle of financing by themselves through innovation that also demands financing to 
be continuous.662  
 
3. How to Structure an Appropriate VC Market in China? 
 
Following on Problem 1 and Problem 2, if VC/PE investments are more suitable for SMEs 
to obtain capital than debts, how should a country structure its VC market to improve the market 
for spurring innovation? This becomes an important problem to many developing countries and 
investors from developed countries.  
The development of the VC/PE market in the U.S. and some other developed countries is 
excessive, almost saturating the markets, so the incentives of investors663 become limited and 
the development of the markets becomes imbalanced.664 Investors thus turn their attention to the 
capital markets in developing countries in search of new opportunities and higher returns.665  
Responding to these expectations of investors, the VC/PE markets in developing countries 
are inevitably risky.666 Meanwhile, many developing countries still puzzle over how they can 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  661	   Financial	  laws	  and	  government	  guarantees	  are	  considered	  as	  exterior	  factors	  of	  firms.	  The	  assets	  as	  collaterals	  of	  firms	  are	  interior	  factors	  of	  the	  firms.	   	  662	   When	  explaining	  the	  reason	  why	  VC	  investments	  are	  important,	  Mueller	  and	  Reize	  mention	  that	  continues	  R&D	  activity	  in	  SMEs	  require	  a	  huge	  amount	  of	  capital.	  Mueller	  and	  Reize,	  Loan	  Availability	  and	  Investment:	  Can	  Innovative	  
Companies	  Better	  Cope	  with	  Loan	  Denials?	  21.	   	  663	   The	  investors	  here	  are	  not	  discriminated	  by	  VC/PE/institutional	  investors.	   	  664	   The	  bomb	  growth	  of	  the	  PE	  market	  in	  the	  U.S.	  in	  the	  past	  30	  years	  started	  to	  create	  bubbles.	  Also,	  as	  the	  PE	  market	  is	  growing	  so	  as	  to	  increase	  the	  income	  of	  fund	  managers,	  investors	  worry	  that	  the	  incentives	  of	  fund	  managers	  may	  be	  less	  effectively.	  Lerner,	  Hardymon,	  and	  Leamon,	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Book,	  242.	   	   	  665	   Surveys	  of	  limited	  partnerships	  of	  PE	  funds	  show	  that	  many	  largest	  institutional	  investors,	  such	  as	  Goldman	  Sachs	  and	  Frank	  Russell	  Capital,	  are	  increasing	  their	  international	  investment.	  In	  2010,	  the	  average	  level	  of	  making	  investments	  in	  Asian	  emerging	  markets	  reached	  22%	  of	  their	  investments.	  The	  investors	  pursue	  risk	  investments	  in	  developing	  countries.	  Ibid.	  242-­‐3.	   	  666	   Recall	  that	  Lu	  et	  al.,	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson	  tell	  that	  mostly	  the	  VC/PE	  markets	  in	  developing	  countries	  are	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structure an appropriate VC/PE market by financial policies or laws, not only to attract foreign 
investors, but also to ultimately foster the growth of their domestic VC/PE funds and domestic 
firms.667 However, in order to answer this question, there are an aggregate of other questions 
that should be understood.   
The first basic question for a country is to understand whether its financial market is a 
bank-oriented market, an equity market-oriented market, or in between. This is a process of 
self-awareness, to understand what style of financial policies the country currently adopts on the 
financial market.668 This is important because bank-oriented financial systems may impede the 
development of VC/PE markets through their regulations or policies, recalling the failed 
experiences of Japan, Korea and Germany.669  
Although the differences in financial policies and financial regulations in different styles of 
markets should be extremely clear so as to help to recognize the type of financial system 
easily,670 with the development of financial markets and globalization of financial activities, the 
original clear balance could be disturbed. For example, China establishing its financial market 
through state-owned banks is encouraging the development of a “multi-layer capital market 
system.”671 To fill the gap between capital and SMEs, the Chinese government directly invests 
in SMEs, indirectly invests in SMEs through private VC funds, or provides indirect funds to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  immature.	  Also,	  the	  importance	  of	  structuring	  an	  appropriate	  VC/PE	  market	  has	  been	  presented	  by	  many	  scholars’	  literature	  that	  this	  research	  has	  reviewed.	  See	  Bottazzi,	  Da	  Rin,	  and	  Hellmann,	  “What	  Is	  the	  Role	  of	  Legal	  Systems	  in	  Financial	  Intermediation?	  Theory	  and	  Evidence.”	  See	  also,	  Lerner	  and	  Schoar,	  “Does	  Legal	  Enforcement	  Affect	  Financial	  Transactions?	  The	  Contractual	  Channel	  in	  Private	  Equity.”	  See	  also,	  Kaplan,	  Martel,	  and	  Strömberg,	  “How	  Do	  Legal	  Differences	  and	  Experience	  Affect	  Financial	  Contracts?”	  See	  also,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries.”	  See	  also,	  Lerner,	  Hardymon,	  and	  Leamon,	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  
Book.	  See	  also,	  Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China.”	   	  667	   From	  the	  experience	  of	  Israel	  and	  China,	  Lu	  et	  al.	  show	  that	  the	  access	  of	  FDI	  facilitates	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  local	  VC	  markets.	  Ibid.	  668	   Recall	  the	  section	  of	  regulations	  or	  policies	  on	  financial	  markets	  in	  the	  literature	  review.	  Milhaupt	  claims	  that	  financial	  systems	  are	  designed	  as	  bank-­‐oriented	  or	  stock-­‐oriented.	  Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy.”	  669	   In	  the	  literature	  review,	  White,	  Milhaupt,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells	  use	  the	  experience	  of	  Japan,	  Korea	  and	  German	  show	  how	  these	  countries	  with	  bank-­‐oriented	  market	  obstruct	  the	  development	  of	  VC	  market.	  See	  White,	  “Market	  Failures	  and	  Government	  Failures:	  Some	  Cautionary	  Implications	  for	  Financial	  Reform.”	  See	  also,	  Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy.”	  See	  also,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries.”	  670	   “The	  choice	  of	  financing	  vehicle	  differs	  between	  developed	  and	  developing	  countries.”	  See	  Lerner,	  Hardymon,	  and	  Leamon,	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Book,	  249.	   	  671	   Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China,”	  254.	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SMEs through loans and guarantee programs.672 Meanwhile, without any prohibitions, venture 
lending with collateral of patents and copyrights in China is liberal and increasingly important in 
the finance market.673 Hence, it is too complicated to simply define a financial system like this 
as bank-oriented or equity market-oriented.  
After recognizing and clarifying the style of the financial policies and financial regulations 
in a particular financial system, the second question that the developing countries under 
circumstances like China should consider is how these countries should deal with the conflicts in 
the financial policies and financial regulations designed for the two different purposes. Since 
developing countries lack the information infrastructures to support an equity market-oriented 
financial system,674 in order to develop a VC market, they need to understand: how valuable is 
the experience of developed countries to them? 
The literature discussed in the literature review indicates that it might not be appropriate to 
directly apply the successful model of the U.S., and suggests that the governments of developing 
countries should facilitate engineering their VC markets.675 However, although the literature 
discusses the efficiencies of governments intervening in the VC markets as fund investors, or 
bridging VC funds and firms through tax credits, subsidies, grants or financial policies,676 the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  672	   Ibid.	  245-­‐246.	  673	   In	  China,	  patent	  and	  copyright	  pledge	  increase	  times	  since	  2008	  when	  SIPO	  started	  promoting	  them.	  In	  2010,	  the	  362	  copies	  of	  registered	  patent	  pledges	  valued	  ￥70.66	  hundred	  million	  RMB.	  Zhongguo	  Guojia	  Zhishi	  Chanquan	  Ju(中国国家
知识产权局)[State	  Intellectual	  Property	  Office	  of	  the	  P.R.C.],	  Zhuanli	  Tongji	  Jianbao(专利统计简报)[Patent	  Statistic	  
Report]-­‐No.	  108,	  2011.	  674	   Milhaupt	  believes	  that	  most	  developing	  countries	  have	  this	  issue.	  Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy,”	  185.	   	  675	   “It	  is	  often	  unclear	  where	  to	  begin	  the	  process	  of	  duplicating	  the	  success	  of	  the	  U.S.”	  Hence,	  Lerner	  et	  al.	  suggests	  that	  well-­‐targeted	  government	  efforts	  can	  play	  an	  important	  and	  positive	  role.”	  See	  Lerner,	  Hardymon,	  and	  Leamon,	  Venture	  
Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Book.	  103.	  Moreover,	  recall	  the	  simultaneity	  problem.	  Gilson	  suggests	  that	  developing	  countries	  can	  consider	  involving	  government	  assistances	  to	  start	  to	  structure	  their	  VC	  market,	  which	  is	  differently	  from	  the	  VC	  market	  in	  the	  U.S.	  with	  little	  government	  involvement	  but	  a	  pure	  contracting	  system.	  See	  Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience.”	  676	   Recall	  the	  literature	  review.	  Cumming,	  Johan,	  Gomper	  and	  Lerner	  believe	  that	  governments	  acting	  as	  VC	  fund	  investors	  are	  less	  efficient	  than	  professorial	  VC	  managers,	  and	  Milhaupt	  believes	  that	  the	  subsidies	  provided	  by	  governments	  on	  the	  VC	  markets	  are	  inefficient.	  Comparatively,	  Gulinello,	  Sibbitt,	  White,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  Lu	  et	  al.,	  Lerner	  et	  al.,	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson	  support	  governments	  to	  fund	  or	  subsidize	  so	  as	  to	  structure	  the	  VC	  markets.	  See	  Cumming	  and	  Johan,	  “Phasing	  Out	  an	  Inefficient	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Credit.”	  See	  also,	  Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  
Cycle.	  See	  also,	  Milhaupt,	  “The	  Small	  Firm	  Financing	  Problem:	  Private	  Information	  and	  Pulic	  Policy.”	  See	  also,	  Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience.”	  See	  also,	  Sibbitt,	  “Law,	  Venture	  Capital,	  and	  Entrepreneurism	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	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scholars usually merely cite the successful experiences from the U.S. and other developed 
countries, but do not suggest how the governments of developing countries could deal with the 
conflicts between their situation and the experience of developed countries. This ignored 
question could be the real gap between theoretical suggestions regarding financial policies and 
the performance in practice by each financial system.677   
Recall the discussion of financial policies and financial regulations in the literature review. 
Some governments with an equity-oriented market, such as the U.S., Canada, Ireland, Italy and 
Finland, design policies that prohibit investing pension funds or banks’ investments in the VC 
market,678 and some governments of bank-oriented market countries, such as Germany, France 
and Japan, encourage the development of both private and public equity markets through the 
capital from banks.679 These conflicts between the two types of financial systems could form 
significant obstacles to impact the efficiency of a VC market.680   
For example, in the case of China, a developing country with an emerging VC market,681 
its laws allow insurance companies to be VC/PE investors,682 but still sets rigid bars to restrict 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	  Generation	  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses.”	  See	  also,	  White,	  “Market	  Failures	  and	  Government	  Failures:	  Some	  Cautionary	  Implications	  for	  Financial	  Reform.”	  See	  also,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries.”	  See	  also,	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs.”	  See	  also,	  Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China.”	  See	  also,	  Lerner,	  Hardymon,	  and	  Leamon,	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Book.	  677	   On	  the	  side	  of	  criticism,	  these	  studies	  use	  empirical	  evidence	  to	  criticize	  the	  efficiencies	  of	  these	  government	  intervening	  behaviors	  or	  criticize	  them	  through	  the	  failure	  experiences,	  such	  as	  Germany	  or	  Japanese	  experiences.	  Comparatively,	  on	  the	  side	  of	  supporting,	  the	  scholars	  usually	  take	  the	  successful	  experiences	  from	  other	  countries,	  especially	  the	  U.S.,	  without	  any	  empirical	  evidence.	   	  678	   Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  278-­‐280.	  679	   Recall	  the	  study	  by	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  Lu	  et	  al.,	  and	  Jacobson	  et	  al.	  See,	  Ibid.	  See	  also,	  Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China.”	  See	  also,	  Jacobson,	  Lindé,	  and	  Roszbach,	  “Credit	  Risk	  versus	  Capital	  Requirements	  under	  Basel	  II:	  Are	  SME	  Loans	  and	  Retail	  Credit	  Really	  Different?”	  680	   I	  consider	  the	  efficiency	  on	  growth	  of	  economy	  through	  spurring	  innovation	  and	  financing	  SMEs,	  which	  the	  introduction	  and	  the	  literature	  review	  has	  been	  discussed.	  See,	  Metrick	  and	  Yasuda,	  Venture	  Capital	  &	  the	  Finance	  of	  
Innovation.	  See	  also,	  Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience.”	  See	  also,	  Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience.”	  681	   The	  VC	  market	  in	  China	  has	  entered	  an	  new	  strategic	  stage	  after	  China’s	  12th	  Five-­‐Year	  Plan	  (2011-­‐2015).	  Shouren	  Wang	  (王守仁),	  “Zhongguo	  Chuangtou	  Yixian	  Xin	  Geju(中国创投业已现新格局)[The	  VC	  Market	  in	  China	  Have	  Shown	  Up	  a	  New	  Pattern],”	   2011,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	   	  http://www.chinavalue.net/Investment/Article/2011-­‐5-­‐19/195172.html.	  682	   P.R.C.	  Insurance	  Law	  [中华人民共和国保险法](effective	  Feb.	  28th	  2009),	  Article	  106.	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VC/PE investments by banks,683 not just limited to the VC/PE investments from its state owned 
banks.684 Moreover, after learning from the experience of the U.S., China revised its Corporate 
Law and allowed investors to use convertible preferred stocks in their investments in portfolio 
companies,685 but still limits the stock options to be only the privilege of public companies.686 
However, in practice, Chinese domestic VC funds do not often use convertible preferred stocks 
in their investments.687  
In this circumstance, instead of solely introducing the experience of other countries, I 
follow the methodology of the earlier literature and test the effectiveness of the various types of 
government funding or subsidies in the financial market of China with empirical evidence. Then, 
I review the financial policies and financial regulations in this particular financial market to 
understand its current structure. Based on the empirical results and the understanding of the 
current financial system in China, it is time to select and then apply the experience of other 
countries. Also, the empirical evidence and the understanding of the current financial system can 
help to explain the reasons why there could be a gap between some financial policies and their 
enforcement, and ultimately help the Chinese government to understand how the government can 
structure an appropriate VC market.  
As the speed of VC market development in many countries is fast，688 this model of 
analysis will help both the countries with a successful VC market and those with a relatively 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  683	   Law	  of	  the	  P.R.C.	  on	  Commercial	  Banks	  [中华人民共和国商业银行法](effective	  Dec.	  27th	  2003),	  Article	  43.	   	  684	   Law	  of	  the	  P.R.C.	  on	  the	  People’s	  Bank	  of	  China	  [中华人民共和国中国人民银行法](effective	  Dec.	  27th	  2003)	  Chapter	  2.	   	  685	   Corporate	  Law[公司法](effective	  Jan.	  1th	  2006)	  Article	  35,	  167.	   	   	  686	   In	  China,	  there	  are	  no	  enacting	  laws	  to	  authorize	  option	  rights	  in	  private	  firms.	  Guantao	  Dalian	  Bangong	  Shi(观韬大连
办公室)[Guantao	  Legal	  Office	  in	  Dalian],	  Yandi	  Liu(刘燕迪),	  and	  Xiaodong	  Bi	  (毕晓东),	  “Guanyu	  Fei	  Shangshi	  Gongsi	  Guquan	  Jili	  Xiangguan	  Falv	  Wenti(关于非上市公司股权激励相关法律问题)[Legal	  Issues	  about	  Option	  Rights	  Incentives	  in	  Private	  Companies],”	   2014,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.guantao.com/html/yewuguanli/2014nianlvshiyewubeiwanglu/2014/1208/25936.html.	  See	  also,	  Lin,	  “Legal	  Ecology	  of	  China’s	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Reflection	  in	  the	  American	  Mirror.”	  101.	   	  687	   Ibid.	  688	   From	  the	  statistic	  by	  Preqin,	  we	  know	  that	  the	  amount	  of	  global	  PE	  and	  VC	  asset	  investments	  were	  reached	  a	  new	  high	  as	  of	  June	  2014	  in	  $	  3.8	  trillion.	  The	  capital	  in	  the	  pool	  of	  994	  PE/VC	  funds	  reached	  $496	  trillion.	  2014	  also	  saw	  a	  $128	  billion	  increase	  in	  dry	  powder	  since	  Dec.	  2013.	  Also,	  the	  researchers	  of	  Preqin	  are	  positive	  to	  predict	  the	  VC/PE	  market	  in	  2015.	  Preqin,	  2015	  Preqin	  Global	  Private	  Equity	  &	  Venture	  Capital	  Report,	  2015,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  private-­‐equity-­‐venture-­‐capital-­‐report/1/10599.	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immature VC market. The former type of countries can understand their current efficiency 
through this model, and the latter type can understand the efficiency of their financial policies 
better and find appropriate financial policies to effectively facilitate their VC market.     
 
4. Difficulties in Learning from American VC Experience for Civil Law Countries 
 
After Problem 3, we understand how China and other civil law countries structure their VC 
markets through selectively learning from the successful experience of some developed common 
law countries, such as the U.S. However, in this process of applying the American experience 
with its VC market, these countries face many difficulties. For example, the domestic Chinese 
VC funds do not use convertible preferred stocks, which are allowed by the Corporate Law of 
China. Hence, it is necessary for civil law countries to consider how they can approach theses 
difficulties as an extension of Problem 3.  
In the literature, the scholars have criticized the inefficiency of the financial markets in civil 
law countries,689 but it is not sufficient to help the countries by merely making them realize the 
weaknesses of their legal culture and emphasizing the success of the American VC market.690 
Moreover, there is an obvious conflict between the criticisms of the poor legal enforcement in 
the civil law countries and the suggestions that these countries should learn from the American’s 
contracting system. This means that, if their worries are true based on their statistics,691 their 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  689	   Lerner	  and	  Schoar,	  Bottazzi	  et	  al.,	  and	  Kaplan	  et	  al.	  have	  proved	  the	  inefficiency	  issue	  by	  theories	  and	  empirical	  evidence.	  See	  Lerner	  and	  Schoar,	  “Does	  Legal	  Enforcement	  Affect	  Financial	  Transactions?	  The	  Contractual	  Channel	  in	  Private	  Equity.”	  See	  also,	  Bottazzi,	  Da	  Rin,	  and	  Hellmann,	  “What	  Is	  the	  Role	  of	  Legal	  Systems	  in	  Financial	  Intermediation?	  Theory	  and	  Evidence.”	  See	  also,	  Kaplan,	  Martel,	  and	  Strömberg,	  “How	  Do	  Legal	  Differences	  and	  Experience	  Affect	  Financial	  Contracts?”	  690	   Recall	  the	  research	  done	  by	  Kaplan	  and	  Stromberg,	  Kaplan	  et	  al.,	  Lerner	  and	  Schoar,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  Bottazzi	  et	  al.,	  and	  Gilson.	  See	  Kaplan	  and	  Stromberg,	  “Financial	  Meets	  Theory	  Contracting	  An	  Empirical	  the	  Real	  World :	  Of	  Venture	  Analysis	  Capital	  Contracts.”	  See	  also,	  Kaplan,	  Martel,	  and	  Strömberg,	  “How	  Do	  Legal	  Differences	  and	  Experience	  Affect	  Financial	  Contracts?”	  See	  also,	  Lerner	  and	  Schoar,	  “Does	  Legal	  Enforcement	  Affect	  Financial	  Transactions?	  The	  Contractual	  Channel	  in	  Private	  Equity.”	  See	  also,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries.”	  See	  also,	  Bottazzi,	  Da	  Rin,	  and	  Hellmann,	  “What	  Is	  the	  Role	  of	  Legal	  Systems	  in	  Financial	  Intermediation?	  Theory	  and	  Evidence.”	  See	  also,	  Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience.”	  691	   Lerner	  and	  Schoar	  find	  that	  the	  return	  of	  PE	  funds	  in	  common	  law	  developing	  countries	  was	  on	  average	  19%	  higher	  than	  that	  in	  civil	  law	  developing	  countries	  in	  2004.	  Lerner	  and	  Schoar,	  “Does	  Legal	  Enforcement	  Affect	  Financial	  Transactions?	  The	  Contractual	  Channel	  in	  Private	  Equity,”	  224.	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suggestions are less valuable for these civil law countries to structure an efficient VC market.  
After following the process of answering the series of questions in Problem 3, the civil law 
countries should have knowledge of the efficiency of their current financial system, the 
effectiveness of the current financial policies and financial regulations, and the demands of the 
VC market from the governments and their legal systems. Even though my research is not going 
to provide a better solution for the civil law countries, especially the civil law developing 
countries, than the previous scholars, I construct an analyzing process to help these countries to 
clarify their financial situations. 
This process does not mean declining to learn from the successful experience of the U.S. 
and other common law developed countries. Instead, in addition to suggesting that civil law 
developing countries should enhance their contract enforcement for tens years,692 they can turn 
to other approaches to stimulate the incentives of VC investments and to fix the issue of poor 
enforcement. For example, recall what the IP literature suggests on IP strategies.693 The scholars 
appreciate that a significant function of IPRs is their signaling effects on attracting VC investors 
and lenders, especially venture lenders. This drags us back to Problem 2 and the problems 
discussed in Chapter 3, and my research actively explores solutions in these ways.  
Alternatively, besides the access of the VC market, civil law countries can strengthen their 
IPO markets because IPO is a crucial exit mechanism for VC investments.694 Meanwhile, in the 
literature, there is empirical evidence on how IPOs and a well-structured security market are 
critical to the incentives of VC investment by VC investors.695 Hence, this study also evaluates 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  692	   For	  example,	  the	  study	  done	  by	  Lerner	  and	  Schoar	  was	  in	  2005.	  Ibid.	  The	  study	  done	  by	  Cumming	  and	  Johan	  in	  2010	  also	  reminds	  the	  risks	  of	  legal	  environment	  for	  PE	  investors.	  Cumming	  and	  Johan,	  “Phasing	  Out	  an	  Inefficient	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Credit.”	  693	   Ziedonis,	  “Chapter	  10.	  Intellectual	  Property	  and	  Innovation.”	  See	  also,	  Graham	  and	  Sichelman,	  “Why	  Do	  Start-­‐Ups	  Patent.”	  See	  also,	  Hsu	  and	  Ziedonis,	  “Resources	  as	  Dual	  Sources	  of	  Advantage:	  Implications	  for	  Valuing	  Entrepreneurial-­‐Firm	  Patents.”	  See	  also,	  Hsu	  and	  Ziedonis,	  “Patents	  as	  Quality	  Signals	  for	  Entrepreneurial	  Ventures.”	  See	  also,	  Long,	  “Patent	  Signals.”	   	  694	   Rousseau,	  “The	  Future	  of	  Capital	  Formation	  for	  Small	  and	  Medium-­‐Sized	  Enterprises:	  Rethinking	  Initial	  Public	  Offering	  Regulation	  after	  the	  Restructuring	  of	  Canadian.”	  See	  also,	  Black	  and	  Gilson,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Structure	  of	  Capital	  Markets:	  Banks	  versus	  Stock	  Markets.”	  695	   Gompers	  and	  Lerner,	  The	  Venture	  Capital	  Cycle.	  See	  also,	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	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the efficiency of IPOs in encouraging VC investment in China, which is a civil law developing 
country and has unsolved difficulties in its VC market alone.  
Hence, when I choose to look into a VC market in a civil law developing country, China, 
my analysis does not limit us to the VC market, but also focuses us on other relevant factors in 
both its financial market, including in debt, private equity and public equity, and its IP regime. In 
order to overcome the previous criticisms on the inefficiency of its legal system in fostering the 
development of the VC market, it is necessary to comprehensively learn about various financial 
instruments in China.  
 
III. Research Questions and Hypotheses 
 
    Based on the above discussion of the issues that remain in the prior literature, this study 
structures these issues into the concerns with respect to financing, patenting and their interactions. 
What is the efficiency of external financing, including equity investment and debt, in stimulating 
innovation by SMEs when China is structuring a multi-layer capital market system? Among 
local private venture capitalists, state-owned enterprises (SOEs) investors, foreign investors, 
initial public offerings (IPOs), which are the effective resources to induce SMEs to conduct 
R&D and improve their R&D commercialization? What is the patenting propensity of SMEs, 
which are indebted with mortgage or credits, or invested by the above investors, on utility 
patents and utility models?  
Are SMEs’ access and needs on debt, both in long-term and in short-term, associated with 
grants and tax credits from governments and the other forms of external financing acquired by 
SMEs, such as private investment and public investment? Taking account the effects of those 
external financing resources, while banks do not usually accept patents as collateral from SMEs, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries.”	  See	  also,	  Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience.”	  See	  also,	  Sibbitt,	  “Law,	  Venture	  Capital,	  and	  Entrepreneurism	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	  Generation	  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses.”	  See	  also,	  Lin,	  “Legal	  Ecology	  of	  China’s	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Reflection	  in	  the	  American	  Mirror.”	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are they prefer to lend the SMEs acquiring more patents, under the government policy that 
encourages banks to accept patents as collateral?  
One hypothesis is that both private and public investors can induce SMEs to conduct R&D, 
and VCs, FDI and IPOs can improve their R&D commercialization. The second hypothesis is 
that the indebted SMEs are less likely to file more utility patent and utility model applications for 
saving costs, but the SMEs invested by VCs, foreign investors and public investors are more 
likely to file the two types of patent applications.  
The third hypothesis is that loans, grants and subsidies from governments, and other 
external financing measures, including private investment from VCs, SOEs and FDI and public 
investment, are substitute of SMEs’ demand for capital. The last hypothesis is that lenders prefer 
to lend the SMEs acquiring more utility patents or utility models.  
 
IV. Data and Methodology 
 
As the previous two chapters, this part introduces the financial data that are adopted in the 
research and the methodology to employ the data. Since this chapter also explores the research 
questions with respect to innovation, IP and government subsidies, to remind, those data have 
been introduced either in Chapter 2 or Chapter 3. Besides the data with respect to IPRs and 
innovation both at country-level and at firm-level, to overcome the deficiencies of the probably 
indirect relationship discussed in the literature review in addition to Chapter 4, section 1 
introduces the collected data of professional financial institutions. Section 2 introduces the 
methodology employing the data.  
 
1. Data and Data Sources 
 
    Chapter 2 introduces the background of the observations from Zhongguan-Cun Science 
Park and Zhangjiang Hi-Tech Park. The data in this chapter are from the same group of 
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observations in the previous two chapters. For the research questions in this chapter, the data are 
selected at both the country-level and the firm-level. The range of the data is from 2009-2013. 
Section 1.1 introduces the country-level data in finance and their sources, and Section 1.2 
introduces the firm-level data in finance and their sources. 
 
1.1. Country-Level Data in Finance 
 
Learn from the literature review, the research question in Chapter 3 on exploring a direct 
connection between the IP regime and technical innovation by SMEs may not have a simple and 
direct answer, but is disrupted by some financial activities by SMEs. Hence, in order to 
understand this question and other extended research questions based on this, it is necessary to 
research the financial data between 2009 and 2013 to understand the financial market, the 
financial activities by SMEs and their interaction with technical innovation and IP.  
The country-level data reflect the variance of the financial market. To be concrete, the 
financial market here only means VC or PE market, and the debt activities by SMEs will be 
explored by the firm-level data.696  
First, because Gilson and some other scholars agree that developing countries need 
intermediaries by governments to solve the simultaneity problem, 697 I collect the data of the 
government direct investment in the forms of government funding and the government guide 
fund in the domestic VC and PE market. The two factors show the variation of the intermediate 
activities by the government in VC and PE market, but the Chinese governments play different 
roles in the process of these two types of investment in the VC and PE market.  
Traditionally, the governments in China, behaving as investors, provide government direct 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  696	   As	  our	  introduction	  discussed,	  because	  both	  VC	  and	  PE	  are	  equity	  investment	  institutes	  and	  has	  similar	  functions	  in	  the	  portfolio	  enterprises,	  I	  do	  not	  discriminate	  them	  in	  our	  research,	  both	  in	  analysis	  and	  in	  the	  data	  collecting.	  697	   Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience.”	  1070.	  See	  also,	  White,	  “Market	  Failures	  and	  Government	  Failures:	  Some	  Cautionary	  Implications	  for	  Financial	  Reform,”	  71-­‐74.	  See	  also	  Sibbitt,	  “Law,	  Venture	  Capital,	  and	  Entrepreneurism	  in	  Japan:	  A	  Microeconomic	  Perspective	  on	  the	  Impact	  of	  Law	  on	  the	  Generation	  and	  Financing	  of	  Venture	  Businesses,”	  85.	  See	  also	  Jeng	  and	  Wells,	  “The	  Determinants	  of	  Venture	  Capital	  Funding:	  Evidence	  across	  Countries,”	  278.	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investment into enterprises to fund them and guide their behaviors.698 Comparatively, the 
government guide fund is the construction of financial infrastructure.699 In this process, the 
governments act as both an investor of a VC or PE fund and the financial intermediary, such as a 
VC or PE fund itself. Therefore, the variance of government direct investment and government 
guide fund can represent how the governments of China have constructed its VC and PE market 
between 2009 and 2013.  
The Technology Innovation Fund for Technical SMEs Annual Report publishes various 
types of innovation relative fund for SMEs in China. The data of state innovation fund that I 
record are classified into three categories, including the government guide fund, the fund of state 
subsidy project and the state technology innovation fund. Continued with the research question 
in Chapter 2, one of my research goals is to study the relationship between innovative behaviors 
by the firms and government direct investment, so the data of government direct investment in 
this study adopts the state technology innovation fund. Besides the state innovation fund in total, 
the data of the specific amount of innovation fund in the two cities every year are collected 
separately.  
After understanding how the Chinese government designs and structures its financial 
market, especially its VC and PE market, it is essential to understand how both domestic and 
foreign investors reflect on the structured VC and PE market. Therefore, I collect the number of 
the exited VC and PE projects per year and the IPO rate over all exit methods per year. Because 
the public projects of VC and PE investment are incomplete, I can only rely on these data to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  698	   Keqiang	  Li	  (李克强),	  “Zai	  Difang	  Zhineng	  Zhuanbian	  He	  Jigou	  Gaige	  Gongzuo	  Dianshi	  Dianhua	  Huiyishang	  De	  Jianghua(在地方政府职能转变和机构改革电视电话会议上的讲话)[E-­‐Speech	  on	  the	  Transition	  of	  the	  Functions	  of	  Local	  Governments],”	   2013,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.ce.cn/xwzx/gnsz/szyw/201311/08/t20131108_1724443.shtml.	  699	   For	  example,	  the	  government	  Anhui	  province	  established	  a	  Hi-­‐Tech	  Industry	  Government	  Guided	  Fund	  funded	  with	  50,00	  million	  Yuan.	  The	  government	  invested	  70%	  of	  this	  fund,	  and	  other	  private	  investors	  invested	  the	  rest	  30%	  of	  this	  fund.	  In	  the	  running	  of	  this	  fund,	  the	  government	  selected	  over	  800	  projects	  for	  the	  fund	  to	  invest.Yan	  (付艳)	  Fu,	  
“Zhengfu	  Touzi	  Yindao	  Jijin	  Touzi	  Xiangmu	  Jizhong	  Qianyue	  (政府投资引导基金投资项目集中签约)[Aggregated	  Signed	  Investment	  Projects	  under	  Government	  Guide	  Fund],”	   Hefei	  Zaixian(合肥在线)[Hefei	  Eve	  News],	  2015,	  http://news.ifeng.com/a/20150605/43915489_0.shtml.	  See	  also,	  Jieying	  Gui	  (桂洁英),	  “Yindao	  Jijin	  Yinghou	  62	  Haowen	  Xinshidai	  Gedifang	  Zhengfu	  Zhengxian	  Konghou	  (引导基金迎后 62号文新时代，各地方政府争先恐后)[New	  Generation	  of	  the	  62th	  Document,	  Many	  Local	  Governments	  Welcome	  Government	  Guide	  Investment	  Funds],”	   Qingke	  Yanjiu	  
Zhongxin(清科研究中心)[Zero2	  IPO	  Group],	  2015,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.p5w.net/fund/gqjj/201503/t20150304_967690.htm.	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understand how active the VC and PE funds are in the market through their exit activities, 
especially IPO, a pivotal exit mechanism for them.700 
Moreover, recalling the importance of FDI on innovation and economy that I have 
discussed in the literature review in this chapter, I collect the data of the ratio of foreign VC over 
all VC and PE in China per year. Also, in the side of finance per se, this factor can tell how the 
VC and PE market is attractive to the foreign investors, and its variance between 2009 and 2013 
can present how the government structures its finance market with the demands of foreign 
investors on available projects in some extent.701 On the other hand, the ratio instead of the 
amount regarding the investments can tell the weights of FDI in the VC and PE market of China, 
which does not only help to explain the finance market of China but also further help to connect 
the data of innovation to IP and other economic instruments by the government that discussed in 
the previous two chapters. 
The sources of the above data between 2009 and 2013 are the China Venture Capital 
Research Institute, China Venture Capital Yearbook and the Technology Innovation Fund for 
Technical SMEs Annual Report. The dataset of China Venture Capital Research Institute 
provides the data on the exited VC and PE information. The China Venture Capital Research 
Institute publishes the data relating to government direct investment and government guide fund. 
The rest of the data are collected through the latter source.  
The China VC Investment Research Institute collects the data published in China Venture 
Capital Yearbooks. Instead of acquiring the total number in the VC/PE industry in China, in the 
process of data collection, it does surveys of sampling and the over 800 samples of VC/PE funds 
in their survey cover all areas in China and all types of industries.702 Therefore, its data can 
represent the status of the development of the VC/PE market in China, but the data also are 
incomplete. For the incompleteness of the data, the ratios should be more accurate to represent 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  700	   Black	  and	  Gilson,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Structure	  of	  Capital	  Markets:	  Banks	  versus	  Stock	  Markets.”	  701	   Recall	  the	  potential	  imbalance	  of	  the	  VC/PE	  market	  in	  developed	  countries	  Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China.”	  See	  also,	  Lerner,	  Hardymon,	  and	  Leamon,	  Venture	  Capital	  and	  Private	  Equity:	  A	  Case	  Book,	  242.	  702	   Zhongguo	  Fengxian	  Touzi	  Yanjiu	  Yuan(中国风险投资研究院)[China	  VC	  Investment	  Research	  Institute],	  Zhongguo	  
Fengxian	  Touzi	  Nianjian	  2014(中国风险投资年鉴 2014)[China	  Venture	  Capital	  Yearbook	  2014]	  ,	  221-­‐222.	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the whole data of the VC/PE market in China than the amounts, which is another reason why 
most of the data that I adopt in this research are ratios rather than amounts.  
 
1.2. Firm-Level Data in Finance 
 
The goal of collecting financial data of the sample firms is to carefully observe the 
financing activities of their investors and their financial demands and availability of various 
financing channels. When a firm demands cash, it can issue more shares for investors or lend 
money from lenders. Therefore, my data collection of the amounts of VC/PE investment, 
long-term loans and short-term loans can monitor the financing activities of each SME.  
The information behind these financing activities can tell the variance of the value of the 
SMEs during 2009 to 2013 and their financing preferences. By reading the backgrounds of the 
SMEs, most of the biggest individual investors are entrepreneurs.  
Later on, except IPO when the SMEs can acquire public equity investment, for most of the 
other time when they demand on cash for running their businesses, especially the R&D part, 
loans, investments from private equity investors or subsequent share offerings in the public 
market can present their financing preferences. These financial behaviros are clearer and more 
direct than questionnaires with the managers or even the board members of the SMEs.  
Meanwhile, because the process of financing is bilateral, but not just easy to follow the 
desires of the SMEs, their successful financing activities can reflect how lenders, private 
investors and public investors value and judge the SMEs and their programs demanding on the 
cash.  
When counting the amount of VC/PE investment and its shareholding ratio within a 
company, I do not only count those from professional VC/PE funds, but also count the part from 
some particular types of enterprise investors, such as the enterprises that provide management or 
legal services to the portfolio companies. This is because these enterprises monitor the portfolio 
companies and at least provide non-financial support, including management assistance and 
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access to investors, lenders and other resources, to the portfolio companies, like the functions 
that are provided by VC investors.703  
The shareholding ratio of state-owned enterprise (SOE) investors is collected independently 
from the shareholding ratio of VC investors. State-owned enterprises behave as angel investors, 
but they are like government investors and less likely to monitor the running of the businesses by 
the portfolio firms because of the lack of incentives of monitoring and the knowledge of 
investing and monitoring.704 
Under the Chinese stock market that only allows sole class common stock, the percentage 
of common stock held by different types of investors can show their voting rights which can 
have an effect on some crucial business decisions, including the direction of doing R&D. 
Shareholding ratios can more directly present the financing structure of an SME. Therefore, 
when the data of amount of investment from various types of investors are not available, their 
shareholding ratios can be their substitutes for some meanings. This can also fix the issue that 
SMEs may not disclose the exact amount of investment before IPO and the amount of 
investment from minority investors.705   
Moreover, after IPOs, that an SME did not have subsequent share offerings for some years 
does not mean that the structure of the investors of this SME was the same during the years. This 
is because the exchange of stocks on the public market can result the change of the investors and 
their shares of the SME, but the transactions of the shares and capital do not flow into the firm. 
Therefore, the percentage of common stock held by various types of investors can present how 
these investors were interested in the SMEs and their confidence on the development of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  703	   Bottazzi,	  Da	  Rin,	  and	  Hellmann,	  “What	  Is	  the	  Role	  of	  Legal	  Systems	  in	  Financial	  Intermediation?	  Theory	  and	  Evidence,”	  560.	  Also	  see,	  Gulinello,	  “Engeering	  a	  Venture	  Captal	  Market	  and	  the	  Effects	  of	  Government	  Control	  on	  Private	  Ordering:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  Taiwan	  Experience,”	  846.	  Also	  see,	  Nahata,	  “Venture	  Capital	  Reputation	  and	  Investment	  Performance,”	  133.	  Also	  see,	  Barkoczy	  and	  Edmundson,	  “Australasian	  and	  South	  East	  Asian	  Venture	  Capital	  Tax	  Expenditure	  Programs,”	  59.	  704	   This	  is	  because	  the	  investments	  by	  SOEs	  are	  like	  the	  Germany	  venture	  capital	  fund,	  WFG,	  which	  is	  invested	  by	  government	  officers	  who	  will	  not	  be	  disciplined	  for	  the	  failure	  investments.	  See	  Gilson,	  “Engineering	  a	  Venture	  Capital	  Market:	  Lessons	  from	  the	  American	  Experience,”	  1108.	  Also	  see,	  Ralf	  Becker	  and	  Thomas	  Hellmann,	  The	  Genesis	  of	  
Venture	  Capital-­‐Lessons	  from	  the	  German	  Experience,	  CESifo	  Working	  Paper	  No.883,	  2002.	  705	   Usually,	  these	  public	  SMEs	  only	  disclose	  their	  first	  ten	  biggest	  investors,	  either	  individual	  investors	  or	  institutional	  investors.	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SMEs in different stages.  
When the entrepreneurs of an SME are also the controllers of the VC funds investing in the 
SME, however, their investments through this manner are collected in separation from the total 
value and ratio of VC/PE investment. This is because the monitoring function of these VC funds 
to the SME could be comparatively more limited than the function of other unrelated VC funds 
from the financial market.  
The difference between institutional investors and VC/PE investors is the time when they 
enter the investment of the SME. I categorize the organizational investors other than individual 
investors of the public SMEs as institutional investors. Here, I do not discriminate the channels 
in which they acquire the stock of the SMEs, either from the public market or the subsequent 
share offerings other than the public market. By contrast, the organizational investors who 
enrolled the SMEs before their IPOs are PE/VC investors. Because of their expertise on 
managing capital for a pool of investors and investing on the equity market, my research do not 
discriminate their functions and performances in the financial market.  
Because the prospectuses disclose the backgrounds of the investors, the data of the amount 
of VC investment are only from the capital resource of VC investors, excluding the resources of 
SOE investors or institutional investors. The annual reports only disclose the names of the top 
ten biggest investors, but not disclose further details of these investors. Some of the institutional 
investors also invest as VC investors or underwriters,706 and it is hard to recognize the function 
of these investors through their names. Therefore, the shareholding ratio of VC investors 
inevitable includes parts of some institutional investors, which only takes a small portion of the 
organizational investors because of the trading restrictions. The restrictions restrain particular 
types of shareholders or underwriters from trading their shares in general or in a percentage in a 
particular period of time.707  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  706	   Zhongguo	  Zhengjian	  Hui(中国证监会)[China	  Securities	  Regulatory	  Commission],	  Zhengquan	  Faxing	  Yu	  Chengxiao	  
Guanli	  Banfa(证券发行与承销管理办法)[Administrative	  Methods	  on	  Stock	  Issuance	  and	  Commitment	  Underwriting],	  Article	  9,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  2013,	  http://www.csrc.gov.cn/pub/newsite/flb/flfg/bmgz/fxl/201312/t20131224_240253.html.	   	   	  707	   Zhongguo	  Zhengjian	  Hui(中国证监会)[China	  Securities	  Regulatory	  Commission],	  Shangshi	  Gongsi	  Guquan	  Fenzhi	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Some SMEs were invested by VC investors or did not acquire VC investments during 2009 
to 2013, but had invested by VC investors. In order to discriminate them from other SMEs that 
had not acquired any VC investments before 2013, my study uses a dummy variable to indicate 
the status of the entrance of VC investors into the SMEs. After the VC investors entranced into 
an SME, the value of the variable is recorded as 1, in contrast to 0.  
Moreover, even though the SMEs do not acquire investments from VC investors every year 
and the variance of percentage of shares held by them may be caused by other types of investors 
rather than VC investors, once the SMEs have been invested by them, their non-cash 
contributions can be brought into the SMEs. Therefore, it is vital to discriminate the status of the 
entrance of SMEs. Similarly, it is also important to discriminate the status of the SMEs before or 
after the IPO year because IPO brings disclosure requirements on finance and management and 
the access to lenders, suppliers and customers other than capital alone. Hence, this study controls 
for the IPO status as a dummy variable.    
Monitoring the financing activities by the SMEs, other than private or public equity 
financing, I also consider on debt financing. Therefore, my data collection includes the amount 
of long-term loan and the amount of short-term loan that the SMEs obtained. The duration of the 
repayment of long-term loan is more than one year, and that of short-term loan is less than one 
year. Even though the SMEs may amortize some amounts of the principal and interest of the loan 
in the first year of the loan, the lender had authorized them a longer duration than a year. 
Therefore, for this situation, I still count the debt as long-term loan.  
 
2. General Data Description 
 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 describe the data regarding R&D, IP and government funding, and 
compare the data of the Beijing SMEs to that of the Shanghai SMEs to investigate the behaviors 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gaige	  Guanli	  Banfa(上市公司股权分置改革管理办法)[Circular	  of	  China	  Securities	  Regulatory	  Commission	  on	  Distributing	  
the	  Measures	  for	  the	  Administration	  of	  the	  Share-­‐Trading	  Reform	  of	  Listed	  Companies],	  2005,	  Chapter	  4	  Article	  27,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?lib=law&id=4552&CGid=.	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of the SMEs among the fourteen industries. Following the comparison between the two cities, 
this section describes their data regarding financing.  
About the resources from the exterior of the firms, the results of t-test show that the amount 
of long-term loans or short-term loans obtained by the SMEs was not different between the 
SMEs from the two cities in a statistically significant degree. However, the Beijing SMEs on 
average acquired slightly more equity financing during 2009 to 2013 than the Shanghai SMEs. 
The summary statistics in Table 4.1 show that on average, a Beijing SME was funded ￥2.88 
RMB from private investors by equity financing. A Shanghai SME yearly obtained ￥1.14 
million RMB from private investors through equity investment. In the interior of the firms, the 
shareholding rates of local and private VCs investing in the Shanghai SMEs on average were 
slightly higher than those in the Beijing SMEs. The shares of the Shanghai SMEs on average 
held by local and private VC investors were 2.44 percent higher than those in the Beijing SMEs. 
Among all the industries, the industry of information technology, electronic manufacturing, 
mechanical manufacturing, petroleum and plastic manufacturing, and pharmaceutical 
manufacturing are the five largest groups of SMEs in the samples. In the industry of information 
technology, the Beijing SMEs obtained more capital from both government financing and equity 
financing between 2009 and 2013. In the industry of electronics manufacturing, the Shanghai 
SMEs were able to acquire more both long-term loans and short-term loans than the Beijing 
SMEs were.  
Moreover, in the industry of mechanical manufacturing, the SMEs from the two cities did 
not have statistically significant difference in financing activities during 2009 to 2013. In the 
industry of petroleum and plastic manufacturing, the results of t-tests show that the differences in 
the amount of equity financing and VC investors’ shareholding ratio between the SMEs from 
Beijing and Shanghai are statistically significant. As regards the results, the Beijing SMEs, 
which on average obtained more equity financing than the Shanghai SMEs, were controlled by 
local and private VC investors at a higher level than the Shanghai SMEs were. In addition, in the 
industry of pharmacy manufacturing, the Shanghai SMEs did not obtain any long-term loans 
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from banks. In contrast, the Beijing SMEs utilized long-term loans from banks during 2009 to 
2013.  
With repect to Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the Beijing SMEs and the Shanghai SMEs 
performed differently in R&D, IP, financing and marketing between 2009 and 2013, so it is 
important to investigate the SMEs from the two cities and their IP and financing factors relating 
to innovation. 
 
3. Methodology 
 
To explore the research questions in Section III, this part utilizes the same panel dataset in 
Chapter 2 with the above-presented variables and estimates a series of panel data models for 
them. The panel dataset is constructed for the characteristics of the 82 and 58 enterprises that are 
registered or headquarter in Zhongguan-Cun Science Park in Beijing and Zhangjiang High-Tech 
Park in Shanghai. The duration of the data is five years, from 2009 to 2013, and covers at latest 
three years’ data of the public SMEs before the IPO year. Accordingly, the data are coded into 
five panel datasets for the difference of the two science parks and the difference of the status of 
IPO.  
To explore the association between the equity investment and the debt investment acquired 
by SMEs, following the theories that the literature review discusses in this chapter, the OLS, 
random-effects or fixed-effects models are estimated in two-way error component as the 
followings: 
 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦!"+ 𝛽!𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"#!! + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!!𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (1) 
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𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦!"+ 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!!𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (2) 
 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
i denotes the individual SME. t denotes the year in which the SMEs innovate to apply and 
acquire patents, and f denotes the industry type. 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑡, a dummy variable, is controlled as fixed, 
denoting the time effect and varying across the five years. 𝜇! is an individual effect and varies 
across individual SMEs, but not across time. The remainder disturbance, 𝜈!" , denotes the 
residual varying with individuals and time. In different individuals or levels of time, ∝ denotes 
the intercept and  𝛽!, 𝛽!,..., 𝛽!" denote the slopes. 
The amount of short-term loans that an SME obtains in a year (𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛) and the amount 
of long-term loans that an SME obtains in a year (𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛) are chosen as dependent variables 
to indicate the demand of short-term loans and long-term loans of an SME and its ability to lend 
capital from banks. The dummy variable, 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶, controls for the entrance of a real private 
and local VC, rather than a state-owned enterprise as an investor or a capital pool funded by an 
SME’s own board. If the investors in an SME include state-owned enterprises, the dummy 
variable, 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸, controls for the discrimination between this SME from the others. The 
SMEs invested by foreign direct investment is also distinguished and controlled in the model 
through the dummy variable, 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼. Since the observations are public SMEs, a dummy 
variable, 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂, controls for the stages of an SME’s financing, before the IPO and after 
the IPO. One year-lagged effect of short-term loans also is controlled in the model to indicate the 
consistent demand of debts among the SME.  
Learning from the prior literature, the investment decision of equity investors and debt 
investors could be relevant to the IPRs that portfolio companies acquired from SIPO. The models 
add the number of issued utility patents (𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒) and issued utility models (𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒) that 
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the SME acquires from SIPO in a year as control variables. Meanwhile, the Chinese 
governments provide subsidies for loan interests to bridge SMEs and lenders. In order to capture 
this direct government intervention in the financial market, their direct investment that Chapter 2 
has discussed, and other indirect intervention, such as through tax credits for SMEs, the models 
also control for the amount of subsidies for loan interests a year (𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦), the status of 
obtaining governments grants or not (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡) and the status of obtaining tax credits in 
any categories or not (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) as control variables.  
The variables representing individual firm’s characteristics and time are also included as 
other control variables. Revenue of an SME (𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒) indicates a capital resource that the SME 
has other than financing. The number of employees (𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒) surrogates for the size of an 
SME growing every year. 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 is a dummy variable controlling the category of industries 
where an SME is, so it only varies across individuals, but not across time. The fourteen 
categories of the industries have been introduced in Chapter 2.  
To further explore the association between the equity investment and the debt investment 
acquired by SMEs, the first two OLS, random-effects or fixed-effects models are improved and 
estimated in two-way error component as the followings: 
 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦!"+ 𝛽!𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"#!! + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑃𝑂𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!!𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!"+ 𝛽!"𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (3) 
 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦!"+ 𝛽!𝐼𝑃𝑂𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑!" + 𝛽!"𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!!𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!! + 𝛽!"𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐷𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (4) 
 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 
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𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
The ratios of the local and private VC investors (𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜), SOE investors (𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) and 
FDI investors (𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜) are controlled as explanatory variables to indicate the effects of the 
variation of the equity structure in an SME. Moreover, in the two improved models, the status of 
entitling government grants and tax credits are specified into the amount of IPO fund acquired by 
an SME (𝐼𝑃𝑂𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑑), the amount of corporate tax credits acquired by the SME (𝐶𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) 
and the amount of capital gains tax credits acquired by the SME (𝐶𝑎𝑡𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡) as the control 
variables.  
If the model only focuses on the internal factors impacting on the demands of the short-term 
loans and long-term loans demanded and obtained by SMEs, following the prior study 
distinguishing the demand of debt investment among the capital intense firms from the other 
firms’,708 the OLS, random-effects or fixed-effects models are estimated in two-way error 
component as the followings: 
 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"#!! + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (5) 
 𝐿𝑜𝑛𝑔𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑠𝑖𝑑𝑦!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡!" + 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇!+ 𝜈!"        (6) 
 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,642 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,193    , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}. 
The net profit of the SME in a year (𝑁𝑒𝑡𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡) is selected as an explanatory variable to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  708	   Heitor	  Almeida	  and	  Murillo	  Campello,	  “Financing	  Frictions	  and	  the	  Substitution	  between	  Internal	  and	  External	  Funds,”	  
Journal	  of	  Financial	  and	  Quantitative	  Analysis	  45,	  no.	  03	  (2010):	  589–622.	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surrogate for the internal financing of the SME. The status of IPO of the SME (𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂) is 
not a control variable anymore in those two models, since the panels of the SMEs before and 
after IPO are employed under the models separately. Then, their results of coefficients in those 
two models will be compared by t-test. 
To explore the association between the patenting propensity of the SME and its financing, 
following other studies researching on patenting propensity,709 the OLS, random-effects or 
fixed-effects models are estimated in two-way error component as the followings:710 
 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"        (7) 
 𝑈𝑀!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡+ 𝛽!"𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡!" + 𝛽!!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"          (8) 
 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  𝑅&𝐷𝐼 is the explanatory variable to signify the R&D intensity of the SME, measured as a 
ratio of R&D investment to employee numbers, which has been explained in Chapter 2. 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡 
and 𝑈𝑀 are the numbers of utility patent and utility model filings. They are chosen to be 
dependent variables to capture the patenting propensity of SMEs. The number of patent 
application filings, 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡, is also controlled in model 6 as a control variable for tracking the 
consistency of patenting behaviors of SMEs. Other than the variables representing the structure 
of equity investors and their investment status in the SME, the status of either long-term loans or 
short-term loans (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑏𝑡𝑒𝑑) lent by the SME is controlled as a dummy variable.  
To explore the association among revenue, short-term loans and innovation by SMEs, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  709	   Hall	  and	  Ham,	  The	  Patent	  Paradox	  Revisited:	  Determinants	  of	  Patenting	  in	  the	  US	  Semiconductor	  Industry,	  1980-­‐94.	  710	   Shown	  by	  the	  regression	  results,	  the	  lagging	  effects	  of	  R&D	  intensity	  and	  R&D	  investment	  do	  not	  explain	  the	  patenting	  propensity	  better	  than	  their	  immediate	  effects,	  so	  the	  model	  designs	  finally	  do	  not	  include	  the	  lagging	  effects.	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following the model designs in the previous two chapters, the OLS, random-effects or 
fixed-effects models are estimated in two-way error component as the following: 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"+ 𝛽! 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!" + 𝛽!(𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!")+ 𝛽!(𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!")+ 𝛽!𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇!+ 𝜈!"      (9) 
 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  𝑅&𝐷𝐼, 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 and 𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒 are the control variables and indicate R&D intensity, 
the number of issued utility patents, issued utility models, and registered software copyrights in 
an SME in a year.  
The two-way interaction terms, 𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!"  and 𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!", capture the interacted effects between short-term loans and the issued utility 
patents or utility models on the variation of revenue of the SME. In addition, the two-way 
interaction term, 𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ∗ 𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑟𝑡𝐿𝑜𝑎𝑛!", captures the covariation between R&D and lending on 
impacting revenue of the SME.  
In addition, to explore the association among revenue, equity investment and innovation by 
SMEs, following the model designs in the previous two chapters, the OLS, random-effects or 
fixed-effects models are estimated in two-way error component as the followings: 
 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!"+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!"𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!"+ 𝛽!"𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!"𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!"+ 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"      (10) 
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𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒!"# =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!"+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!"𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!"+ 𝛽!"𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!"𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!!+ 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"    (11) 
 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑖𝑓𝑡 =∝ +𝛽!𝑅&𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!𝑃𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑡𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" + 𝛽!𝑉𝐶𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!"+ 𝛽!𝑆𝑂𝐸𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐼𝑃𝑂!" + 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!"+ 𝛽!𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!"𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!" + 𝛽!!𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑉𝐶!"+ 𝛽!"𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝑆𝑂𝐸!" + 𝛽!"𝑈𝑀𝐼𝑠𝑠𝑢𝑒!" ∗ 𝑑𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦𝐹𝐷𝐼!"+ 𝛽!"𝐸𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑒𝑒!" + 𝛽!"𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦! + 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟! + 𝜇! + 𝜈!"      (12) 
 
where 𝑖 ∈ 𝐼! = 1,… ,410 , 𝐼! = 1,… ,290     , 𝐼! = 1,… ,700 , f ∈ 𝐹 = {1,… ,14} and 𝑡 ∈ 𝑇 = {2009,… ,2013}.  
The interaction terms in the models capture the strength of the associations between issued 
utility patents or issued utility models and revenue among the SMES invested by various types of 
investors, including the local and private VCs, the SOE investors and the FDI investors.   
 
V. Results and Implications 
 
Implication 1: Acquiring short-term loan is a consistent strategy for SMEs’ financing, and their 
previous relationship with banks effectively helps them to acquire continuous access of bank 
financing. 
 
In Table 4.2, among the models to estimate SMEs’ demand for short-term loans, the 
autocorrelation coefficients, which are the coefficients on the one-year lagged short-term loan, 
are statistically significant and positive, suggesting that the demand and access to short-term 
loans are consistent with their lending experience in the previous year. After the SMEs have 
acquired short-term loans, they are more likely to keep acquiring short-term loans from banks. 
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However, the coefficient in model 8 with the overall samples is 0.63, less than 1, suggesting that 
they may demand less loans than the previous year.  
Even though the model 2, model 5 and model 8 in Table 4.2 do not control for industry 
categories as fixed for collinearity, the models in Table 4.3 controlling for industry categories as 
fixed suggest that the one-year lagged short-term loans have positive effect on acquiring 
short-term loans in the ongoing year. Therefore, the consistency of external financing through 
short-term loans exists across all industries.  
On the other hand, the positive effect of the short-term loans lagged by one year on the 
acquired short-term loans in the ongoing year could also suggest that the SMEs are easier to 
access short-term loans after they have successfully acquired short-term loans in a similar and 
even higher amount from banks in the previous year. In another words, the previous connection 
of SMEs with banks can effectively help them acquire short-term loans from banks in the 
ongoing year.  
Since Almeida and Campello found a substitution between external financing and internal 
financing among the financing unconstrained firms,711 in order to further prove the consistent 
lending behavior of the SMEs, in Table 4.8, the observations are divided as two groups of before 
and after IPO to estimate the amount of short-term loans and long-term loans. Compared to the 
SMEs before IPO, the SMEs after IPO can be relatively financing unconstrained and have better 
financial strategies compared to the private SMEs. For example, they can easily acquire equity 
financing through subsequent stock offerings.  
In the panel of the SMEs after IPO, the coefficients on net profit, representing internal 
financing of the SMEs, yield statistically significant and negative results, suggesting a negative 
correlation between their net profit and both short-term loans and long-term loans. A stronger 
negative correlation of long-term loans and net profit also exists among the private firms, which 
could be relatively financing constrained compared to the public firms.  
Usually, the scholars, such as Lerner and Schoar, argue that the lender protection and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  711	   Almeida	  and	  Campello,	  “Financing	  Frictions	  and	  the	  Substitution	  between	  Internal	  and	  External	  Funds.”	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contract enforcement is weak in civil law developing countries, so it is to hardly fill the gap 
between SMEs and bank lenders for long-term loans.712 My research result based on SMEs’ data 
is consistent with the common law countries’ studies conclusions, such as Almeida and 
Campello’s research, suggesting that long-term loan is a significant substitute of internal 
financing, especially for private SMEs. When a private SME has lower profitability to provide 
internal financing and is not as easy as the public SMEs acquiring equity investment by 
subsequent share offering, they significantly pursue long-term loans, shown by this statistically 
significant difference in the effects of net profit between the two panels, before and after IPO.  
By contrast, the positive and statistically significant coefficient on net profit to predict 
short-term loans suggests that the correlation between short-term loans and net profit among the 
private SMEs is positive, which is opposite to the prior literature and the discussed story with 
respect to long-term loans. This positive correlation suggests that the net profit and short-term 
loan are supplementary for the private SMEs’ financing. On the one side, banks may prefer to the 
SMEs with relatively higher profitability. On the other side, the private SMEs need external 
financing supports to supplement their internal financing to expand business, since they have less 
measures of external financing compared to public SMEs.  
Linking this financial decision to their decision to treat long-term loans as substitute of their 
internal financing, those private SMEs’ financial strategies could be inefficient. The cost of 
short-term loans usually is higher than the cost of long-term loan. However, those SMEs select 
short-term loans as supplementary financing for their internal financing, but select long-term 
loans as a substitute. A financial strategy like this could be inefficient, especially when the 
further implications explain that SMEs adapt to the IP regimes with the significant assistance 
from either short-term loans or long-term loans. This could be a reason why the SMEs can 
improve commercialization of R&D and patents through short-term loans rather than long-term 
loans, regarding the discussion of the regression results in the previous page.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  712	   Lerner	  and	  Schoar,	  “Does	  Legal	  Enforcement	  Affect	  Financial	  Transactions?	  The	  Contractual	  Channel	  in	  Private	  Equity.”	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Nevertheless, this is exactly what Giannetti’s statistic across countries shows.713 Unlisted 
firms are more likely to be indebted, especially when their local stock market is underdeveloped. 
The firms from different countries have different debt-preferences, and most of the countries use 
short-term loans in a higher frequency than long-term loans.  
In addition, compared to the SMEs after IPO, whose coefficients on subsidies for either the 
long-term loan’s interest or short-term loan’s interest to predict the loans are statistically 
significant and positive, the SMEs before IPO’s coefficients on the subsidies do not yield 
statistically significant results. In other words, the private SMEs were not significantly 
subsidized by the government in the process of acquiring debt financing, especially for long-term 
loans. Therefore, the amount of either long-term or short-term loans did not vary in the same way 
as the amount of the interest subsidies of the loans did.  
By contrast, shown by the statistically significant and positive coefficients on interest 
subsidy to predict short-term loan and long-term loan with the panel of public SMEs, there is a 
positive correlation between their interest subsidies and both short-term and long-term loans 
among public SMEs. In the process of acquiring debt financing, they actively use the interest 
subsidies. Also, when the regression adds in the one-year lagged short-term loan as an 
independent variable to predict their short-term loans acquired in the ongoing year, the 
coefficient yields a statistically significant and positive result. Meanwhile, the statistical 
significance of the effect of net profit and interest subsidies disappears. The regression result 
suggests that the demand and access of short-term loans are consistent with their lending 
experience in the previous year. Since the industry category is controlled as a fixed variable, this 
consistency of acquiring short-term loan is across all the industries. Nevertheless, this 
consistency is not clear among the private SMEs, despite an overall consistency existing. Besides 
the unsolved endogenous issue, one possibility could be that the size of the samples is too small.  
It is interesting to see that SMEs are consistently acquiring short-term loans, even after their 
IPO. Therefore, it is important for the government to explore other measures to fill the gap 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  713	   Giannetti,	  “Do	  Better	  Institutions	  Mitigate	  Agency	  Problems?	  Evidence	  from	  Corporate	  Finance	  Choices.”	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between SMEs and long-term loans, rather than just provide ex post loan interest subsidies. This 
is even more important for the private SMEs, regarding their demands of loans and ineffective 
financial strategies in the financial market.  
 
Implication 2: Bank loans and public equity investment are substitutes when SMEs demand 
capital. In addition, innovative SMEs may have other financing forms, such as corporate tax 
credits, as substitutes of short-term loans for their needs of capital. 
 
The coefficients on the IPO status and the availability on tax credits for SMEs yield 
statistically significant and negative results, shown by model 7 and model 8 in Table 4.2 with the 
overall samples to predict short-term loans. Those results suggest that both the group of public 
SMEs, which have acquired a big amount of capital from public equity market, and the group of 
SMEs, which can acquire capital gains tax credits, corporate tax credits, or other types of tax 
credits, on average have less demand for short-term loans in their business running.  
In addition, the coefficient on the IPO status to predict long-term loans, shown by model 9 
in Table 4.2 with the overall samples, also yields a statistically significant and negative result, 
suggesting that the public SMEs on average have less demand for long-term loans. In general, 
public equity investment can be substitutes for SMEs’ demand for both short-term loans and 
long-term loans.  
In Table 4.3, shown by the details of the two main types of tax credits for 
innovation-intensive SMEs, which are corporate tax credits and capital gains tax credits, the 
coefficients on corporate tax credits yield statistically significant and negative results in model 1, 
model 4 and model 7 with the three panels of samples. When an SME from any industry 
acquired more corporate tax credits, this SME would acquire less short-term loans. Some 
innovative SMEs may demand less capital from bank loans, especially short-term loans. Instead, 
they can acquire capital from corporate tax credits. On the one hand, the corporate tax credits 
could be one substitute of short-term loans for the SMEs’ demand for capital. On the other hand, 
	   217	  
the coefficients on corporate tax credits are over 1, shown by model 1, model 4 and model 7 in 
Table 4.3, suggesting that every 1 unit increase of corporate tax credits vary with 2.1 units 
decrease of short-term loans in the overall case. Because the amount of increased corporate tax 
credits cannot fully offset the decreased amount of short-term loans for the SMEs, they should 
have other resources of financing as substitutes of short-term loans for their demands for capital.  
 
Implication 3: Lenders care about revenue and IPO status of SME debtors, but may not 
significantly value the utility patents and utility models owned by the SME debtors.  
 
Regardless of SMEs’ demands for capital, the banks may be more likely to lend long-term 
loans to public SMEs. In Model 9 of Table 4.3, the coefficient on IPO fund yields a statistical 
significant and positive result, suggesting that the SMEs acquiring more IPO fund acquire more 
long-term loans from banks. 
IPO fund is from local governments to subsidize the high costs of IPO and award to the IPO 
firms.714 It is usually payoff in two years before or after the IPO, and the total amount is 
random.715 Therefore, when thinking of IPO fund as an indicator of the appreciation by the 
governments and successful IPO or successfully getting IPO in a big chance, the estimation 
result in model 8 suggests that the lenders are more likely to lend short-term loans to the SMEs 
which have successfully gone public and been appreciated by local governments.  
In model 1, model 4 and model 7 of Table, presenting the estimations to predict short-term 
loans for the overall samples, the coefficients on revenue yield statistically significant and 
positive results, suggesting that revenue has a positive effect on increasing the amount of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  714	   The	  Beijing	  Government	  Office,	  Guanyu	  Jinyibu	  Tuidong	  Qiye	  Shangshi	  Gongzuo	  De	  Yijian(关于进一步推动企业上市工
作的意见)[The	  Opinions	  About	  Further	  Improving	  Enterprises’	   IPOs],	  2010.	  Also	  see,	  Yu	  Sun	  (孙玉),	  “Shanghai	  Minhangqu	  Shixing	  Zhongxiao	  Qiye	  Shangshi	  Jiangli	  Xinzheng(上海闵行区实行中小企业上市奖励新政)[Shanghai	  Minhang	  District	  Employs	  New	  Policies	  to	  Prize	  SMEs’	   IPOs],”	   Zhengquan	  Shibao(证券时报)[Security	  Times	  China],	  2008,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://money.163.com/08/0820/10/4JPIFICD00251RJ2.html.	  715	   Leaned	  from	  the	  annual	  reports	  of	  the	  SMEs,	  the	  fund	  can	  be	  from	  the	  Administrative	  Committees	  of	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun	  Science	  Part	  and	  Zhangjiang	  Hi-­‐Tech	  Park,	  and	  local	  governments	  of	  the	  headquarters	  of	  the	  SMEs.	  There	  was	  no	  clear	  standards	  for	  regulating	  the	  IPO	  fund,	  and	  it	  usually	  depends	  on	  how	  the	  governments	  appreciate	  the	  development	  and	  future	  of	  an	  SME,	  their	  ongoing	  beneficial	  policies,	  and	  probably	  their	  relationship	  with	  the	  SME.	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short-term loans acquired by SMEs. On the one side, for the SMEs with better market 
performance, represented by their increased revenue, they may demand more external financing 
in their business running and they think of short-term loans from banks as a significant form of 
external financing. On the other side, when banks make decisions on lending SMEs, whose 
business is riskier than bigger firms, especially the innovation-intensive SMEs, revenue is a 
significant factor to be considered by banks.  
Banks, nevertheless, may not think of the utility patents and utility models owned by SMEs 
as a significant factor when approving loans to them. In the estimations to predict short-term 
loans and long-term loans, the coefficients on issued utility patents do not reach a statistically 
significant degree. Even the issued utility patents in the previous year cannot show correlation 
with the amount of short-term loans and long-term loans in a statistically significant degree. 
Therefore, the estimation results suggest that issued utility patents of SMEs have insignificant 
effects on the amount of short-term loan acquired by the SMEs.  
While the coefficients on utility models yield statistically significant and positive results 
when predicting short-term loans with the overall panel’s samples and the Beijing panel’s 
samples, I cannot infer the results that bank lenders value the utility models owned by the SME 
debtors. Instead, those bank lenders may not significantly value utility models. Without a process 
of substantive examination, the value and quality of a technology protected under utility models 
should be lower than a technology in a form of utility patents. Therefore, when utility patents 
cannot have a significant effect on acquiring more loans from banks for SMEs, utility models 
also should not have a significant effect. There must be another endogenous factor with the 
characteristics of acquiring more short-term loans and issued utility models.  
 
Implication 4: SMEs are adapting to the IP regime under the supports from debt financing. With 
short-term or long-term bank loans, they apply for more utility patent applications and utility 
model applications. Despite that no obvious evidence shows that SMEs effectively invest the 
acquired loans in their R&D, short-term loans can effectively support them improving the 
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efficiency of commercialization of R&D, utility patents and utility models in their business 
running.  
 
    In Table 4.4, among the product-term estimations to predict revenue, the base group for 
indebted is the group of SMEs not acquiring any short-term loans and long-term loans in the 
ongoing year. In the overall case, the SMEs acquiring either short-term loans or long-term loans 
from banks are estimated to apply for 2.62 utility patents and 0.93 utility models more than the 
SMEs not acquiring any bank loans, with the same levels of R&D intensity and other equity 
financing status. In other words, the SMEs with the supports from debt financing on average 
have higher propensity to file utility patent and utility model applications.   
Nevertheless, SMEs may not invest the bank loans in their R&D activities, which are a 
pre-condition of applying for patents. Both the amount of short-term loans and long-term loans 
acquired by SMEs are less likely to correlate with their R&D investment (r=0.05 with the overall 
panel’s data). The insignificant correlation between bank loans and R&D investment cannot 
suggest that SMEs are effectively using the bank loans to conduct R&D.  
In order to explore the reason why the indebted SMEs have higher propensity to file utility 
patents and utility models when the bank loans do not significantly contribute to their capital 
needs for conducting R&D, the models in Table 4.5 add product-term between short-term loans 
and other variables representing innovation, including R&D intensity, issued utility patents and 
issued utility models. The added product terms account roughly for 5% of the variance of 
revenue. 
Even though the coefficient on R&D intensity shows a statistically significant result in the 
main-effect only model with the overall data, shown by model 5, the statistical significance 
disappears after the interaction term between R&D intensity and short-term loans are added in 
model 6. However, the coefficient on the interaction term yields a statistically significant and 
positive result. It suggests that the R&D intensity could have a positive effect on revenue through 
its interaction with the moderator variable, short-term loans. In other words, innovation-intensive 
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SMEs can effectively acquire more revenue with the short-term loans that they lent from banks.  
In model 6 of Table 4.5, the coefficient on issued utility patents yields a statistically 
significant and negative result to predict revenue. However, the interaction term between issued 
utility patents and short-term loans is estimated as positive in a statistically significant degree 
when the estimation holds years and industry categories as fixed, suggesting a positive effect of 
short-term loans on increasing a positive contribution of issued utility patents to improving 
revenue. For every ￥10,000 RMB that short-term loan increases, the slope of revenue on issued 
utility patents increases 0.1 units.  
The estimated result suggests that when a SME acquires more than ￥42,728,200 RMB, its 
issued utility patents shall have a positive effect on improving its revenue. Actually, most of the 
SMEs did not acquire that much of short-term loans. However, it does not mean that SMEs 
should increase their leverage ratio. Even though the mean of short-term loans acquired by the 
SMEs is higher than this threshold (mean of overall case=54,621,630, mean of Beijing’s 
case=53,483,217, mean of Shanghai’s case=56,258,361), the distribution of short-term loans is 
positive skew. There could be other endogenous factors inside the mechanism, allowing the 
SMEs to acquire more short-term loans compared to other SMEs and transform their issued 
utility patents effectively to revenue. At least, short-term loans have a significant effect on 
supporting this effective IP commercialization mechanism.  
While the coefficient on the interaction term between short-term loans and issued utility 
models yields a statistically significant and negative result in model 6, its value is lower than the 
value of the positive estimated coefficient on the interaction term between short-term loans and 
issued utility patents. Only if the acquired short-term loans are higher than ￥98,019,802 RMB, 
will the effect of issued utility models on improving revenue turn from positive to negative. 
Actually, less than 15% of the SMEs acquired short-term loans over this threshold. If they all did, 
the effect of issued utility patents should be positive to offset the negative effect of issued utility 
models on improving revenue. This could be a fair result of the patent strategy of an SME to 
commercialize their R&D and IPRs.  
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Overall, SMEs could effectively improve their R&D commercialization and 
commercialization of utility patents and utility models with the increased amount of short-term 
loans that they acquired from banks. Meanwhile, under the effect of bank loans, they apply for 
more utility patents and utility models. For all industries across the years from 2009 to 2013, the 
SMEs were adapting to the IP regime under the supports from debt financing.  
 
Implication 5: Despite revenue of the SMEs invested by SOE investors is higher than the other 
SMEs, SOE investors cannot effectively assist SMEs to improve the commercialization of their 
R&D, utility patents and utility models, compared to local and private VCs.  
 
In model 3 of Table 4.5, the coefficient on SOEs’ share ratio yields a statistically significant 
and positive result to predict revenue. This result suggests that the SMEs involving more SOE 
investors could acquire more revenue in general. I am interested in if the higher revenue comes 
from a higher efficiency of commercialization of R&D and IPs after the SMEs have consulted 
with SOE investors. In other words, I am interested in whether the regression coefficient is 
different from the corresponding regression coefficient for the SMEs without the involvement of 
SOE investors when regressing revenue onto R&D intensity, issued utility patents and issued 
utility models together for SOE-invested SMEs.  
Therefore, the models in Table 4.7 control for those factors’ interaction with the 
involvement of SOE investors and present two slopes of revenue on R&D intensity with issued 
utility patents or issued utility models being identical or different, respectively. For the overall 
case, shown by model 7, model 8 and model 9, the coefficients for the interaction terms in the 
three models were statistically significant, suggesting the presence of interactions. However, the 
coefficients yield negative results, suggesting that SOE investors exacerbate the impact of R&D 
intensity, issued utility patents and issued utility models on improving revenue.  
In model 7, when R&D intensity, issued utility patents, issued utility models, SOEs’ share 
ratio, VC and institutional investors’ share ratio, and FDIs’ share ratio, year, size and industry 
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categories are held as fixed, for every 1 unit of R&D intensity of a non-SOE and non-VC 
invested SME increases, revenue is predicted to increase by ￥10,720,000 RMB. By contrast, 
for every 1 unit of R&D intensity of a SOE invested SME increases, revenue is predicted to 
decrease by ￥9,460,000 RMB, if the SME has not been invested by a local and private VC. If 
the SOE-invested SME also has been invested by a local and private VC, the effect of R&D 
intensity on improving revenue is positive because the coefficient on the interaction term 
between R&D intensity and local and private VC involvement yields a statistically significant 
and positive result. Nevertheless, the effect is still lower than the effect among the SMEs without 
the involvement of SOE investors.  
 If we look into the two cities’ samples, shown by model 1 and model 4, for the group of 
Beijing and Shanghai SMEs, coefficients on R&D intensity of the SOE invested SMEs also yield 
statistically significant and negative results, even though the coefficients on R&D intensity of all 
the SMEs in the two cities yield statistically significant and positive results. It is consistent that 
in the two cities, SOE investors cannot effectively assist SMEs to transform their R&D outcomes 
to revenue and even exacerbate the commercialization of R&D by the SMEs.  
In the case of utilizing IPs, shown by model 8 and model 9, the coefficients on issued utility 
patents and issued utility models by the SOE-invested SMEs yield statistically significant and 
negative results. I could formally explain the results that the two types of patents in the 
SOE-invested SMEs not only cannot help the SMEs to grab more revenue from the market, but 
also the patents may impede their business running more serious than the SMEs without the 
involvement of SOE investors.  
On the other hand, because the coefficients on the issued utility patents and issued utility 
models are insignificant, I turn to treat those two count variables as moderator variables. For 
every one more utility patent that an SOE-invested SME acquires in a year, its revenue is 
predicted to decrease by ￥22,040,000 RMB in that year, when the estimation holds R&D 
intensity, issued utility patents, issued utility models, SOEs’ share ratio, VC and institutional 
investors’ share ratio, FDIs’ share ratio year, size and industry categories as fixed. After an 
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SOE-invested SMEs acquires eight more utility patents in a year, its revenue is predicted to be 
lower than the SMEs without any investments and any contributions from SOE investors.  
The efficiency of management of utility models in the SOE-invested SMEs is in a similar 
situation as their utility patent management, but the negative effect from this moderator variable 
is less than the negative effect of utility patents on improving revenue. For every one more utility 
patent that an SOE-invested SME acquires, its revenue is predicted to decrease by ￥5,457,000 
RMB. The threshold of having lower revenue than the SMEs without any contributions from 
SOE investors is going up to fourteen utility models, in a higher degree than utility patents.  
By contrast, the coefficient on the issued utility patents to predict revenue is statistically 
significant and positive in the case of Beijing, and the coefficient on the issued utility models to 
predict revenue is statistically significant and positive in the overall case, shown by model 2 and 
model 9 of Table 4.7. In the overall case, the SMEs invested by local and private SMEs on 
average can acquire more revenue when they are acquiring more utility models. In other models, 
the coefficients on the two patent factors do not yield statistically significant results, suggesting 
that the utility patents acquired by the local and private-VC invested SMEs are insignificant to 
impede or improve their revenue.  
Overall, the SOE-invested SMEs on average cannot effectively improve their revenue with 
their R&D activities and patents that they acquire. Especially for the SMEs involving SOE 
investors only, but no local and private VCs, conducting R&D and acquiring utility patents and 
utility models interfere with the growth of their revenue. In other words, SOE investors cannot 
effectively assist them to improve their commercialization of R&D, utility patents and utility 
models, compared to other types of investors, such as local and private VCs. While acquiring 
either the two types of the patents could impede their business running, it seems that the 
obstruction from utility models is weaker than the obstruction from utility patents. When the 
SOE-invested SMEs do not have strong capabilities on IP management, the cost of utility models 
for them is always lower than the cost of utility patents, even after the process of patent 
application.  
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Some of the SOEs investing in SMEs are business banks, incubators and VCs. For example, 
China Gaoxin Investment Group Corp. (CGI), investing in Beijing Lanxum Technology Co., 
LTd. and Beijing Century Real Technology Co., LTd., two of my samples in the group of 
Beijing, is a state-owned investment mechanism to act as a VC/PE investor for technical SMEs 
and an institutional investor in stock market, and also interests in merger and acquisition. CGI is 
a subsidiary of State Development & Investment Corp. (SDIC), established by the P.R.C. State 
Council in 1995 and under the administration of the central government.716 SDI invests in 
various industries, including the traditional industries, the high-tech industries and the financial 
industries under the central government’s policies and encourage sub-investments in some 
industries through their subsidiaries in the form of investment group, such as CGI. CGI usually 
invests in the pharmaceutical and bio-engineering industries, the new material and resources 
industries, the industries of new energy and energy conservation and the industries of 
manufacturing.  
Alternatively, some SOEs only invest in the SMEs that are in the same industry with them. 
Many of the sample SMEs invested by SOEs belong to this situation. For example, Sinosteel 
Corporation funds a special subsidiary, Sinosteel Corporation Investment, to make investment in 
the steel businesses. Mysteel.com, one of my samples in the group of Shanghai, is invested by 
Sinosteel Corporation Investment.  
For either open financial services or narrowed investments in an industry, the fund 
managers have special expertise in the area that they invest in. However, SOEs’ business models 
could be different from other private companies. Their monopoly market position and close 
relationships with governments could provide the invested SMEs better access of market even 
without IPs.717 Other than providing better access of the market, another benefit of having SOE 
investment could be that they can directly apply the central government’s policies to the SMEs in 
the industries so as to decrease some transaction costs in the process of realizing the country’s 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  716	   State	  Development	  &	  Investment	  Corp.,	  “Guanyu	  Guotou(关于国投)[About	  SDIC],”	   accessed	  March	  15,	  2016,	  http://www.sdic.com.cn/cn/gygt/gsjs/A010101index_1.htm.	  717	   Peijun	  Duan	  and	  Tony	  Saich,	  Reforming	  China’s	  Monopolies,	  2014,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://ash.harvard.edu/files/reforming_chinas_monopolies.pdf.	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mission, compared to the local governments’ subsidies and grants to encourage the development 
of the industries. Therefore, it is fair to see that in China, the SOE-invested SMEs on average 
have a higher degree of revenue than the SMEs not invested by SOE investors.  
Similar to private venture capitalists, SOE investors care about the revenue of the invested 
SMEs, and the fund managers are liable for making bad investment decisions because 
State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission of the Chinese State Council 
(SASAC) monitors their performances.718 However, the moral hazard issue could still be more 
serious in the investments made by SOE investors who are managing state assets rather than the 
capital from private investors.719  
On the other hand, even though SOEs do have incentives to encourage SMEs to conduct 
R&D because they need to effectively apply the central governments’ policies encouraging 
innovation, the policies do not require that they should induce SMEs to effectively 
commercialize their R&D outcomes. Meanwhile, different from the subsidies or the grants from 
government, which usually request for IPs as a pre-condition, they may not require SMEs to 
acquire more IPRs so that they may take the valuable IPRs back when the invested SMEs are 
bankrupt. For the SOEs practicing in the industries, they may be too traditional to be good at IP 
strategies, so they could not provide appropriate advice to the invested SMEs to effectively 
commercialize their utility patents and utility models.  
 
Implication 6: Local and private VCs could monitor and assist SMEs to transform utility patents 
and utility models to revenue, compared to the other SMEs not invested by the VCs, but the 
effectiveness of the monitor and assistance is limited. The overall revenue of the SMEs invested 
by the VCs shows that their market performance is worse than the other SMEs and bank loans 
are complementary for the SMEs to improve their patenting propensity. However, the SMEs 
invested by the VCs in average have stronger capabilities of R&D commercialization than the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  718	   State	  Development	  &	  Investment	  Corp.,	  “SDIC	  Introduction,”	  accessed	  March	  20,	  2016,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.sdic.com.cn/en/about/sidcint/A020101index_1.htm.	  719	   Guoguang	  Wu	  and	  Helen	  Lansdowne,	  eds.,	  China’s	  Transition	  From	  Communism-­‐New	  Perspectives,	  2016.	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other SMEs. 
 
Among the 642 observations for the 136 SMEs across five years, 160 observations are 
invested by SOE investors, (taking 21.18% of the total observations), and 70.62% of them, 113 
observations, are invested by local and private VCs simultaneously.  
In total, 385 observations are invested by local and private VCs, and t-test for their revenue 
and the revenue of the group of SMEs not invested by the VCs does not yield a statistical 
significant result. However, when model 3 in Table 4.6 to predict revenue holds R&D intensity, 
issued utility patents, issued utility models, SOEs’ share ratio, VC and institutional investors’ 
share ratio, FDIs’ share ratio year, size and industry categories as fixed, the coefficient on the 
dummy variable of local and private VC-invested group of SMEs yields a statistically significant 
and negative result, suggesting that those VC invested SMEs on average acquire less revenue 
than the other SMEs across various industries. Since the coefficient on the dummy variable of 
the SMEs invested by local and private VCs is insignificant in model 2 with the group of 
Shanghai’s samples, the difference between local and private VC-invested SMEs and other 
SMEs’ revenue is insignificant among the Shanghai SMEs.  
One possibility is that local and private VCs cannot provide effective non-cash 
contributions, such as access to market or other resources, other than the capital that the SMEs 
need. In Table 4.7, even though model 7 and model 9 with overall data suggests that VC and 
institutional investors’ share ratio has a positive effect on improving revenue in a statistically 
significant degree, without an exogenous factor to control for the choice of institutional investors, 
it is hard to defend for the effectiveness of the non-cash contributions from local and private VCs 
because more institutional investors may enter the SMEs when its market performance is 
comparatively better than others.  
Another possibility is that local and private VCs invest in many SMEs in an immature stage 
of their development. Therefore, the average revenue of the local and private VC-invested SMEs 
is naturally lower than the other SMEs.  
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In order to explore how local and private VCs advice SMEs to improve their efficiency in 
commercializing R&D and IPs, the models in Table 4.7 control the two-way interaction terms 
between the involvement of local and private VCs and R&D intensity, issued utility patents or 
issued utility models. The coefficients on the local and private VC-invested SMEs’ R&D 
intensity and issued utility models, shown by model 7 and model 9 in Table 4.7, yield 
statistically significant and positive results, while the coefficients on the group of the local and 
private VC-invested SMEs yield statistically significant and negative results. Those estimation 
results suggest that when the local and private VC-invested SMEs have higher R&D intensity or 
acquire more utility models, the difference between their revenue and the revenue of the other 
SMEs not invested by local and private VCs in a negative degree can be moderated.  
When the R&D intensity of a local and private VC-invested SME increases by 18.14 units, 
it can reach the average revenue level of the SMEs not invested by the VCs. Alternatively, it can 
reach the average revenue level of those SMEs if it acquires roughly 20 more utility models in 
year.  
Unfortunately, these two thresholds are too high to be achieved by the SMEs. In the overall 
sample, over 97% of the observations can only acquire less than 19 utility models in total per 
year, and increasing utility models’ issuance may not be prolonged. Similarly, over 97% of the 
observations cannot reach the threshold of R&D intensity. Therefore, to moderate the negative 
effect of local and private VCs’ involvement on revenue, improving the number of issued utility 
models could be unrealistic. Overall, learning from the above analysis, I infer that local and 
private VCs may be able to monitor and assist SMEs to transform IPs to revenue, compared to 
the other SMEs, but the effectiveness of their monitor and assistance is limited.  
By contrast, improving R&D intensity could be an effective measure to improve the local 
and private VC-invested SMEs’ revenue. In model 1, model 4 and model 7 of Table 4.7, the 
coefficients on R&D intensity yield statistically significant and positive results, suggesting that 
innovation-intensive SMEs can acquire on average more revenue. Also, when the SMEs improve 
their R&D intensity, the estimations predict that they can acquire more revenue. Taking the 
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effect of the involvement of local and private VCs into account, when an SME increases one unit 
of R&D intensity, its revenue can increase ￥20.21 million RMB. The extent of the growth is 
almost one time more than the effect of R&D intensity on improving revenue of the SMEs not 
invested by local and private VCs. Therefore, it seems that the SMEs invested by local and 
private VCs on average have stronger capabilities of R&D commercialization. 
The capital of local and private VCs may not just come from private funds, but also is a 
pool involving government guide funds and funds from various levels of governments. Even 
though those VCs are not state-owned, they are tightly controlled by SOEs or governments. For 
example, Shenzhen Innovation Capital Investment Co., Ltd, investing in China Net Center, 
Beijing TRS Information Technology and Beijing Easpring Material Technology, is a private VC 
and makes investments with the capital from its parent company, which is Shenzhen Capital 
Group Co. LTD. (SCG).720 SCG is a state-owned VC and under the monitor of Shenzhen 
SASAC.721  
The fund managers in a VC like Innovation Capital Investment are not directly monitored 
by SASAC, which is the representative of the real investor of the funds, and they do not have the 
liabilities of working for the government as the SOEs’ employees. On the other hand, the pool 
has stable investments from their parent company, which is an SOE and also has stable 
investments from government. In a situation like this, the moral hazard issue could be more 
serious in investments made by it, compared to SOE investors. There are also other forms of 
cooperation with governments and investments with state assets. For example, there are local and 
private VCs like Zijiang Holdings starting cooperating with local governments and universities 
to manage their own funds and funds from the cooperators as incubators after their successful 
investment in Shanghai WellTech Automation, one of the sample SMEs.722 In the case of 
Shanghai WellTech Automation, Zijiang Holdings invested its own money and monitor the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  720	  “Shenzhen	  Capital	  Group	  Co.,	  Ltd,”	  accessed	  March	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.szvc.com.cn.	  721	   State-­‐Owned	  Assets	  Supervision	  and	  Administration	  Commission	  of	  the	  People’s	  Government	  of	  Shenzhen	  Municipality,	  “Shenzhen	  Shi	  Chuangxin	  Touzi	  Jiquan	  Youxian	  Gongsi(深圳市创新投资集团有限公司)[Shenzhen	  Innovation	  Investment	  Group	  Co.,	  Ltd.],”	   accessed	  March	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.szgzw.gov.cn/szgq/qygk/qyfc_7/.	  722	  “Chanye	  Buju(产业布局)[Layout	  of	  Industries],”	   accessed	  March	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.zijiang.com/indus_park.asp.	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investment by its own team, so the moral hazard could be smaller.  
Moreover, Winfast Holding, investing in Beijing BDStar Navigation, Ruitai Technology, 
Beijing Orient Landscape, Sanju Environmental Protection, Beijing Fuxing Xiaocheng 
Electronic Technology, GI Technologies, and Orient Landscape, only Beijing public SMEs, used 
to only make institutional investments, but transformed its business to make PE investments in 
some companies in a mature stage of their development.723 As a professional investment 
institution, it may have better view of selection of invested objects than governments or SOEs. 
Therefore, it is not surprising that the innovation-intensive SMEs invested by the local and 
private VCs like Winfast Holding could have a higher efficiency in commercializing R&D.  
Besides PE/VC investment, a main business of Winfast Holding is hedge fund,724 so there 
should be moral hazard existing in their businesses. However, regardless of moral hazard issues 
in a VC/PE like Winfast Holding, Zhongguan-Cun is still encouraging any forms of VCs, which 
invests in equities and may involve other types of investments as well.   
In 2011, there were 544 VC investments in Zhongguan-Cun, in amount of ￥35.5 billion 
RMB, which were taken roughly one-third of the whole cases of VC investment in China.725 The 
Administration Office of Zhongguan-Cun provides guide fund and corporates with local and 
private VCs to encourage the VCs to invest, or subsidizes 10% for their investment in the 
technical companies founded less than five years. However, the government does not request the 
quality of investment or monitor of R&D and IP activities in the invested companies for the 
subsidies.  
While the coefficient on the issued utility patents acquired by Beijing SMEs invested by 
local and private VCs yields a statistically significant and positive result, shown by model 2 in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  723	   Wei	  Li	  (李巍),	  “Ruihua	  Touzi	  Zhang	  Jianbian:	  Yige	  Gushi	  Gaoshou	  De	  Huali	  Zhuanshen(瑞华投资张建斌：一个故事高
手的华丽转身)[Ruihua	  Investment	  Zhang	  Jianbin:	  A	  Gorgeous	  Turn	  Around	  by	  A	  Master	  in	  the	  Stock	  Market],”	   China	  
Stock	  Paper,	  August	  26,	  2013,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://finance.sina.com.cn/money/smjj/20130826/025016556905.shtml.	  724	  “Winfast	  Holding,”	  accessed	  March	  20,	  2016,	  http://www.jiangsuruihua.com/dcjj.php.	  725	   Fuli	  Song	  (宋馥李),	  “Baogao:	  Zhongguan	  Cun	  Chuangtou	  Jigou	  100	  Duojia,	  Guanli	  Zijin	  Chao	  200	  Yi	  Meiyuan(报告：
中关村创投机构 100多家，管理资金超 200亿美元)[Report:	  There	  Are	  More	  Than	  100	  VC	  Institutions	  in	  Zhongguan-­‐Cun,	  Managing	  Capital	  over	  $0.2	  Billion],”	   Jingji	  Guancha	  Wang(经济观察网)[Economic	  Observation	  Web],	  2012,	  accessed	  June	  21,	  2016,	  http://www.eeo.com.cn/2012/0316/222793.shtml.	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Table 4.7, in order to acquire higher revenue than the average revenue of the other SMEs not 
invested by the VCs, the estimation suggests that an SMEs should acquire at least 7 utility 
patents in a year. This threshold is too high to be met by over 95% of the Beijing SMEs. 
Therefore, based on the estimation result, it is hardly to conclude that the local and private VCs 
can effectively monitor and assist the Beijing SMEs to improve their utility patents’ 
commercialization.  
Meanwhile, in the models to predict propensity on utility patents, shown by Table 4.3, the 
coefficients of the involvement of local and private VCs are not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the SMEs invested by local and private VCs on average do not file more utility 
patents than the other SMEs in a statistically significant degree. Despite the coefficient on utility 
models in model 6 to predict the propensity of SMEs with the overall data yields statistically 
significant and positive result, the estimation result may not be explained as that the local and 
private VC-invested SMEs on average file more utility model applications and the other SMEs.  
In model 6, the coefficient on filed utility patent applications yields a statistically significant 
and positive result, suggesting that the propensity on utility models and on utility patents should 
be consistent. However, the consistency of the significance of the effect of the involvement of 
local and private VC-invested VCs on improving the filings of the two types of patents by the 
SMEs is not shown in those estimation results.  
There could be another possibility. Local and private VCs may realize that SMEs do not 
have enough capabilities on managing patents, especially utility patents. Both the application 
cost and maintenance cost of utility patents are higher than utility models. Therefore, they may 
induce their invested SMEs to file more utility models rather than utility patents. However, this 
explanation would be very weak because the statistical significance is in the 90% degree 
(p-value<0.1), which is a weak significance. Meanwhile, in model 6, the coefficient on VC and 
institutional investors’ share ratio yields a statistically significant and negative result, suggesting 
that when there are more VCs and institutional investors controling an SME, the SME files less 
utility model applications. It seems that VCs value utility models, but may not effectively induce 
	   231	  
them to file more utility model applications.  
Compared to the effect of local and private VCs on the propensity of SMEs on utility 
patents and utility models, the coefficients on the group of SMEs acquiring either long-term 
loans or short-term loans yield statistically significant and positive results, shown by model 5 
and model 6. Those estimated results suggest that in order to improve the propensity of local and 
private VC-invested SMEs either on utility patents or on utility models, bank loans are 
supplementary with equity financing for them.  
Moreover, it seems that if SMEs lack patenting propensity or the ability of patent 
commercialization, local and private VCs do not effectively assist them to improve those. 
However, the local and private VC-invested SMEs in average do have stronger capabilities of 
R&D commercialization. In order to improve their commercialization of IP, the governments 
may add some pre-conditions for acquiring government guide funds and the subsidies. Then, the 
government/SOE-cooperated funds and subsidized funds could be motivated to improve their 
knowledge and skills on patent and patent commercialization.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 
China is establishing its financial market through state-owned banks and encouraging the 
development of a “multi-layer capital market system.”726 As the empirical evidence shows, in 
practice, long-term loans and short-term loans, rather than private equity or venture capital 
investment, are actively used by SMEs in the process of improving their revenue and net profit 
with utility patents. Other than loan interests, it is important for the government to fill the gap 
between SMEs and long-term loans.  
In the Chinese financial market, this empirical study shows that the association of the 
patenting propensity of the SMEs with bank loans is stronger than its association with private 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  726	   Lu,	  Tan,	  and	  Chen,	  “Venture	  Capital	  and	  the	  Law	  in	  China,”	  254.	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equity financing. Among various types of venture capital investors, the SMEs invested by SOE 
investors on average generate revenue in a higher degree than the other SMEs. Those SMEs’ 
excellent market performance suggests that the SOEs still play a pivotal role in the development 
of the economy in China. Therefore, when the Chinese government is promoting “mass 
entrepreneurship and innovation,” this point should not be disregarded. However, in those 
SOE-invested SMEs, my empirical evidence also shows that the association between R&D 
intensity and revenue is negative.  
Compared to the relatively stronger immediate R&D commercialization capabilities by the 
SMEs invested by the local and private VCs, the equity investment contains much direct 
government investment, which brings inevitable moral hazard issues in the VC market. The 
further studies can explore how those moral hazard issues could be relieved to bolster the 
development of the VC market in China. It is also valuable to survey around the SMEs to 
understand the internal mechanisms by which FDI investors, SOE investors and local and private 
VCs induce patenting and patent commercialization by the portfolio SMEs.  
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VII. Tables 
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